THE RETURN OF
CULTURE AND
IDENTITY IN
IR THEORY

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*Critical Perspectives
on World Politics*

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R. B. J. Walker, Series Editor

The Return of
Culture and Identity
in IR Theory

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PART 1

INTRODUCTION

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Culture's Ship:
Returns and Departures in
International Relations Theory

Yosef Lapid

> Culture's ship has finally come in, and the time is ripe for an inventory of its cargo.
>
> —*R. J. Jepperson and A. Swidler* (1994:359)

Culture and identity are staging a dramatic comeback in social theory and practice at the end of the twentieth century. The trend has not passed unnoticed by some concerned anthropologists who have moved to "recapture" their classical stock-in-trade "imperialized by other disciplines" (Fox, 1991:13). The interdisciplinary contest for these concepts is in full swing, however, and the participants seem genuinely convinced that the stakes are far from negligible (Bremer, 1990).

In view of the fact that culture and identity have failed to figure prominently in international relations' most recent "debate" (Millennium, 1993:375), it is somewhat surprising to find IR scholars among the highly interested parties in the outcome of the above controversy. A swing of the pendulum toward culture and identity is, however, strikingly evident in post–Cold War IR theorizing. The trend cuts across familiar disciplinary divisions and includes both mainstream orthodoxies and newly established critical voices (Linklater, 1994). Political realists—who, under the impact of their Waltzian move to neorealism have harshly marginalized culture and identity—are cautiously partaking in this trend (see, Chap. 6 in this volume).[1] Similarly, following a period of hostile indifference to "ideational explanations" the time for "ideas" seems to have come around once again in International Political Economy (Jacobsen, 1995:283). And foreign policy analysts, who have been long content to treat culture as "an explanation of last resort," seem now determined "to move forward in the study of cultural effects in foreign policy" (Hudson, 1995:2).

With their prime interest in explaining the "sociality" of states, liberal and neoliberal approaches have become increasingly attentive to the consti-

tutive role of culture and identity in world affairs (Caporaso, 1992; Zacher and Matthew, 1995). This tendency is well captured by recent mappings of IR disciplinary trends—such as Alker's "humanistic" (1992) and Kegley's "neoidealist" (1993) "moments"—and it involves European as well as North American approaches (Hurell, 1993). Finally, whereas most mainstream perspectives have only recently and reluctantly begun to acknowledge the significance of culture and identity, reflectivist/constructivist/postpositivist/postmodernist/poststructuralist and feminist challengers have derived much of their energy from a sustained interest in precisely these factors. The sense of a deepening reorientation toward culture and identity thus gains massive support as we turn our attention to the critical margins of the IR discipline (Darby and Paolini, 1994:384).

One need not venture far in search of plausible explanations for this cross-paradigmatic surge of interest in culture and identity in the IR domain. Two sets of dramatic transitions—one in the realm of the global situation, the other in the realm of IR scholarship—have interacted to effect this welcome trend. Starting with the former, the global eruption of separatist nationalism set in motion by the abrupt ending of the Cold War has directly and inescapably forced the IR scholarly community to rethink the theoretical status of culture and identity in world affairs.[2] On a larger scale, however, the IR discipline seems to be responding also to a broader perception that "a new, somehow profoundly globalized, era is being born" (Buell, 1994:2). Arguably, at a moment of deep epochal turbulence (Rosenau, 1990b) when the global order seems to be transforming itself culturally even faster than it is changing geopolitically or economically, it is neither surprising nor improper that the IR discipline should similarly reconfigure its theoretical and empirical gaze.

However, in and of themselves, reality-based explanations do not offer a full account for the rising centrality of culture and identity in contending IR discourses. The trend toward expanding levels of ethnic conflict was, for instance, solidly established by the late 1960s (Gurr, 1994:15). That it took the IR profession two full decades to recognize this trend has little to do with the reality, and much to do with what went on at the time in the IR scholarly domain (Moynihan, 1993).[3] We must therefore supplement our reality-based explanation with a line of reasoning that pays proper attention to IR's slowly changing social scientific sensibilities.

In addition to marking the end of the Cold War and the possible transition to a new epoch of globalization, recent years have also witnessed a burst of critical scrutiny in the IR discipline (Lapid, 1989). Without bringing dominant orthodoxies to their knees, a multitude of partially convergent critical challenges has nonetheless instituted greater intellectual and sociological flexibility in IR scholarship (Sjolander and Cox, 1994:5). The return of culture and identity is, in my view, part and parcel of this "moment of robust intellectual openness" in the IR domain (Latham, 1994:8).

This volume will explore ways in which an enriched understanding of the concepts of culture and identity may contribute to a better comprehension of contemporary global dynamics. The underlying rationale suggests that the rising centrality of the two terms under consideration might also yield a profoundly revitalized IR theoretical enterprise. To further elucidate this rationale, the ensuing analysis proceeds in the following sequence. First, I situate the "return" of culture and identity in the context of recent "moves" in IR theorizing. Second, I offer terminological clarifications concerning recent paradigmatic transformations in received notions of culture and identity. Next, I explicate the theoretical growth strategy that informs the particular cut into the material adopted by this collection. Finally, I explain the organization of the volume and relate each contribution to the broader context of "the whole." It bears mentioning, however, that in developing this rationale I am presenting personal views that are largely, but by no means fully, shared by the coeditor of this volume. To a lesser extent, the preparatory overview presented in this introduction is shared by all the participants in this joint project.

ON THE MOVE:
"TURNS" AND "RETURNS" IN IR THEORIZING

Those interested in new disciplinary directions in these times of political and intellectual uncertainty cannot be oblivious to the manner in which advocated theoretical advances are presented to the IR scholarly community. In recent years, "movings," "turnings," and "postings" have been popular on the strength of their dynamic and forward-looking connotations. By comparison, "returns" seem passive and risk triggering images of nostalgic detours driven by nothing better than "selective amnesia" (see Kratochwil in the Chap. 11). Against this background, it is remarkable that in the subtle struggle of the prefixes, the "re-" (as in rethinking, reclaiming, reorienting, returning, and so on) has lately been scoring some impressive victories over the "post-" (as in postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and so on). This apparent change of fortunes is, in my view, part of a serious reconsideration of the "re-" moment in the very idea of social (re)search. More controversially, this reconsideration extends to the badly misunderstood, and needlessly maligned, role of *meta*-analysis (that is, "second order" inquiry) in a well-managed social scientific enterprise (see Chap. 6).

Be that as it may, with respect to culture and identity there is no alternative to using a "return" type of depiction. For, in terms of our organizing metaphor, this is clearly not the first time that the ship of culture is coming into IR's theoretical line of vision. As in other social sciences, from the 1940s to the 1960s culture played a meaningful part in IR theory and research (Alexander and Smith, 1993:151). And even in the period that fol-

lowed, when the ship of culture was forcefully expelled back into the open seas, some of its "cargo" has continued to prosper, unnoticed by hostile disciplinary headquarters. There is, in short, little to gain and much to lose by mistaking the return for a "revolutionary move" in IR scholarship. In addition to setting the historical record straight, the "return" idea serves as a timely reminder that even as the ship of culture is again within reach, there are important disciplinary assets on shore that deserve to be rediscovered, redeemed, and reintegrated in the IR theoretical enterprise.

But "if questions of culture and identity have been always part and parcel of our analysis of the social world" (see Kratochwil, Chap. 11), what reasons do we have, if any, to believe that we are facing here a potentially productive encounter rather than a random move in a pendulum cycle of seemingly eternal returns? To answer this question we note that, in approaching a new meeting point, neither culture and identity nor IR theory are necessarily the same. And to the extent that it is destined to materialize under substantially transformed conditions, the theoretical growth potential entailed in the current rendezvous may not be accurately prefigured in previous encounters.

"In beginning reflective thought about the nature of the world," says John Shotter, "we have a choice: either to think of it as based in invariances (fixed things) and to treat change as problematic, or, to think of it as in flux (as consisting in activities) and to treat the attainment of stability as a problem" (1994:74). For too long the IR theoretical enterprise has ignored this choice, investing itself almost exclusively in the former possibility. However, at an epochal juncture vividly described by Strobe Talbot (1995:9) as "Westphalia and Versailles run amuck," IR's exclusive bet on stability and continuity may require serious rethinking. For if the game of international politics is not simply an automatic repetition of inherited forms—and if, moreover, the attainment of the stability of "forms" is the very thing that most requires explanation in present-day international relations—a reversal of the bet or, at least a dual-track betting strategy may seem urgently advisable (Cox, 1992). In the following section, I will relate this orienting insight to our changing understanding of culture and identity. The section thereafter will extend this idea to the realm of IR theorizing after the Cold War.

INTO THE DEFINITIONAL FRAY:
FINE-TUNING CULTURE AND IDENTITY

So far, culture and identity have been treated as if their core meaning and relationship were self-evident and nonproblematic. Such is hardly the case. Even those impressed with the theoretical promise of these concepts invariably warn that both are "suspect" in some rather basic sense

(Jepperson and Swidler, 1994:360; Handler, 1994:27).[4] To that extent, some definitional fine-tuning will bring our argument into sharper focus.

So defined, however, our task is neither to venture deeply into the conceptual morass that continues to bog down both terms under consideration nor to totally sidestep this morass by legislating clearly delimited "operational definitions." For the problem is not the absence, but the oversupply, of *potentially rewarding* definitions. The challenge, in other words, is not to push energetically to some consensual but arbitrary reduction, but to reflectively match suitable definitional assets to declared theoretical missions.

With these orienting ideas in mind, let us begin by noting that the core meanings of culture and identity have undergone in recent years a series of largely parallel redefinitions. The intention has been to render both concepts more highly compatible with emerging pluralities and fluid instabilities that have rendered traditional understandings largely untenable. Anticipating key concerns in our next section, let us also note that whereas these novel understandings can indeed offer some promising remedies to IR's growing difficulties with an increasingly fluid, hybrid, and polyethnic world, traditional depictions can only camouflage and further aggravate the problem.

As astutely pointed out by George and Louise Spindler (in their foreword to Thomas Fitzgerald's *Metaphors of Identity*, p. ix), *the perception of multiplicity* and the *pervasive theme of construction* are the two central motifs dominating the current rethinking of culture and identity in social theory. Under the impact of these motifs, new approaches tend to highlight hitherto ignored or denied dimensions of culture and identity such as their socially constructed (as opposed to primordially given) nature; their optional (as opposed to deterministic) dimensions; their fragmenting/diversifying (as opposed to integrating/homogenizing) implications; and their multidimensional/dynamic (as opposed to unidimensional/static) features.

The current rethinking recasts culture from a reified singular concept into a more nuanced and finely tuned semantic field (Jepperson and Swidler, 1994). It rejects "congruent cultural wholeness" superstitions (Herbert, 1991:3) and "Leibnizian monad" imageries (Fleischacker, 1994:122), which tend to elaborate culture in terms of boundedness, homogeneity, and natural immutability. And it encourages skepticism toward omnibus depictions of culture as a "way of life," an "unmoved mover" a "super-ordinate organizer" (Van de Vijver and Hutschemaeker 1990:5), or of social action.

With respect to *identity* the rethinking follows a similar pattern. The conjoint themes of "multiplicity" and "social construction" are used to problematize a dominant ontology and epistemology of stability and continuity that have hitherto informed depictions of individual and collective identity. As pointed out by Richard Handler, for more than two hundred years dominant Western discourses have depicted groups as bounded objects in the natural world. By contrast, "in current scholarly analyses of collective identi-

ties, there is a tension between the notion that identity is essential, fundamental, unitary, and unchanging, and the notion that identities are constructed and reconstructed through historical action" (1994:29).

Embracing the idea that cultures and identities are emergent and constructed (rather than fixed and natural), contested and polymorphic (rather than unitary and singular), and interactive and process-like (rather than static and essence-like), can lead to pathbreaking theoretical advances (Somers, 1994). Such insights raise the possibility that our intuitive notion of fully formed, stable actors, producing and reproducing a predictably stable and invariant world, may be seriously misleading. They also encourage greater sensitivity to heterogeneity and contradictions in all cultural systems (Wolf, 1994:7). Collectivities, we need to remember, come in many varieties; simply relabeling them as "identities" or "selves" (rather than as states, ethnicities, nations, civilizations, and so on) is, at best, a promising point of departure, but hardly an acceptable point of arrival in our uphill struggle against reification in social inquiry (ibid.:7).

To reiterate, the point of this definitional excursus is to highlight the risks involved in implementing an IR theory move toward culture and identity without a corresponding move away from categorical, essentialist, and unitary understandings of these concepts. That this is not an idle concern is indicated, for instance, by the fact that Samuel Huntington's influential "clash of civilizations" thesis represents precisely such a disabling combination of moves. As noted by some of his critics (Rubenstein and Crocker, 1993:115; Shapiro, 1994:495), Huntington superficially disengages political realism from its notorious statecentrism, only to recreate in his next move a reified world of pregiven cultural agents with inherently conflicting interests (that is, civilizations). Far from being the rare exception, Huntington's failure simply confirms that "reification is an epistemological problem not easily vanquished, for it pervades the rhetorical and conceptual apparatus of our scientific world-view" (Handler, 1994: 27).[5]

So far, our fine-tuning operation has focused on parallel transformations in our core understanding of culture and identity. Fused as they are, however, by both history and current social practices (Cohen, 1993), culture and identity are not isomorphic. Although cultures typically provide symbolic materials needed to delineate identity groups, identity groups do not always constitute separate cultures (Fitzgerald, 1993:190). And by the same token, cultures may change "while identities frequently persist, precisely because each fulfills different important functions for the individual or society" (ibid.:194).

If they are not simply predicated on each other, what is the nature of the culture–identity linkage? Volumes have been written on this question without yielding a definitive answer (Edwards, 1994). Whereas some attempted resolutions prioritize the construct of culture, others remain closer to identity (Fitzgerald, 1993:xi).[6] Thomas Fitzgerald, for instance, treats culture "as

the 'frame' in which people derive a sense of who they are, how they should act, and where they are going" but grants identity an "executive role" as "fundamentally the problem-solving tool for coping in particular environments." Identity thus becomes "the action unit of culture" (ibid.:186).[7]

From the standpoint of this volume, there is no need to reduce the culture–identity linkage to a single invariant formula. The more promising move at this point is to highlight the complexities of the culture–identity linkage, and show how both concepts map in interesting ways into ongoing IR controversies, such as the structure–agent or anarchy–hierarchy debates. This observation takes us directly to the next section in our rationale.

HARNESSING THE RETURN: RECONCILING THE "CULTURAL" AND THE "SCIENTIFIC" IN IR THEORY

So how do we move from here to the land of better knowledge on international relations? At first blush, those who have managed to keep intact their belief in a single, highly standardized, easily accessible implement for the fast assembly of certified knowledge (the "scientific method"), seem best qualified to chart the course. Their prescribed course of action would most likely include the following points: In the past, we've had our doubts that it is possible to engage the cultural without losing—or badly compromising—the scientific. We realize now that problems of measurement in the study of culture are every bit as tractable as comparable problems in the study of economics and geopolitics. The priority is to move quickly from metaphysical affirmations that culture and identity matter to empirical demonstrations of "*how* they matter, and how their effects can be systematically studied by social scientists" (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:6). Two imperatives will stand out in particular: First, keep a safe distance from the "purgatory" (ibid.:26) of second-order (that is, metatheoretical) analysis; second, converge swiftly on a single type of scholarly operation, namely the formal articulation and the empirical testing of causal hypotheses relating culture/identity/ideas to behavioral outcomes.

The need for a sound empirical dimension in a working research program cannot be denied. However, neither the exclusive validity of a positivist/empiricist/behavioralist shortcut to reconciling culture and science in international relations nor the irrelevance of metatheoretical reflection to such an effort seems to necessarily follow. In IR, as elsewhere, a successful blending of culture and science requires a clear understanding of the historical context and the scholarly practices that have rendered them incompatible in the first place. And surely at a historical and intellectual moment when both culture and science are in a state of flux, adopting a strict metatheory-avoidance strategy toward their reconciliation virtually secures deep ontological and epistemological misunderstandings.[8]

Three considerations in particular seem to caution against a premature settling into a first order/positivist/empiricist mold. First, such an approach leads to a "variable-centered model," which has been vigorously challenged in recent years (Abbott, 1992:435). Second, our past experience with the "variable approach," as applied to culture and identity, has been profoundly disappointing.[9] And third, since the positivist/empiricist hegemony is itself frequently invoked as a prime culprit in explaining the marginalization of culture and identity (Misra and Gergen, 1993: 225), one may question the prudence of entrusting the current culture–science reconciliation project to this very approach.

Indeed, as a prelude to rewarding empirical work we will need a clearer understanding of what types of knowledge problems IR scholars can realistically hope to better solve by harnessing culture and identity to their stalled knowledge-seeking enterprise. In the reminder of this section, I will briefly profile three such problems. With respect to all three, my argument anticipates significant advances following a well-managed culture–science reintegration effort in IR theory.

It is, I believe, both ironic and evident that IR scholars are now vigorously reclaiming culture and identity in response to their mounting difficulties with exponential increases in global heterogeneity and diversity. It is ironic because, as an "inter-" type discipline long dominated by political realism, the IR field should have been doubly well prepared to deal with issues of diversity. Instead, recent events have rendered apparent IR's inability to encompass vastly accelerated and co-occurring dynamics of integration and disintegration at both sub- and supra-state levels. It seems as if IR's fascination with sovereign statehood has greatly decreased its ability to confront complex issues of ethnic nationhood and political otherhood. As a result, the IR theoretical enterprise must now reorient itself to a dynamic pluralism conceived at a new level of complexity and fluidity.

Bringing into focus the intricate texture of a reconstituted global ontology will not be an easy task (see Chap. 6). But to the extent that IR theorists have turned to culture and identity to better encompass, describe, and explain novel issues of global diversity, they may be pursuing a task that can be done. Critical in this context is the emphasis on *multiplicity,* which, as noted, is one of the formative themes that shape the current rethinking of culture and identity in social theory.

Moving to the second set of knowledge problems to which the return to culture and identity may offer interesting solutions, we come to the issue of *reification* and the need to revisit the relationship between nature and convention in IR scholarship (Parmentier, 1994:175). In a context of unprecedented fluidity, IR scholars continue to be more concerned with predictability and manipulability than with the recurrent magic of reification by which we turn our words into fixed and immutable objects (see Kratochwil, Chap. 11). There is no general sense of puzzlement that, in a world of flux, our

scholarship is focused primarily on entities rather than on processes and on nouns rather than on verbs.

Like colleagues from other fields, IR scholars are bound to ask, however, how can we focus on moves when all we have is nouns with which to work? (Dervin, 1993:51). The current concern with culture and identity should facilitate greater IR reflexivity on this distorted noun to verb ratio problem. Condensing issues of considerable complexity, I submit that culture and identity offer unmatched opportunities to sensitize the IR scholarly community to the research implications of the social construction of reality (which, as noted, is the second formative theme in recent scholarly contributions).

Finally, intellectual isolation and parochialism is the third knowledge problem that may be eliminated or significantly reduced by the current return to culture and identity in IR theory. To be sure, the situation in this respect has been vastly improved in recent years (Linklater, 1994:119). The refreshing absence, in the case of the "return" under consideration, of the customary time lag in IR's perennial catch-up game, is itself a telling testimony in this respect. Be that as it may, it is clear that culture and identity cry out for massive collaborative cross-fertilization. Their pursuit is therefore likely to stimulate an even fuller integration of international studies with exciting new fields of inquiry in social theory.

ORGANIZATION AND PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Partaking in a multidisciplinary effort to denaturalize our thinking on culture and identity, this volume sets out to enliven the scholarly debate on these issues in international relations. Our approach recognizes that there is "no one methodology for cultural studies" (Jepperson and Swidler, 1994:368). With respect to culture and identity we are also more impressed, at this stage, by the risks and costs of ignoring the vibrant diversity of perspectives (Hermann and Woyach, 1994) than by the mere absence of an imposing body of testable hypotheses.

With no pretense to all-inclusive representation, the variety of perspectives included in this volume reflects IR's status as a "divided discipline" with multiple theoretical inlets. While hardly exhausting the long list of queries that might be raised about culture and identity in international relations, the following contributions touch on fundamental issues that must be faced in a credible effort to advance our knowledge in this increasingly vital area of scholarship. Critical as they are of IR's recent record on culture and identity, their emphasis is not on the outright rejection of "mainstream" positions. To the contrary, most of our authors take established achievements seriously, even as they challenge them to rethink, refine, and reconstitute theoretical and empirical research programs. And in most cases,

criticism is followed by substantive efforts to chart new research directions.

The volume is divided into four parts. Following the introduction, (Chap. 1), is a historical context for thinking about culture and identity in international relations (Chap. 2). Part 2 focuses on critical engagements with neorealism. It includes contributions (Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6) dealing, in different ways, with the emerging effort "to culture" IR's still-dominant tradition. Part three, shifts the attention to culture and identity in perspectives other than realism. Included are chapters on environmentalism (Chap. 7), feminism (Chap. 8), postmodernism (Chap. 9), and normative theory (Chap. 10). Finally, part 4 offers a concluding overview of the entire volume (Chap. 11).

Preview of Chapters

In a volume predicated on the importance of culture and identity, the second chapter, by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, has a lot to offer. The authors start with a simple conviction: When science fails to measure up to reality, it is time to modify science. As far as Ferguson and Mansbach are concerned, in the aftermath of the Cold War IR theory represents failed science. If so, the critical question is not whether, but with what, to replace this defeated body of knowledge. Engaging this question brings the authors face to face with the key dilemma in any empirical work namely, "what to look at and by inference, what can be safely ignored."

It is with their stand on this dilemma that Ferguson and Mansbach join this return of culture and identity project. For their answer stipulates that "contests for loyalty and the changes in affiliation that they produce are the stuff of history." Whatever else they may chose to sacrifice on the altar of parsimony, IR theorists cannot hope to both ignore the manner in which "old political affiliations evolve or die and new ones emerge" and keep theory adequate to the realities of political practice. And yet ignoring such "stuff" is precisely what IR theorists did in recent years, with predictably disastrous results.

The purpose of Chapter 2 is both to explicate the origins of the problem and to offer some applicable solutions. With respect to the former, the difficulty is traced back to the deficiencies of statecentric theorizing and to the obdurate grip of the Westphalian model on the political and scientific imagination of most IR theorists. With respect to the latter, IR theorists are invited "to conceive of global politics as involving a world of 'polities' rather than states and focus on the interrelationships among authority, identity, and ideology." The coauthors demonstrate the rewards of such a theoretical refocusing in six carefully selected case studies that should render the continued subscription to a symmetrical world of Westphalian "like-units" rather difficult to maintain. One suspects that putting forward an empirically based

argument that "the real world of politics has always been one of layered, overlapping, and interacting polities" is a main ambition of this chapter. Needless to say, when many observers regard the flux in identities, loyalties, and beliefs we are currently experiencing as somehow unique and unprecedented, a historical reminder that "this sort of thing has happened many times before" is of considerable importance.

In terms of abstract conceptual and analytic baggage, Ferguson and Mansbach prefer to travel light in this particular set of historical case studies. They are, however, warmly sympathetic to a quick return of culture's ship to the pluralistic theoretical inlet with which they have long been affiliated. To be sure, they are particularly interested in those parts of the "cargo" that lend themselves to productive applications to polities other than nation-states. In this, Ferguson and Mansbach find themselves in solid agreement with many other participants in this volume, but not with Alex Wendt, whose contribution is next.

In the third chapter, Alex Wendt follows a highly refined discursive strategy that blends interpretative understanding with causal explanation, first-order analysis with second-order elucidation, and theoretical continuity with deep theoretical reconstruction. Wendt situates himself squarely within the reflectivist camp to develop a new theoretical synthesis labeled "structural idealism." This position is guardedly "idealistic" because of its emphasis on intersubjective (or cultural) rather than material factors; it is "structural" because the intention is to theorize collective identity formation at the systemic, as opposed to the unit, level. Since prime attention is given to socially constructed "meanings," his "constructivist" approach seems consistent with interpretivism; however, since reference is also made "to causal mechanisms that . . . promote collective state identities" it is also favorably predisposed toward causal explanation. Insofar as Wendt pursues substantive interests in the structural transformation of the Westphalian system, his inquiry is unmistakably of the "first order" type; however, insofar as this substantive interest is sustained by a meticulous elucidation of related epistemological and ontological issues, it is also "second order" in a deep metatheoretical sense.

Finally, as long as Wendt keeps his entire project within the "anarchy problématique" he maintains theoretical continuity with neorealism and other mainstream positions; however, as soon as he prioritizes intersubjective structures over material structures, in the neorealist "hardcore," his project becomes theoretically reconstructive in a profound, as opposed to a cosmetic manner. With reference to the return project pursued in this volume, Wendt identifies materialism and rationalism—rather than realism and statism—as the main leakage points through which culture, identity, and "meaning" are constantly drained out of the IR theoretical corpus. Culture and identity are central to his effort to plug these leaks and restore vigor to this troubled scholarly enterprise. In terms of our maritime metaphor,

Wendt's chapter is testimony to the fact that the unloading and the inventorying of culture's ship's "cargo" is already in full swing, at least at the particular pier called "constructivism."

In the fourth chapter, Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney join the quest for an IR approach that is "amenable to the theoretical return of culture and identity." In so doing, they also situate Wendt's argument in a more critical context. While sympathetic to Wendt's general project, these coauthors insist that the latter's critique does not extend far enough to render Waltz's seminal contribution—and, by extension, the IR theoretical enterprise itself—meaningful. The core problem, we are told, is Wendt's refusal to resolutely part with the "anarchy problématique." For, in the view of these coauthors, it is simply impossible to meaningfully culture IR theory without severing its biblical connection to the profoundly ahistorical and acultural "state of nature" fiction. Is there value, they implicitly wonder, in tinkering with putative leakages within the anarchy problématique (that is, materialism and/or rationalism), if the entire construct is so inherently and irreversibly incapable of retaining any culture, identity, or meaning-related content?

Whereas Wendt approaches the main deck on culture's ship looking for updated and well-established sociological tools (constructivism), Inayatullah and Blaney seek inspiration in a clandestine corner, where exotic implements for "the study of Otherness as a fundamental category of experience and reflection, and as an important perspective in the study of human thought, intercourse and culture" (Corbey and Leersen, 1991:viii) are secretively displayed. Here, they astutely acknowledge the relevance of "cultural encounters" (as developed by Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy) to the IR theory enterprise and harness this construct in a valiant effort to steer Wendt's work—and the entire return of culture and identity project—to a different—and in their view more promising—direction.

Let the reader make up his or her own mind as to the merits of this creative, if somewhat promiscuous, conjoining of Waltz, Wendt, Todorov, and Nandy. Three observations are in order, however. First, Inayatullah and Blaney identify the human urge to meaningfully "discover the other" as the deep motive for both individual and collective encounters. Second, while sustained by postmodern ideas, their incisive criticism of Waltz and Wendt explicitly rejects the notion of a quick dismissal of mainstream contributions. And finally, this chapter does much to clarify why the theme of cultural encounters, which has generated so much interest in other fields, also raises some central questions in international theorizing.

In the fifth chapter, Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic frontally challenges the members of the IR scholarly community—realists, rationalists, and "societalists" in general—to place their theoretical endeavors in "an explicitly cultural context." She insists that the sustained hesitation to move from implicit to explicit engagements with culture—a hesitation shared even by

scholars interested in international society and interstate sociality—has had a crippling effect on the IR theoretical enterprise. To rectify this problem, Chakrabarti Pasic engages in a bifocal effort designed "to bring both systems and culture back into international relations theory." Based on a balanced combination of critique and substantive suggestions for better theorizing, this chapter joins and broadens theoretical debates opened in the previous two chapters.

Chakrabarti Pasic goes beyond pleading for a reintroduction of the culture "variable" into IR theorizing. In her view, when "culture" and "system" are properly theorized, the very distinction between international and intercultural relations is rendered redundant. In fact, her case against both Wendt and Buzan rests partly on their putative readiness to sacrifice the complexity of culture on the altar of a narrow understanding of science.

Be that as it may, this author approaches culture's ship with a clear objective in mind. Justly suspecting that her object of interest may not be on current display, she goes straight to a lower deck, where the legacy left by "the cultural historians of the British School" (Spengler, Toynbee, and Wight) is accumulating dust in long-term storage. There she redeems the construct of "civilization," which, in her view, is singularly well suited to the task of (re)culturing the IR theoretical enterprise. Sensing, however, that in its present form her fresh acquisition is vulnerable on the science side, prior to returning to shore Chakrabarti Pasic arms herself with "historiography," "myths," (Lakoff and Johnson), and "imagined community" (Benedict Anderson) in the hope of removing this "softness."

Chakrabarti Pasic's ambitious project may well prove feasible. At a minimum, her contribution serves the important function of sheltering the construct of "civilization" from sensationalist abuses that, following Huntington's influential intervention, are back in fashion. For the time being, we are well advised to take her suggestions seriously but to defer judgment on whether civilizational clashes are "the biggest of all problems in world politics" (Bozeman, 1994:25). As wisely put by Irving Louis Horowitz: "It will be interesting to chart the degree to which this (civilizational analysis, Y. L.) offers better guidelines than the study of nations that dominated the cold war epoch" (1994:16).

Noting the dramatic rise of neorealist interest in issues related to contemporary nationalism, in the sixth chapter Kratochwil and I alert the IR scholarly community to important intellectual opportunities entailed in this long-deferred, but currently evolving, encounter. The chapter affirms the possibility and evaluates the prospects for a progressive identity-based problem shift in the neorealist research program. Such a theoretical and empirical refocusing should help neorealism touch base again with the subjective constitution of a tumultuous and rapidly self-transforming world order. Like our predecessors, we strive to maintain a productive balance between negative criticism and positive construction. And in both respects, we focus

attention on the role of metatheory in promoting disciplinary reconstructions such as the return of culture and identity project.

As to our interest in culture's ship, suffice it to say that the problem shift advocated in this chapter entails a massive and continuous infusion of culture and identity-related "cargo" into an IR theoretical enterprise starved for "meaning" (see Chap. 11). Kratochwil and I are, more specifically, on the lookout for intellectual tools (abundant in ethnic and cultural studies) that will facilitate a sharper grasp of the ethnonational category. We are particularly interested in the manner in which the IR debate on culture and identity in general, and on nationalism in particular, is conducted, and call attention to the merits of "second order" analysis in social theory (Ritzer, 1991).

The seventh chapter, by Daniel Deudney, serves as a reminder that if history, time, and context play an important role in the construction of viable collective identities, so do geography, space, and place. For the move from the individual "I" to the collective "we"—which, as Ferguson and Mansbach tell us, is the "stuff" of politics—involves an intricate blending of a "here-feeling" with a "we-feeling," both of which are indispensable in the construction of effective units of macrolevel loyalty and affiliation, such as the "national." Now, imperfect as our understanding of the "we-feeling" is, our comprehension of the "here-feeling" is, according to Deudney, even more defective. This chapter addresses this gap with a theoretical elucidation of the relationship between space, place, and national identity; an empirical observation of this relationship using American nationalism as a relevant case study; and a reasoned prediction that foresees the rise of earth identities as viable challengers to ethnic and state-based nationalisms.

An attempt to situate this chapter in the context of the entire volume yields interesting results. Deudney approaches the return-of-the-cultural project from the standpoint of another recent "return" in social theory, which seeks to resituate human nature in its biological, ecological, and/or geographical contexts. This other return has stimulated, in Deudney's words, "an explosion of political activity and theoretical revisionism." On the IR disciplinary shore, this theoretical revisionism has culminated in the provisional consolidation of a new theoretical presence known as the "environmental paradigm" or the "ecological world view" (Hughes, 1994).

As a resident of this new theoretical site, Deudney's interest in the return of culture project is driven by a dual insight. First, he senses that an entire dimension (the "here-feeling") may be missing from the study of national and other collective identities. Second, he does recognize that the ecological worldview shares with other IR perspectives a lack of interest in culture and identity. The convergence of these two insights shapes Deudney's interest in culture's ship. He is searching for new conceptual constructs such as "geopiety" (Wright) or "Topophilia" (Yi-Fu Tuan) that can access and elucidate the "here-dimension" of national and other collective identities. Regardless of whether he is right or wrong in his specific fore-

casts concerning "earth" and national identities, Deudney's contribution demonstrates the potential for a productive blending of the "cultural return" and the "ecological return" in the study of collective identities.

Ann Tickner's contribution, in Chapter 8, shows telling commonalities and revealing differences with Deudney's argument. Like Deudney, Tickner approaches the return-of-culture-and-identity project from the standpoint of a recently established and still struggling, theoretical presence—that is, IR feminism. However, unlike Deudney, as far as identity is concerned, Tickner has no reason to be apologetic. To the contrary, the reader is promptly and justly informed that "identity has been a central concern in contemporary feminist theory." And in view of the fact that "most contemporary feminist approaches take identity as a starting point for their theoretical constructions," Tickner casts her argument as an open invitation to all interested parties to seek inspiration on identity-related issues on "gender's boat."

Tickner's argument introduces the reader to feminist theorizations of identity in general, and to adaptations of these theories to problems concerning state identities and national identities that are central to international relations. Her analysis suggests that difficulties encountered by mainstream approaches to culture and identity are intimately related to the way in which these concepts are gendered. If so, paying more careful attention to the gendering problem may show the way not only to better IR theory but also to a more inclusive and less exploitative world. A close reading of Tickner's analysis indeed suggests that many, if not most, of the themes pursued by other contributors to this volume can benefit substantively from a gender-sensitized context. This is not to say, of course, that gender analysis and cultural analysis simply reduce to one another; it is to say, however, that they can be, and should be, combined in a scholarly productive manner (Kaplan, 1994:100).

David Campbell's contribution, in Chapter 9, is driven by a sense of opportunity following the collapse of Cold War cartography and the unraveling of realist hegemony in the IR discipline. The opportunity, as Campbell astutely points out, is nothing less than "the possibility to rethink the problematic of subjectivity in international politics." The author moves vigorously into this opening to "refigure the state," "re-imagine America," and reconsider "'balkanization' at home and abroad." On this basis, Campbell mounts a devastating ethicopolitical critique of American and Western policy toward the Balkan crisis. Based on a provocative reconceptualization of "identity" that inverts common-sense understandings of the state as existing prior to, and independent from, its "foreign policy," this analysis refreshingly highlights the intimate—but rarely acknowledged—relationship between co-occurring debates over "national interest," "multiculturalism," and "ethnic conflict" in the United States and abroad.

Campbell's themes and concerns are predicated on distinctly postmodern scholarly sensibilities. The analysis invokes the absence of bedrock cer-

tainties as a defining context, deepened by the recent demise of the Cold War system but also indicative of a postmodern condition. The postulated "deconstructibility" of polities in general, and of America in particular, is the centerpiece in Campbell's argument. It denotes a postmodern outlook that rejects—or at least, tries to go beyond—"foundations" and "essence-talk" and embraces an image of constant reversibility and permanent inter-action. Dismissing criticisms that depict postmodern understandings of identity and sociality as unethical and politically disabling, Campbell concludes with the "outrageous" notion "that without deconstruction there might be no question of ethics, identity, politics, or responsibility."

Situating Campbell's contribution requires a slight modification of our organizing metaphor. To refer to postmodernism as a new scholarly para-digm—involving boats, inlets, piers, and so on—would betray a lack of sen-sitivity to its antiessentialist/antifoundationalist spirit. To preempt such a violation and stay within the ambit of our maritime imagery, I will borrow Michael Dear's vivid depiction of postmodernism as a "tidal wave" hitting the social sciences "with predictable consequences" (1994:299). Campbell's chapter forcefully rides this tide and adds a refreshingly controversial voice to the return of culture and identity project in international relations. The productive manner in which this chapter interacts with other chapters in this volume confirms, however, that in international relations, as in other schol-arly domains, modernist and postmodernist efforts "can learn from each other and benefit from each other's insights (Sassower, 1993:443).

In Chapter 10, Friedrich Kratochwil engages the concept of citizenship "as a prism for investigating the problem of inclusion and exclusion that is fundamental to the problem of political order." In so doing, he opens an observational window onto the social practices that constitute "internal" and "external" domains of politics, inform collectivities of "who" they are, and mediate between thus individuated collectivities and "humanity" in general. The analysis identifies "participation" and "membership" as the two core components of citizenship and highlights the need to go beyond purely cog-nitive accounts of such phenomena. On the critical side, Kratochwil's con-ceptual analysis suggests a departure from established understandings of cit-izenship as an attribute of people or as a legal status. On the positive side, it endorses a historical and nonfoundational understanding of citizenship as an "instituted process."

The need to revisit citizenship in the post–Cold War era requires no fur-ther justification. That such a rethinking takes us deep into the domain of culture and identity is equally well established by this chapter. However, to situate it in this volume, it is helpful to note that Kratochwil's contribution is inspired by the "return of practical reason" (Alker, mimeo:1) and by the "resurgence of normative theory" (Smith, 1992) in international relations. His argument concerning citizenship echoes the pragmatist insistence that our concepts and theories must be connected to experience and practice

(Misak, 1994:123). While concurring with the need to abandon foundations and essence-talk (such as citizenship as a "thing"), Kratochwil also points out that postmodernism and deconstructionism are not the only, or necessarily the best, venues to pursue such objectives.[10] Equally instructive is his use of political theory—Humean philosophy in particular—as a corrective to theories that ignore "feelings" and other noncognitive dimensions of social reality. In this sense, the chapter reminds would-be visitors on culture's ship to pay careful attention to updated political theory and pragmatic philosophy exhibits.

In the concluding chapter, Kratochwil takes another look at some basic themes that surface from arguments presented in this book and delineates future directions for the return of culture and identity project. The theme of "return" is effectively juxtaposed with the notion of "intermittent episodes of 'amnesia'" to address the "question of fad." To bring culture and identity into focus as a promising research agenda, Kratochwil emphasizes the *constitutive nature* of the current preoccupation with culture and identity. And to explicate the implications of culture and identity as a new research program for world politics, he discusses them under the suggestive rubrics of "systems," "historicity," and "meaning." Engaging our organizing metaphor, Kratochwil leaves us, however, with the suggestion that by embarking on "culture's ship" the IR theoretical enterprise will remain "at sea" rather than return to a "safe harbor."

Regardless of whether it accents the tranquility of a safe harbor or the uncertainty of a stormy sea, the return of culture and identity project is part and parcel of those "great debates" that "are defining parts of the historicity of any scientific discipline . . . (and) are never 'over'" (Alker, mimeo:2). However, especially today, such debates need not be repetitive or redundant. For, as perceptively said by Clifford Geertz, "Learning to exist in a world quite different from that which formed you is the condition, these days, of pursuing research you can on balance believe in and write sentences you can more or less live with" (1995:101). We can only hope that ensuing addenda to IR's ongoing debate on culture and identity will be of the kind that Geertz has in mind.

NOTES

1. Indeed, even the notoriously orthodox subfield of security studies seems to be moving in a similar direction. For we are now reliably informed that in current security analysis, "the site of security has spread from state to nation, from sovereignty to identity" (Waever, 1994:1).

2. As astutely pointed out by Joane Nagel (1994:152), identity and culture "are fundamental to the central projects of ethnicity: the construction of boundaries and the production of meaning" (ibid.: 153). And boundaries are, in turn, central to international relations theories, which are well described as "theories of relations across borders" (Walker, 1992:18).

3. A materialist/rationalist/positivist regulative consensus continues to play an important, if weakened, role in this context. This consensus insists on: (a) the epiphenomenal role of "immaterial" (cultural/ideational/mental) forces; (b) the "nonproblematic" (fixed/given) nature of actors/identities/selves; and (c) the methodological resistance of culture and identity to "genuine" (positivist/empiricist) modes of scientific analysis. See Mearsheimer (1995) and Zartman (1993) for recent rearticulations of this far-from-defeated consensus. For a comprehensive critique, see Walker (1990b) and Wendt in this volume.

4. Anthony Cohen, for instance, portrays *identity* as "an awful portmanteau carrying all sorts of murky cargo" (1993:195). And James Clifford depicts *culture* as "a deeply compromised idea (he) cannot yet do without." See also Wolf 1994.

5. A similar problem is apparent in Barry Posen's recasting of "anarchy" and "security dilemma" in terms of ethnic groups. See Chapter 6. See also Chris Shore's (1993) excellent critique of the dominant models of culture and identity currently used by European Community officials.

6. See, for instance, Will Kymlicka's depiction of the "downplay" of culture as the root cause for the continuing misunderstanding of nationalism (1995:132).

7. Fitzgerald uses the following metaphor to depict the culture–identity linkage: Culture equals the map; identity equals the compass. Identity thus becomes the critical bridging concept mediating between culture and action (1993:186). This depiction leaves ample room for studying the culture–identity link as an interpretative enterprise in the Geertzian sense.

8. One such mistake is to conflate ontology, epistemology, and methodology and to assume that the interpretative makeup of the social world necessitates an "interpretative" methodology. See Jepperson and Swidler (1994:368).

9. See, in particular, W.J.M. Mackenzie's (1978) fascinating reconstruction of the "murder" of "political identity."

10. As pointed out by Seigfried: "The pragmatic appeal to experience has the same subversive intent as the poststructuralist appeal to the indeterminacy of the text. But it also allows and provides for something more, namely, a legitimate means of closure, albeit one that is always finite and particular and in principle revisable" (1992:151).

2

The Past as Prelude to the Future?
Identities and Loyalties
in Global Politics

—— *Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach* ——

Theory purports to tell us what to look at and, by inference, what can be safely ignored. By simplifying reality, theory helps us organize our beliefs about an ever-changing world and offers an intellectual foundation for policies. Bad theory almost inevitably means bad policies. Unfortunately, the failure to predict (or adequately to explain, even in retrospect) the end of the Cold War, adds powerfully to evidence from many other quarters that something is seriously wrong with our theories of global politics (Allan, 1992). International relations theorists have difficulty accounting for change,[1] particularly when it arises from massive shifts in loyalties from one set of authorities to another. The demise of the Soviet empire surprised statecentric theorists in part because their theories could not accommodate a revival of old identities. Such theories are equally useless when it comes to addressing mini-nationalisms, tribal violence in Africa, the globalization of business and finance, or criminal cartels.

Surely we must discard and replace theory that fails to shed light on issues that any reader of today's headlines knows are most important. But replace it with what? In our view, we should conceive of global politics as involving a world of "polities" rather than states and focus on the relationships among authority, identities, and ideology.[2] Central questions are: In particular times and places, who or what controls which persons with regard to which issues, and why? How and why do old political affiliations evolve or die and new ones emerge?[3]

Since political evolution and devolution presumably involve bedrock processes that are as old as political association itself, it is critical to escape our Eurocentric blinders and adopt the widest possible historical perspective. Our own response to this challenge has been to analyze six historical cases selected for temporal, cultural, and geographic diversity. The six cases are: (1) the world's first great civilization in Mesopotamia, which arose in the mid-third millennium BC and lasted until the Persian conquest in the sixth century BC; (2) the Greek world, from the Archaic period of eighth cen-

tury BC until its conquest by Macedonia in 338 BC; (3) Mesoamerica, from the emergence of Olmec culture about 1250–1150 BC until after the Spanish conquest; (4) China, from the early Chou era of about 1100 BC until the end of the Han era in AD 220; (5) the Islamic world, from AD 622 until the Mongol sack of Baghdad in the thirteenth century; and (6) Italy, from the decline of Rome in the fourth century AD until the Golden Age of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century.[4]

"POLITIES" RATHER THAN "STATES"

"Polities" in our definition are entities with a significant measure of institutionalization and hierarchy, identity, and capacity to mobilize persons for value satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation). We regard the sovereign territorial states that are associated with the Westphalian settlement of 1648 as only one type of polity. All but perhaps the very earliest "primitive" (pre)historical epochs have been characterized by layered, overlapping, and interacting polities—coexisting, cooperating, and/or conflicting. Indeed, a range of overlapping or embedded polity types may govern effectively, each within a specified (not necessarily exclusive) domain, over one or more issues. A polity's domain includes the persons who identify with it, the resources (including ideological resources) it has, and the issue(s) it affects. No polity is omnipotent, controlling all persons and resources with regard to all issues.

Although all polities have a territory of sorts—where the persons that identify with the polity are—that territory need not be clearly demarcated. A polity need not have a "center," though it is a disadvantage not to have one—or to have more than one, like the medieval papacy at one stage or the late Roman Empire. All our historical cases suggest the utility of the distinction made by Sahlins (1989:4) between "boundary" and "frontier." A boundary, like that of a Westphalian state, is a "precise linear division within a restrictive, political context"; a frontier "connotes more zonal qualities, and a broader, social context." The linear boundary typified the Westphalian polity with its territorial view of society, reinforced by the European principle of contract and Euclidean conceptions of space. The idea of a zonal frontier allows for overlapping "civilizations," with continuity regardless of changing linear boundaries. Nevertheless, just as there is a propensity among many international relations theorists to exaggerate the significance of Westphalian state boundaries, there is a tendency among them to ignore the extent to which many other polities do have well-defined boundaries.

Our cases reveal an enormous variety of polities. Those of the greatest significance in ancient *Mesopotamia* were cities, and loyalty to city consistently threatened to undermine empires. Once cities arose, many grew rapidly in size, population, and prosperity. Lagash, one of the largest Sumerian

cities, had 30,000–35,000 residents. By comparison, during the sixth century Babylon—which was the center of a much larger polity—alone had a population of 100,000. The Mesopotamian city was a genuine economic center, not just a political and cultic core like the less-integrated "village-state" model prevailing in China and some parts of Mesoamerica. Other key polities in the Mesopotamian case included large kingdoms (regional polities) and tribes, both inside and outside Mesopotamia. Temples, large private landowners, and merchants were important economic actors.

Mesopotamian tribes and cities afford excellent examples of overlapping and interactive polity types. Mesopotamian tribes included bedouin nomads, whose only interest in civilization was an occasional raid for plunder, and others who became hired agricultural laborers, settled pastoralists, and/or mercenaries, and thereby acquired "civilized" language and culture. Tribal organization included groups under individual shaikhs, as well as tribal federations, the names of which are associated with an entire people or ethnicity like the Chaldeans,[5] who nonetheless often fought among themselves and eventually became rulers of Babylon. If city polities were deeply embedded in Mesopotamian tradition, so were empires. Indeed, in the actual Mesopotamian context, there is ambiguity in both polity types. Some early cities were amalgamations of lesser cities, and various leagues of otherwise-independent cities may have existed. There were fourteen known major cities in Sumer/Akkad during the Early Dynastic period. According to the Sumerian King-List, after kingship again descended from heaven following the flood, it was held in succession by a number of cities like Kish, each by implication exercising hegemony. The first Akkadian king, Sargon (2310–2273 BC), not only conquered rival cities, but also he and his grandson Naram-Sin (2246–2190 BC) created an empire that encompassed all of Mesopotamia. The Assyrian empire at its zenith in the seventh century BC reached as far as Egypt and Persia.

The city was the leading polity throughout much of the *Greek* experience, but there were also chiefdoms, alliances, hegemonical alliances, empires, and functional regimes for shrines and games. The city polity itself involved two main subtypes, the polis and the ethnos, and both exhibited considerable variety. Because Greek cities were so small, external relationships loomed large, and a wide range of informal and more institutionalized arrangements overarched the city polity. Alliances were influenced to some extent by historical ties, tribal identities, and constitutional preferences. Some alliances, such as the Spartan, evolved into hegemony, and that of Athens into a form of empire. The ethnos eventually provided a model for a series of federations, and regimes for shrines and games were important within their limited domains. Ultimately, however, no overarching polity threatening the freedom or independence of the individual city-state gained sufficient legitimacy to endure.

The *Mesoamerican* record reveals a rich variety of polities from fami-

lies to empires. The patrilineal extended family was the basis of early Mesoamerican society, and kinship remained important. In many polities, including those of the classic Maya, a hereditary aristocracy emerged from the former heads of various lineages and came to control productive land, which client families worked. In central Mexico extended-kinship groups also retained a high degree of identity and autonomy. One can still see in Teotihuacán the remnants of what were apparently apartment compounds in which such groups resided. These compounds resemble the urban residences of the *calpulli* of later Aztec times. Each *calpulli* worked a particular plot of land or engaged in the same craft, sent its members together into battle, educated young boys in its own school, and provided a shrine to honor its patron deity.

Beyond family and artificial kinship groups was tribe. Tribal groups overlapped not only with one another but also with other polities. The Aztecs were confused about the legendary Toltecs, from whom they claimed descent. But who were the Aztecs? According to their chronicles, they were originally part of a group of seven Chichimec tribes that migrated over several generations from their original home, known as Aztlán, in western Mexico. One of their leaders was named Meci, from whom they acquired their own tribal name, Mexica. The name *Aztec* also came to refer to the imperial polity constructed by a Triple Alliance of the Mexica, the Acolhua, and the city of Tlacopán.

Long-distance merchant-trader was an important occupational-identity category. The best-documented long-distance merchant-traders were the Aztec *pochtecas,* who practiced their profession on a hereditary basis, lived in separate *barrios* in Tenochtitlán-Tlatelolco and probably elsewhere, married within their group, had their own courts and laws, and maintained their own shrines, priests, and sacrificial rituals. The *pochtecas* wore special dress and owed neither personal nor military service to the ruler, though they did pay tribute. The local guild was affiliated with a regional merchants' association stretching across the twelve towns in the center of the Aztec empire.

Other Mesoamerican polities were local, subregional, or regional; and local and subregional identities and loyalties proved more durable than those associated with more-inclusive polities. In the Valley of Oaxaca, widely spaced independent villages with dependent hamlets gave way to subregional centers, then to a single dominant regional polity, and finally to subregional centers again. At its peak, Monte Albán dominated the entire Valley of Oaxaca. In the Lowland Petén before 250 BC, Maya culture was one of scattered small villages. Over the next 500 years some six subregional fortress centers emerged.

Overarching Mesoamerican polities included alliances, empires, and a Mayapán "confederation" that is difficult to distinguish from empire. The overlap between alliances and empire is even more pronounced. After the

fall of the Toltecs and the weakening of residual Olmec control in the Basin of Mexico, three city polities—Azcapotzalco, Culhuacán, and Coatlichan—joined in an alliance dominated by the Tepanecs of Azcapotzalco. The newly arrived Aztec-Mexica eventually formed a Triple Alliance with Texcoco and Tlacopán that overthrew Azcapotzalco and inaugurated the Aztec Empire. That empire was only the last in a series of preconquest Mesoamerican empires, and at its peak ruled five to six million subjects.

The Spanish conquest added the Catholic Church to the list of Mesoamerican polities. No Indian temple priesthood ever matched the degree of autonomy, lands, and wealth the Spanish Church enjoyed. The Pope granted to Spain the *Patronato* charge of evangelizing the New World, and the King of Spain provided an enormous permanent income. The Church received land grants from the king and wealthy laypersons, and in time came to own or control much of the arable land in Mexico.

In ancient *China,* the family or clan was the basic sociopolitical unit, and China's ethical system was oriented toward the family rather than a supreme being (as in medieval Europe or Islam) or encompassing polity (as in ancient Greece). Since the patriarchal family was regarded as the taproot of other polities, no distinction was made between private and public spheres, and Chinese thinkers easily accepted hierarchy as an organizing principle. The family, rather than any larger polity, provided economic and personal security and was the source of personal and political values for individuals. Religious ideas, military organization, even agricultural labor mobilized from above revolved around the family. During the late Chou era, China consisted of a cluster of city polities, whose capital was home to a lineage that itself was a political entity.

Although Chou influence extended across much of northern China, as many as 200 small walled cities and their environs, especially in the east, retained independence under vassal lords who acknowledged Chou suzerainty. The decline of the Eastern Chou left a number of competing polities in control of the north China Plain—some ten to fifteen by the eighth century BC. These sought to build alliances to protect themselves from the predatory policies of neighbors, and a novel approach to curbing instability was adopted in 651 BC, when these small polities designated the Ch'i ruler as hegemon of their confederation.

Nomadic tribes, ethnically similar to but linguistically distinct from the Chinese, constituted another polity type. Called *Hsiung-nu* by the Chinese, these nomads spoke a Turkish dialect. Horses provided them with mobility and allowed them to adapt to the grasslands of the northern steppe, which could not support the intensive agriculture that evolved in China's Yellow River basin. In the third century BC, even as China was being united, a *Hsiung-nu* tribal federation exercised authority across Mongolia from western Manchuria to the edge of the Pamir Mountains in Turkestan. *Hsiung-nu*

mobility posed a permanent threat along the frontiers of cultural China and, at their peak, these nomads could put as many as 300,000 mounted archers in the field.

Notwithstanding the variety of polities in China, a strong sense of cultural unity developed early, and the Chinese regarded their civilization as superior to others. As a result, the ideal of an overarching Chinese polity remained strong even during eras in which it was a fiction. The first two historical dynasties, the Shang and Chou, actually controlled little beyond their capital cities and, under Chou feudalism, the center was weak. Only with the triumph and consolidation of Ch'in authoritarianism after 221 BC did a genuine imperial polity emerge, and it was short-lived. Despite the myth of continuity from the Shang, it was not until the Earlier Han era (202 BC to AD 8) that a durable Chinese empire took root.

Islam began as a rebellion against Arab tribal practices, but the death of Muhammad triggered a struggle within the movement that led to clashes between tribal and statist practices, struggles among kinship groups, differing class-based perceptions, and strongly held religious beliefs. Three major polity types coexisted uneasily within the medieval Islamic system: tribe, religious community, and empire. Tribal or clan loyalties dominated Arabia prior to the Prophet's revolution, and Muhammad sought to replace tribal attachments with loyalty to a Muslim community of believers. However, Muhammad's authority was putatively derived directly from Allah, and his actions were believed to have divine sanction that was unavailable to others. Ultimately, the identification of religious and secular symbols proved an insurmountable obstacle to institutionalizing "statist" forms and practices.

Within Arab society, the extended family produced potent loyalties and was affiliated with a kinship group claiming a common ancestor that would afford protection and, if necessary, seek vengeance. Muhammad was from a secondary branch of the Quraysh tribe, which, through its control of trade routes, was the dominant political force in Mecca and, therefore, Arabia. As his preaching gained converts, Muhammad earned the animosity of leaders of his tribe, ostensibly because he threatened traditional tribal authority, but also because of rivalry between two branches of the Quraysh.

The Islamic community was established by the Constitution of Medina that was written by Muhammad after his migration from Mecca to Medina in AD 622. Communal unity was to be based on religious belief rather than tribal affiliation, and tribal practices like blood feuds were to be abandoned. Muhammad's community was not a "state" but an expression of Islamic solidarity against traditional tribal forms, and in contrast to tribal tradition viewed all individuals, whether or not blood kin, as equals. Religion and language marked, for Muslims, the demarcation between themselves and others, and the Quran was almost only accessible in Arabic. Mosques were built in city centers and were used to conduct religious and public business, thereby reflecting the merger of political and religious functions.

The Prophet's death triggered efforts to elaborate more centralized forms and brought to the surface old tribal loyalties and identities. By the middle of the seventh century, Islam conquered all of Arabia, the Byzantine provinces of Egypt and Syria, and additional territory to the north and east. In a short time, the Sasanian holdings in Iraq and Iran were added. In AD 639, the ancient cities of Egypt fell, and imperial Islam then advanced to the frontiers of India. Thereafter, the Umayyads swept across North Africa and soon crossed into Spain. Tribal customs alone were inadequate to govern an empire of such enormous size and diversity, and as power shifted from the Arabian periphery to the Syrian and later Iraqi heartland, the ruling elite grew hostile to tribal mores. The new government bureaucracy was taken over from Islam's imperial predecessors—the Byzantines and Sasanians. However, at no time did the caliphate exercise strong central control. A caliph's authority was greatest in "his" city and the immediate countryside, and a permanent military presence existed only in key cities and a few productive agricultural centers. Ultimately, rival caliphates successfully challenged the center.

After the decline of the Roman Empire *Italy* also included a wide variety of polities. The two polities that occupied center stage in the Middle Ages were an empire centered in Germany and a church in Rome. Both sought to inherit the mantle of the Roman Empire and exercise temporal authority over Christianity. Both the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy were actually territorial empires that sought to extend their territory and authority; their struggle waxed and waned for centuries, forcing other polities to take sides or play the two pretenders against each other. In the end, both had to cede primacy to the territorial princes whose allegiance they sought.

Tribes played a key role in Italy, especially in the decline of Rome. Like the Huns, most were clan federations. For some years after they invaded, the Lombards ruled much of northern Italy. They, like the Goths who proceeded them and the Carolingian Franks and Magyars who came later, found their ways of life transformed by the legacy of Rome, and tribe ceased to be a significant identity. Kinship ties persisted, however, and the rulers of Italian city polities were groups of families dubbed the patriciates. Many commercial and trading companies and banking houses were identified with particular families and *consorterie* (interfamily alliances and/or a family with its clients). Family rivalries complicated additional divisions—for example, Guelph versus Ghibelline, *popolo grasso versus popolo minuto*—and the resulting competition threatened public order in many cities. That was the immediate origin of the single *podestas* and *signori* whose appearance signaled the end of the communes' republican tradition. In the end, many cities installed family dynasties like the Florentine Medicis.

Italian towns and cities enjoyed greater autonomy from external authorities than German polities because feudal structures in Italy were weak.

There was a growth of urban polities in much of Italy after AD 900. Many were on previous Roman foundations, while others developed around a local church or shrine, at the intersections of travel routes, or from clusters of villages or farms. Towns and cities helped fill the authority vacuum created by the absence of kings and the weakness of the Holy Roman Empire. Conceptions of urban communities began to change in the mid-twelfth century, when the term "commune" came into fashion. A process of consolidation continued until the late fifteenth century, when most urban centers were overshadowed by Milan, Florence, or Venice.

Of importance, in addition to (and often overlapping) family groupings were fraternities, guilds, companies, and banks. Fraternities and guilds served to advance economic interests, uphold standards, and regulate membership in a trade, and they also provided a sense of belonging in an urban setting. By the later thirteenth century trading companies and banks had evolved into powerful entities. Single-venture enterprises or family businesses developed into permanent firms, drawing capital from a variety of sources. Some Italian traders settled in foreign trading centers, where they formed local associations or "nations" for mutual advancement and protection. Large banks established a symbiotic relationship with local and foreign governments as well as with popes, until it was difficult to determine who was beholden to whom.

A wild card among polities in Italy were independent "companies" of mercenary *condottieri,* who became arbiters of Italian politics between roughly 1340 and 1380 (Thomson, 1994:27). Conditions both inside and outside Italy helped account for the rise of the *condottieri,* including the progress of commerce and industry that undermined civic militias. Greater wealth made it possible to pay the high prices mercenaries demanded for their services. The Essex knight Sir John Hawkwood was the most famous mercenary general, waging war in the 1370s for the pope, Milan, and Florence. By the fifteenth century, the *condottieri* were largely Italian, and *condottieri* leaders like Francesco Sforza countered adversity by capturing a city or group of cities that could serve as a permanent base.

POLITIES AND IDEOLOGIES

Like Westphalian states, other polities attract loyalties and exercise authority.[6] It is essential to "[r]ecognize that what makes actors effective in world politics derives not from the sovereignty they possess or the legal privileges thereby accorded them, but rather lies in relational phenomena, in the authority they can command and the compliance they can thereby elicit" (Rosenau, 1990a:40). "Authority" in our conception is effective governance, the ability to exercise significant influence or control across space over persons, resources, and issues. Authority is often not exclusive, and it

need not be enshrined in formal law. Authority may even be regarded by many as illegitimate (like military "authoritarian rule" in Latin American countries with democratic constitutions), although authority seen as legitimate is obviously more secure. Virtually all polities have means of disciplining or coercing persons within their domain, but individuals rarely accept authority just to avoid punishment. They expect benefits in exchange, including the psychological satisfaction associated with group identity and ideology. Identities can be imposed, but most are not; rather, they are embraced because they deliver what people want. Loyalty, too, is an exchange phenomenon that derives from perceived benefits.

Issues can arise that force choices among nonexclusive identities and loyalties. For example, Holy Roman emperors appointed bishop-barons as local imperial administrators because celibate clerics presumably could not found rival dynasties. This policy worked well until a reforming pope who came along insisted that bishop-barons put loyalty to church ahead of loyalty to emperor. Similarly, citizens and politicians in contemporary Europe are repeatedly forced to choose between the latest variant of supranationalism and their more familiar national loyalties. It is the sum of individual choices, over time, that strengthens some polities and undermines others.

Every polity needs a distinctive ideology, which helps to legitimize its authority, and that ideology is communicated and reinforced through a process of political socialization. The ideological source of supreme authority in Sumer was the leading god of the pantheon, Enlil, whose priesthood administered the temple Ekur at Nippur. When the Babylonians eclipsed the Sumerians, they elevated their own god Marduk to the top of the pantheon, and the Assyrians later did the same for Ashur. Athens and Sparta each cultivated a special ideological image—liberal democratic Athens versus disciplined oligarchic Sparta. Venice—formed by literally bridging what were circa AD 1200 some sixty neighborhood parishes, "each with its own saint, festivals, bell tower, market center, local customs, and first citizens" (Lane, 1973: 12)—rested on several reinforcing identities: Venice the Christian city of the apostle St. Mark (versus less-favored patron saints); Venice founded by the last real Italian Romans and with a special relationship with Byzantium; and Venice of the Book-of-Gold noble families, whose stable rule earned the city the coveted appellation *la serenissima*.

The bridging analogy for Venice is fitting because the best ideology to legitimize a larger polity is one that is at once distinctive and yet makes use of ideological strands already within the expanded domain.[7] Broad cultural norms can provide an ideological foundation for large polities. Mesopotamian and Chinese rulers made much of the common cultural heritage of their peoples, which contrasted with the supposed inferiority of neighboring peoples. Mesopotamian empires appropriated a shared pantheon of gods, sacred shrines like Ekur at Nippur and the moon-god's abode at Ur, age-old sacred texts, and ancient titles like King of Kish—and there-

by competed with city and other identities. The closest parallel in Greece was an overarching sense of Hellenism that sustained the alliance against Persia, the role of the oracle at Delphi and other shrines, and the Olympic Games. However, Greece was different from Mesopotamia and China in that there never developed a persuasive ideological justification for empire.[8] Greece and Mesopotamia were similar in one respect: The primary identity in both regions continued to be cities.

Early on, China developed a powerful sense of cultural exclusivity, and the myth of a single unified kingdom governed by sage-kings persisted even in periods of anarchic localism. Religion—largely ancestor worship, and divination and shamanism—sanctified clan lineages in China, and larger polities drew sustenance from philosophies that were constructed on clan-based analogies. Constant war during the Warring States era eroded the most powerful clans, and loyalties to a variety of crisscrossing authority patterns, sealed by blood covenants, became common. The shift from ancestor worship to the universalism of Heaven under the Chou was gradual, retaining patriarchal authority and stressing ancestral protection.

When the Chou defeated the Shang, whom they had earlier served and to whom they were linked by marriage, they argued that theirs was the central kingdom, an extension of the Shang claim that they were at the center of the universe, and proclaimed that the "Mandate of Heaven" had been passed on because of Shang corruption. The effect was to replace pantheism and shamanism with a powerful abstract and universal principle. Thereafter, a belief that emperors enjoyed a "Mandate of Heaven" helped legitimize an overarching polity and all Chinese dynasties, although it also acted as a constraint because of the assumption that an unpopular emperor's overthrow signaled the mandate's withdrawal.

Confucianist ideas, drawing analogies between ruler and father and emphasizing the role of virtue in acquiring the Mandate of Heaven, buttressed imperial stability based on conservatism and continuity. Confucius venerated the past, especially the peace of the early Chou, and stressed the need for continuity and social responsibility. He argued that political affairs should mirror a natural moral order. Confucian virtues were a direct extension of the ideal of filial piety, and Confucianism appealed to authorities because it emphasized the proper roles of individuals in society and the stability of the resulting hierarchy. The Confucian emphasis on ritual, manners, and deportment reflected beliefs that external forms could produce, or at least reinforce, virtue and that observing ritual was a bond with antiquity that increased legitimacy.

By contrast, Islamic ideology failed to sustain an overarching polity. The simplicity and egalitarianism of Islam made conversion easy and attractive, especially to those who had fared poorly under other polities. However, Muhammad's heirs did not enjoy the authority of a prophet. The caliphs received no revelations and, though they guarded the community and its tra-

ditions, they could not claim the legitimacy of one who was a messenger of Allah. For Muhammad, God was the source of authority, and secular authority without religious sanction was inconceivable. Key questions remained: Did a caliph possess religious authority and, if so, what was its source? If a caliph lacked religious authority, what could be the source of his temporal authority? Were the tribal customs regarding caliph selection sufficient? Were caliphs infallible and, if not, could they be overthrown? Did legislation issue from the caliphs or the jurists, or was the Quran its only legitimate source? Neither the Quran nor Muhammad's prescriptions provided clear answers.

Tribal and class differences intensified disputes about these matters. A schism among Shi'a, Sunni, and Kharijite branches of Islam over the sources of political authority erupted with the fifth caliph, who assumed power after a civil war and the murder of 'Ali. For those who assumed the name *shi' at 'Ali* ("followers of 'Ali"), 'Ali's blood tie to the Prophet had been the basis of his authority, which could neither be surrendered to nor seized by others. 'Ali's followers believed that the line of succession should come through his sons, thereby preserving a portion of Muhammad's charismatic authority, and they resisted the resurgence of tribal traditions. Those who supported the Umayyads and accepted the legitimacy of the caliphs after 'Ali were known as Sunni ("standard practice" or "normal and normative custom"). They viewed Muhammad as a tribal, as well as religious, leader and accepted much of pre-Islamic tribal tradition as a source of authority and practice. The Sunni tradition was a pragmatic concession to practical necessity and changing circumstances.

NESTED POLITIES

A consequence of contact among polities is the nesting or embedding of some within others, as though one polity form were superimposed on another. One form may lose some of its separate identity and autonomy, but in the process the dominant polity may assume some of the characteristics of the one(s) it has incorporated. A nested polity is either the remnant of an earlier form or the incubus of one yet to come, depending on the direction of political evolution. Most polities are always changing or "becoming," sometimes coming from or moving toward another polity type.[9] During some epochs change is tumultuous, and during others it is so slow as to be almost imperceptible. In Greece, the polis gradually established its domination over Dark Age chiefs whose source of authority was kinship and artificial kinship. However, kinship ties retained importance among aristocrats in different poleis and in the diplomatic institution of proxenia.[10] Meanwhile, the polis became more complex internally and linked to various external polities—alliances, functional regimes, and informal empires.

In Mesopotamia, cities retained their identities and the loyalties of inhabitants even under local hegemons or after incorporation into larger polities. There was also residual tribalism. In Mesoamerica, the head of one Maya family (the Cocom) in the Yucatán succeeded in grouping Maya cities into a single regional "confederation" polity under his leadership at Mayapán. The nesting was almost literal, insofar as the rulers of other polities were required to establish residence at Mayapán. Indeed, before the Spanish arrived, as we have stressed, Mesoamerica had a remarkable range of overlapping and nested polities, including extended-family and artificial kinship groups, merchants, tribes, villages, cities, subregional urban centers, regional polities, and empires.

Nesting was common in ancient China, too, especially when triumphant rulers surrounded themselves with officials co-opted from defeated lineages. Chou rulers, for example, appointed a Shang prince to govern the old Shang capital region and used Shang officials in local governments. Medieval Islam eroded, but did not eliminate, tribal solidarity. Tribal practices resurfaced almost immediately after Muhammad's death, when a tribal council selected his successor, and claimants to the caliphate had to demonstrate a familial relationship to the Prophet. Tribal favoritism was widespread, and nepotism during the reign of the third caliph roused discontent and was a factor in his assassination. The importance of tribal vendetta resurfaced when the clan Banu Umayya resisted 'Ali and sought to avenge kinsmen who were killed in a battle they fought against Muhammad.

Nesting is equally apparent in contemporary politics. For example, today's European states are in the midst of an awkward transition. None is fully responsible for its own defense; some economic functions have been "EC-ized," and others have been surrendered to multinational firms and worldwide financial markets—not to mention the challenges of coping with a more organized and demanding citizenry. There has been such to-ing and fro-ing that there is no historical model that can do justice to the patterns of authority taking shape in modern Europe.

The impact of nested polities will be felt in the unique attributes of the successor polity and will show up in variations among institutions, ideas, and behavior within each class of polity. Thus, even in this century, some state forms have been hard to distinguish from empires (the Soviet Union), tribal conglomerates (Rwanda and Kenya), religious movements (post-Shah Iran), multinational firms and banks (Japan Inc.), cities (Hong Kong and Singapore), or even coteries of families (El Salvador). Each polity reflects the impact of its own history and other polity types that are nested within it.

We ignore nested polities at our own peril. Just as the imperial form assumed by the ninth-century caliphate contrasted with its Byzantine and Persian predecessors because of its tribal and clan patrimony, so contemporary Muslim states of the Middle East (or for that matter Israel with its Zionist roots) have little in common with European states of different

parentage. And the facile assumption that all states are the same—with similar motivations or institutions—plays no small role in the errors policymakers make when they meddle in states with nested tribal or clan polities such as Somalia, Lebanon, and Iraq.

Polities do not evolve in a vacuum. The path that political evolution takes—toward centralization and larger polities, or toward decentralization and fragmentation—depends on factors that have a different impact in specific historical contexts. Thus, for almost every issue we can identify three generic polity forms: status quo, expansive, and contractive. The competition among status quo, expansive, and contractive polities is apparent in a range of economic issues. The ERM crisis in Europe illustrated the resistance of national bureaucrats to expansive polities. When the German Bundesbank failed to lower interest rates, pressures on other European currencies drove them down against the deutsche mark and encouraged wide swings in the frenetic financial markets. In no case was the limited capacity of the Westphalian polity more clearly revealed than in their inability to insulate themselves from resulting speculation; not even the Bank of England had sufficient currency to defend the pound. The crisis may have been a setback for one expansive polity—the EU—but it reflected the power of others—globalizing business and financial firms—to operate across national borders.

The resistance of status quo polities was reflected more broadly in efforts to sabotage the Maastricht Treaty and in resistance to progress in the Uruguay Round of the GATT on both sides of the Atlantic. Unfortunately for Maastricht, recessionary conditions, long-standing resentments over regulatory decisions of the Brussels bureaucracy, fears of the erosion of national culture in a wider Europe, and the Yugoslav debacle undermined support among publics for political integration. It was the threat of an expansive polity—"Fortress Europe"—that provided, in turn, one incentive for the negotiation of another—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The United States' other NAFTA partner, Canada, confronts political difficulties of another kind as it faces the challenge of contractive nationalisms. Unlike Yugoslavia, the outcome of the struggle between status quo and contractive polities for the loyalty of Canadians remains in doubt. Polls suggest that most Canadians do not want an end to Canada, although national identity is weak. Were the country to divide, it is unclear along what lines—far West, agricultural heartland, French speakers, and maritime provinces?—because Quebec is not the only distinct identity. Also uncertain is the eventual effect of NAFTA on the unity issue. NAFTA should increase general prosperity and thereby enhance the rewards of being Canadian. On the other hand, militant separatists argue that, with larger entities like NAFTA, membership in a Canadian national economy has lost much of its relevance. Canada is a victim of both fission and fusion.

As issues like this reveal, centrifugal and centripetal forces continuously tug polities in different directions. There is a "tale of two tendencies" that characterizes historical change: the elaboration of larger networks of interaction and interdependence, alongside the fragmentation of other collectivities into vulnerable and tiny units of self-identification.

CHANGE, STASIS, AND THE STATE CONCEPT

Richard Hooker is credited with observing that change "is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better." What was true for the sixteenth century is no less true for the twentieth, both for our hopeful, yet turbulent post–Cold War world and for the theories we use to make sense of that world. Today, there are many versions of "the state" as well as numerous polities with only a fragile kinship to any historical state. A model of dichotomized—domestic versus international—political life fails to capture the trends we have highlighted. The state concept provides an illusion of stability and continuity that contrasts with a restless reality. The question is not whether the state exists and is observable, but to what extent it explains the things we need to understand. Although the state has many definitions, in international relations it is usually equated with the Westphalian model of a sovereign territorial entity enjoying a monopoly of authority within and legal equality without. Today this model serves as something of an ideal type that few actors approach.[11] In this usage, the European experience of a particular era is generalized to all times and places. In fact, the Westphalian state is just one type of polity, distinguished less by any criteria focusing on loyalties or resources than by a legal claim to legitimacy and the formal recognition of other members of the "sovereign club" that it is what it claims to be. Unfortunately, there is no official certification board comparable to the community of states to provide formal recognition for other polities.

Generalizing from the Westphalian model conveys the appearance of a world divided into neat territorial compartments, each governed by a single set of authorities who command the exclusive loyalties of those residing within its boundaries. In fact, history contradicts assumptions about the universality, exclusivity, or permanence of any polity. The record reveals the presence of constant pressure both toward larger and more inclusive polities and the fracturing of existing polities.

Fortunately there are other, nonstatist ways to think about the world, including conceptualizing a single political arena consisting of a wide range of actors engaged in issue-specific behavior.[12] The ways in which people organize themselves for political ends evolve along with everything else, and an intellectual map that focuses only on the interaction of two hundred "states" captures only a slice of reality. Our alternate model extends beyond

the familiar notion of "pluralism" and paints a world of overlapping, layered, and interacting polities.

Today, as in the past, human beings identify themselves in a variety of politically relevant ways and, as a result, are enmeshed in a multitude of authoritative networks, have loyalties to a variety of authorities, and distribute resources (including their time, labor, and money) among them. Each network has the capacity to mobilize adherents in the context of issues that touch their perceived interests or excite their passions. Each is a polity of sorts with a hierarchy (albeit sometimes minimal), ideology, frontiers, and resource base. Patterns of loyalties and resulting polities necessarily overlap, thereby blurring "frontiers." This overlap does not usually entail conflict. Particular polities tend to enjoy niches in the lives of adherents, and the loyalties they evoke are normally activated only in the context of specific issues. There is no inherent contradiction between an individual's national, religious, tribal, professional, or other affiliations. Tensions may arise, however, when authorities perceive conflicting interests in the same issue(s) and compete with one to become the principal objects of affection for the same constituents. Clashes like those that pitted Chinese communism against the Chinese family during the Cultural Revolution or the Polish church against the Polish communist party in the 1950s exemplify such conflicts. Contests for loyalties and the changes in affiliation that they produce are the stuff of history.

Change is continuous as loyalties, like cards, are shuffled and reshuffled and people are seduced to follow new authorities on new political adventures (or misadventures). Rarely are contests sufficiently decisive to eliminate polities permanently; sometimes, as in the Chinese absorption of the Mongols or the Islamic absorption of Arab tribal loyalties, new polity types arise that synthesize the key features of old ones. Napoleon's effort to replace the sovereign Westphalian state by an empire of nations was finally rebuffed by the older states at the gates of Moscow, and efforts to build a new entity—the nation-state—succeeded, but only for a time. The murder of an obscure Austrian archduke in 1914 highlighted the tension between the Westphalian state and nationalist passions, and the Wilsonian doctrine of national self-determination revealed the incompatibility of the two concepts as organizing devices. History has a habit of biting those who would ignore it, and it is hardly surprising that the end of the Cold War again pointed up the ill fit between "state" and "nation" in the Balkans, Africa, and elsewhere. In the words of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, if the fires of contemporary nationalism continue to burn unchecked, "we'll have 5,000 countries rather than the hundred plus we now have" (*New York Times,* February 7, 1993:1).

Although the Westphalian polity triumphed in its collision with tribal polities in Africa and the New World between the fifteenth and twentieth

centuries, no polity remains unchallenged or unchanged forever. Old loyalties remain, sometimes dormant, that may be triggered by events like the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. It is a challenge to any polity to cope with old memories, identities, and loyalties within its domain. While it is easy to make martyrs, it is almost impossible to eradicate an old identity. In this respect the world appears a "living museum" of identities and loyalties in which some exhibits are currently on show, some are being refurbished, and still others are in cold storage. Polities survive only if they can co-opt those old memories, identities, and loyalties—those that once supported other polities—or fit them into their own ideologies.[13] Unless old authorities and ideologies are co-opted, they may haunt a new polity and later become the bases of rival political associations and faiths.

The manner in which the Westphalian polity evolved illustrates the fate of all polities. Its ideology—sovereignty—grew out of a particular historical context. That polity never stood alone as an identity but from the outset prospered, both as an idea and as a fact, to the extent it incorporated other identities. Some of these identities have remained actual and potential challengers to the present day.

THE WESTPHALIAN STATE AND THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM

Medieval conceptions of legitimacy rested on an assumption of the unity of Christendom, and monarchs seeking to extend their authority beyond their family holdings looked to the Catholic Church and/or Holy Roman Emperor to establish a divine right to rule. Legitimate rule proceeded only from God, though God's earthly intermediaries had to ratify the grant. The technical problem was that some saw the pope and others the emperor as God's certifying agent, but one or the other could usually be found to give the blessing, normally in exchange for a supplicant king's pledge of support in the Church–Empire rivalry.

The Westphalian polity emerged gradually, as divine-right monarchy in the early modern period merged with a concept of "sovereignty" that reflected the influence of Bodin and Hobbes. Monarchs claimed authority to rule over a territory that included and extended beyond their own holdings. The authority of Church and Empire waned with the consolidation of local polities, and the stirrings of secular humanism in the Renaissance also undermined the influence of the Church. Henry VIII and Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin sought to capture what remained of Church authority and link it to the monarchy, thus providing ideological glue for a new state polity.

Although even the most absolute of divine-right monarchs was never fully autonomous, kings consolidated their positions enough to give sover-

eign claims some substance. They extended their territory and acquired standing military forces, significant internal police capabilities, extensive bureaucracies, and growing tax revenues. Historical sociologists stress the role of continual warfare in consolidating the power of early modern kings.[14] Historian McNeill also observes that the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) "disentangled the French and English kingdoms from one another geographically [and] endowed the French king with a standing army and a tax system capable of supporting an armed force that was clearly superior to any and all domestic rivals in peacetime." "Challenges to royal absolutism did not disappear until after a final flare-up in the seventeenth century." Nevertheless, "armed rebellion was decisively defeated in France with the suppression of the Fronde (1633); whereas in England, where absolutism had never taken firm root, a remarkably flexible parliamentary sovereignty emerged from the Civil Wars and Glorious Revolution of 1688" (1986:39).

Nascent national consciousness enhanced the authority of early kings, and their consolidating activities, in turn, lent greater credibility to the sovereign state. Moreover, for all the significance of the establishment of national churches, the theoretical justification for sovereignty became increasingly secular; for example, Hobbes's claim that the only alternative to a single source of absolute power was chaos. In addition, early writers on international law, such as Grotius and de Vattel, added an external dimension to sovereignty by positing the existence of a system of independent states that were not obliged to recognize any higher authority.

According to McNeill, "what mattered for the later rise of nationalism was the pattern of town and rural life in France and England, where sufficient homogeneity between urban populations and the surrounding countryside was sustained between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries to make an extension of the ancient civic ideal of citizenship to the kingdom as a whole seem conceivable by the mid-eighteenth century." Not that anything like homogeneity was ever achieved. In France, writes McNeill: "Apart from German-speakers in Alsace-Lorraine, and Celtic speakers in Brittany, the gap between Langue d'oc and Langue d'oïl divided peasant France into significantly different communities. Indeed, one may argue that the incandescent quality of revolutionary propaganda in the crisis of 1793–1794 was partly a deliberate effort to override such local divergences by insisting on the sacredness of the republic, one and indivisible" (1986:38).

Nonetheless, the French Revolution, following the birth of the American republic, had a major impact on notions of the relationship between nation and state. Tamir argues that the "false identification" of nation with state "reflects the historical processes that accompanied the emergence of the modern nation-state" (1993:60). "The belief that the state should be the 'institutional representation of the people's will' formed the basis of the American and French revolutions, marking a substantial shift in

the type of legitimacy sought by political institutions from justifications based on divine or dynastic right to justifications grounded in popular voluntary consent." (See also Hobsbawm 1990:14–45.)

The legacies of American and French revolutionaries in this regard were distinct and not necessarily compatible. The new America was a republic but had to weave a separate ethnos out of almost whole political cloth. Except for being colonials, most white Americans had cultural roots in the former metropole. In later years, of course, the United States attracted immigrants of so many ethnicities that the only possible "American" ethnos was one based on myths of individual liberty and democratic citizenship. The American experience points up the fact that democracy is a brilliant ideological invention, not least because it does not demand that citizens give up their ethnic, religious, or other loyalties, unless those threaten the democratic process itself. It is significant, for example, that rioting blacks in urban ghettos demand not a separate state but a share of the pie promised by their status as Americans. Nevertheless, like any polity, a democracy must demonstrate a capacity to meet demands, and failure to do so invites the (re)surfacing of competing identities.

By contrast, the model advanced by the French Revolution was based on ethnos. "Whereas in America the new state had created a nation, the French Third Estate, in its search for an autonomous source of political legitimation independent from that of the old royalist regime, 'invented' a nation, presented itself as its true representative, and demanded the right to self-rule" (Tamir, 1993:61). Napoleon convinced the French that they should support him—not because he was a divine-right aristocrat, but because he was French, and they were French, and emperor and people together could do glorious things.

As Bismarck was to demonstrate, when state becomes entangled with ethnos, it may be only a short step to Hegel's romantic view of the state as a moral idea, the highest realization of self, to a side connection with Social Darwinism's survival of the fittest and Treitschke's ecstatic hymns of praise for the race. In this fashion, national identity—expressed through democratic or authoritarian political institutions—legitimated a state polity that could no longer rely on the pope's blessing. Ironically, it was Napoleon's spectacular effort "to build a transnational empire on the strength of an aroused and mobilized French nation" that "assured the idea and practice of the ethnically unitary nation-state of rather more than a century of florescence" (McNeill, 1986:52). European rivalries fueled by that idea only ran out of steam about 1945, after two world wars.

Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson (influenced by John Stuart Mill) had given the national idea a new currency by advancing the principle of "national self-determination." The twist was dangerous, especially because no one, including Wilson, could offer a consensual definition of "nation,"

thereby inviting any dissident group to claim nationhood and demand its own state. The Versailles conferees tried to limit the principle to the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, which, because of their polyglot character, were the worst places to start. The result set the stage for World War II and is echoed in current Balkan conflicts. The self-determination principle was also enshrined in the UN Charter, where it was invoked after 1945 in support of Third World independence movements. Decolonization proceeded despite the fact that the only unity in evidence in some cases was that imposed by arbitrary colonial boundaries. Now the self-determination principle lies like a ticking bomb, waiting for the next round of ethnic claimants. Referring to that bomb, Moynihan recalls Milton's "Pandaemonium" that "was inhabited by creatures quite convinced that the great Satan had their best interests at heart" (1993:174).

Wilson's "nation" was not the only challenger to the Westphalian polity. Another was the idea of "class," as proclaimed by Marx and Engels and, later, Lenin and Trotsky. In their eyes the state was an instrument of class domination, and when the proletariat seized the levers of power, it would wither away. Although the Soviet state only recently withered (for reasons unforeseen by Marxists), the 1917 Revolution saved the Russian Empire from the fate of the Hapsburgs by substituting class—the dictatorship of the proletariat—for a Westphalian-state Tsar.

The popularity and durability of the ideology of the Westphalian polity, ironically, owes much to European imperialism. There is a parallel here to McNeill's observation about Napoleon's campaigns and the growing popularity in the early nineteenth century of the ethnos model of identity. Later in that century, statist ideology followed the conquering flags of the Europeans. When the sun finally set on those empires in the mid-twentieth century, a host of new states appeared with the former colonial boundaries. They were sovereign entities like the European metropoles but different from them in almost every other respect.

THE PRESSURES OF CHANGE: PRESENT AND FUTURE

The apparent contradiction between the expanding functions of the European Union (EU) and the centrifugal pressures of separatists like the Corsicans in Europe—the home of the Westphalian polity—illustrates the continuous and simultaneous pressure on polities to grow and fracture. As Barber declares, the "planet is falling precipitantly apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same moment" (1992:53). An efficient solution is to create polities that can "specialize" in meeting specific human needs and encourage citizens to divide their loyalties for particular purposes. It may make sense to look to large specialized polities to achieve economic effi-

ciency while nourishing local loyalties to provide psychological satisfaction. Unfortunately, it is difficult to maintain those "rational" boundaries. so different polities tend to collide.

The Westphalian polity is much admired because it seemed to be a successful multifunctional experiment—large enough to satisfy values requiring economies of scale but small enough to satisfy values that demand intimacy. In fact, the Westphalian model, as noted earlier, was an ideal type that is linked to the success of only a few polities in creating a viable "national" identity and institutions. Nearly everyone thinks of England and France, though France fleshed out its present boundaries only late in the nineteenth century and the United Kingdom still has problems with its Celtic fringe. But why should England and France be considered "typical" when in fact most of Europe's states have always had to find ways to cope with dangerous identity fault lines? Flemish and French quarrel in tiny Belgium. Renewed constitutional invention may be needed there, as in Spain, which granted autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque region.

Relatively late bloomers like Germany and Italy also have a claim to being considered "typical." Germany, like Italy, was forged in the late nineteenth century with Prussian power and Bismarck's *zollverein* providing the core. Nevertheless, the Holy Roman Empire model and spread of the German language and culture seriously complicated the problem of identifying "natural" German boundaries. Italy, on the other hand, only *appeared* to create a viable state. Local and regional loyalties remained primary; some of the most dynamic sectors of the economy have never been integrated—or documented and taxed—and the Mafia established itself as the most effective authority in southern Italy and Sicily. And today, as the government wages inconclusive war on organized crime, the separatist Lombard League has emerged as a significant political force in the prosperous north.

The Westphalian polity prospered in Europe, but not in isolation. From 1945 until recently, Europe's security—the hallmark of sovereignty—has been bound up in NATO, and Cold War bipolarity kept the lid on change. Events in Yugoslavia and Brussels suggest that the fission and fusion of polities has not ceased, even in the cradle of statecentric mythology. The European Union has gradually extended its authority over matters historically regarded as within the exclusive preserve of states. Despite posturing in some quarters about loss of sovereignty, preserving "national security" in traditional fashion is inconceivable without cooperation and institution-building—within the region and across the Atlantic. Although each step toward integration in Europe has preserved the legal nicety of countries' "voluntarily" surrendering sovereign rights, the fact is that borders have gradually diminished in significance and decisions are made in an EU context that used to be made only by national decisionmakers.

None of this means that the Westphalian polity is disappearing. Instead, it is evolving into something different alongside new polities. As Peters and

Peters explain, there are "at least three large games being played" in Europe today. One is a "coping with interdependence" game in which governments seek "to extract as much as possible from the EC, while relinquishing as little . . . as possible." Another involves competition among European institutions themselves. The third is a bureaucratic game "that is apparently becoming an important subtext for everything else happening within the EC." Twenty-three directorates-general develop "their own organizational cultures and approaches to policy," compete for "policy space," and attempt to establish "their own working relationships . . . with relevant elements of national governments." Add Peters and Peters, "There may also be still other games being played simultaneously, including those involving interest groups." "Firms, for example, may believe that they would find a less restrictive regulatory environment if the Community had greater control of environmental policy" (1992:106–107 and 107n). As with other polities, the future of "Europe" rests on establishing authority in a particular domain, supported by identity and ideology. Whether Westphalian polities will become nested in the future remains to be seen.

The end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the emancipation of countries in the East, and the crises over the ERM and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty raise new questions about the relationship of states, the EU, and smaller ethnic polities. What ideological basis should be invoked to legitimize the outcomes of political bargaining on these questions? "Federalism" has uncomfortable Anglo-Saxon overtones and seems to suggest a "United States of Europe." "Confederation" implies little more than loose political association. "Subsidiarity"—the idea that control should be exercised at the lowest possible level—has a Catholic and Continental ring to it. On the other hand, subsidiarity is attractive in theory to the British and others who seek a decentralized EU, but it is not clear how the principle might apply in practice. How are member states to decide what the appropriate level for control actually is? Finally, "consociationalism" draws on the experience of divided democratic polities like those of Switzerland and Holland, which preserve the segmental autonomy of internal minorities by demanding consensus if major changes in common tasks and decisionmaking are to be made (Taylor, 1991). Like subsidiarity, consociationalism might reassure those who are dubious about the common EU enterprise, but the formula is close to the long-standing EU arrangement whereby each member has an effective veto.

In the end, no Westphalian polity exercises the degree of autonomy and control that sovereignty implies, and only a few even put on an impressive show. Far from possessing a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence, states—especially but not exclusively in areas of the Third World—often are unable to preserve a modicum of domestic tranquility because governments themselves lack legitimacy. They are routinely challenged by malaise and insubordination, as well as by street demonstrations, corporate power, rural

guerrillas, urban terrorism, ethnic conflict, religious fanaticism, party strife, drug cartels, and warlord gangs. All illustrate the collision of loyalties based on interest and sentiment.

The challenges to the Westphalian polity are also intensifying with an increase of "turbulence" in global politics (Rosenau, 1990b). The rising capabilities of citizens and a tendency to subgroupism are interacting in unpredictable ways. More and more persons and groups are traveling, negotiating business deals, transporting goods, offering services, moving money, listening to mass media, telephoning, sending faxes, and sharing electronic data—and ideas. Sovereign boundaries in these respects are not so much being altered as ignored or transcended. The developments that overarch states also have an impact within them. They promote democracy and capitalism, and a resurgence of ethnic identity. Ironically, largeness has helped foster smallness; sovereignty-eroding economic and political interdependence have encouraged fragmentation. Self-determination seems more than ever within reach, partly because others are demanding it, but also because of the EU and the NAFTA; the revitalization of international organizations; and the resources of transnational corporations, banks, and other institutions of global capitalism. French Canadian separatists, Baltic republics, Croatians, and others do not have to go it alone; they have other potential relationships to replace those they choose to end.

SECURITY IN A POST–COLD WAR WORLD

The end of the Cold War and the broadening of the concept of "security" to include economics, environment, and ethnicity have made it easier for advocates of expansive and contractive polities to make their cases openly and persuasively, to reawaken old identities and compete successfully for human loyalties. Whatever the taboo regarding the alteration of sovereign boundaries, in fact they have lately been radically rearranged *from the inside* in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. With ethnic conflict simmering in Central Europe and many parts of the Third World, one wonders what claims for self-determination will be advanced next.[15] Will there be external intervention, especially by neighbors claiming kinship? At the very least, there will have to be new forms of autonomy invented for pockets of ethnicity. Then, when the smoke has cleared, there will be a need for new formulas to knit the pieces back together into larger polities for functional ends. This returns us to the units to be ordered, and here the going gets difficult. Certainly, the primacy of economic issues opens up a broad field of polities that, until recently, political scientists have been pleased to leave to analysts in management schools.

The real world of politics has always been one of layered, overlapping,

and interacting polities. Our task as theorists is to explain that most defining characteristic of politics: the manner in which individuals come together (or are brought together) to behave collectively. We need to understand the sources and consequences of political change—the processes by which polities emerge, evolve, expire, and are sometimes resurrected. As we have emphasized, there are always trends toward larger political groupings along with the fracturing of existing polities. The Westphalian ideal seems remote from the solutions that must be found to accommodate contemporary mini-nationalisms or issues of global scope. It seems destined to remain a reassuring symbol, rather like the British monarchy before the latest scandals, while what is most important takes place among other polities in a variety of arenas. New polity forms are being born, even as others persist. This sort of thing has happened many times before, and it will not cease simply because Hegel, Fukayama, or someone else declares history to have ended.

NOTES

1. Neorealists have sought to grapple with loyalty change by focusing on international structures, with only moderate success. See Keohane 1984.

2. This analysis is elaborated in Ferguson and Mansbach 1994.

3. These questions return us to the classic issues raised by Lasswell and Kaplan 1950.

4. For detailed analyses and our sourcing of these cases, see Ferguson and Mansbach 1995. In this essay we only cite sources from which we have taken quotations.

5. The Chaldean label encompassed at least three distinct tribes: the Bit-Dakuri, the Bit-Amukani, and the Bit-Yakin.

6. Bloom 1990 develops what he calls "identification theory" to serve as "the methodological bridge between individual action and theoretical interpretation," but inexplicably fails to see its application to polities other than nation-states.

7. For an example of the effort to weave diverse ideological strands into a comprehensive source of legitimacy at the Chinese court of Wu Ti during the first century of the Han dynasty, see Ames 1983.

8. On this point see Runciman 1992.

9. Polities acquire one another's characteristics not only by nesting, subordination, and conquest, but also by contact at the periphery. In Mesopotamia, "Urartu—the major rival of Assyria—was the creation of Assyria itself. . . . The constant Assyrian incursions into the Taurus and beyond . . . familiarized the people of Urartu with much of the culture and infrastructure of a major kingdom" (Saggs, 1984:90).

10. Whereby a citizen of one polis who was resident in another might act as a sort of consul, representing the interests of the citizens of his home polis.

11. A second usage, favored by historical sociologists, equates the state with *any* institutionalized authority. It could be a democratically elected government, a military dictator and his cronies, a medieval monarchy, an Inca hierarchy, or the Ottoman Empire.

12. It is difficult to understand why Rosenau maintains the existence of "two worlds of world politics" (1990b:14).

13. The manner in which Romans and Persians tolerated cultural and religious parochialism and early Christianity embraced symbols from precursors ranging from the Isis cult to Germanic paganism illustrate the value of co-optation.

14. Cf. Mann 1988.

15. Etzioni views self-determination and democracy as competitors: "While they long served to destroy empires and force governments to be more responsive to the governed, with rare exceptions self-determination movements now undermine the potential for democratic development in nondemocratic countries and threaten the foundations of democracy in the democratic ones" (1992–1993:21).

PART 2

CULTURING NEOREALISM?

3

Identity and Structural Change in International Politics[1]

Alexander Wendt

Driven by the rapid transformations in world politics in the late twentieth century, international relations theorists have recently been devoting greater attention to the analysis and implications of structural change in the international system. Most of the discussion has focused on the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world, perhaps with a temporary phase of unipolarity (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). This reflects the materialist dimension of neorealism. Even within a neorealist conceptualization of system structure, however, we might perceive change along other dimensions of structure as well: Functional equality among states might be transformed into differentiation, and anarchic relations among states might be transformed into authoritative ones, which I shall argue in this chapter is happening throughout much of the contemporary states system.

Whether or not the structure of a states system is anarchic is intimately tied to the distribution of state identities. At the broadest level this simply reflects a general principle about the relationship between structures and agents: Structures do not exist except by virtue of the agent- or unit-level properties and relations by which they are instantiated. The structure of a states system is constituted as anarchic by member states having and acting on the identity of juridical independence and self-governance. (States have other identities as well—hegemon, balancer, liberal, communist, revisionist, and so on—that also help constitute system structures, but these possibilities need not detain us here.) More specifically, as Henry Nau (1993) argues, whether or not a states system is anarchic will be determined by the entity with which member states *identify* with respect to the performance of their functions, especially security. If states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the system will be anarchic. If they identify with a world state it will be hierarchical, much as the identification of the 50 states with the federal government constitutes the United States as a hierarchy rather than an anarchy. And if they identify with each other, such that they have a collective identity in which each is bound to cooperate with the other, they would con-

stitute a decentralized authority system, an "international state" that is neither anarchy nor hierarchy. In this chapter I explore the dynamics by which international states might emerge by focusing on the causes of collective identity-formation among states.

Identity-formation has not been an important concern of mainstream systemic IR theorists, neorealist or neoliberal, who have tended instead to take state identities and interests as given. There is a body of systemic IR theory, however, that does problematize state identity and thus structural change. Variously characterized as critical, reflectivist, or *constructivist* IR theory, it takes a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theorizing.[2] It is within this tradition that my argument is developed.

The chapter is organized as follows: In the first section I offer an overview of one version of constructivism, focusing on its conceptualization of the structure of the states system and the latter's relationship to state identities. In the second section I discuss the nature of collective identity, which is central to my subsequent argument about the emergence of international states. I then identify some determinants of collective identity among states, and in the final section I conclude by analyzing the implications of such a process for the formation of international states and thus for structural change in the international system.

ON STATE AGENTS AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE

Constructivism is a structural theory of international politics that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal actors in the system; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures, rather than being determined exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. The first claim is shared by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, and as such is vulnerable to the same antistatist critiques as they are. The second differentiates constructivism from neorealism, which emphasizes material rather than intersubjective structures. And the third differentiates it from systemic theories that are rationalist in form, whether "as if" theories that merely bracket interest formation or unit-level, "reductionist" ones that say interests "really are" exogenous (Moravcsik, 1993; Waltz, 1979). The result is one form of structural idealism or "idea-ism."[3] In this section I will elaborate the second and third claims, deferring discussion of the state.

The key issue here is a proper conceptualization of the relationship between state agents and systemic structures. In the past I have suggested that this relation should be seen as one of "mutual constitution" (Wendt, 1987). While still sympathetic to this notion, my view today is less symmetric, and I also now prefer to explicate it in terms of the concept of

"supervenience," which is used by contemporary analytical philosophers to describe interlevel phenomena like the relationships between biology and chemistry or mind and brain. Supervenience is a nonreductive relationship of dependency, in which properties at one level are fixed or constituted by those at another, but are not reducible to them (Horgan, 1993; Kim, 1993). The mind–brain relation is a good example: States of mind are determined by and thus ontologically dependent on the physiology of brain states, but the former are unlikely to be reducible to the latter because the same state of mind can probably be realized by many different brain states and because we will probably never discover the necessary "bridge laws" for a reduction of mind to brain. Supervenience relations normally work in just one direction, but bilateral supervenience (or "mutual" constitution) is also a possibility. The relationship between state agents and systemic structures has something of this bilateral quality: The structure of the states system is supervenient on the properties of states, and the properties of states—including state identities—are, to a significant but lesser extent, dependent on properties of the states system. It is this (partial) mutual constitution that enables us to analyze structural change in terms of identity-change. I develop each side of the argument in turn below.

The properties of state agents can be differentiated into those that are material, like military or economic capabilities, and those that are ideational, like perceptions, identities, self-understandings, and so on. The distribution of material capabilities across state actors gives us the core of Waltz's definition of system structure as the distribution of power; as such, this aspect of structure is dependent on but not reducible to state actors. For Waltz this exhausts the interesting aspects of structure; he treats anarchy as a constant, and the third element of his definition, principles of differentiation, drops out because he assumes states are functionally equivalent.

If we apply the logic of supervenience to the *ideational* properties of states, however, we can arrive at a similar story about the *cultural*[4] structure of the states system. Cultural structure consists of the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions, identities, or what I would simply call "knowledge" held by members of the system (Ruben, 1985). It is common today in IR scholarship to use cultural concepts like norms, rules, and institutions to treat cooperative relationships in world politics, which are usually seen as expressions of a normatively integrated "society" of states. In my view, however, conflict formations can—indeed, must—be conceptualized in these terms as well, in which case cultural structure is embodied in threat complexes, relations of enmity and fear, ideological hegemony, and so on.[5] The Cold War was at base a cultural rather than material structure, and thus the end of the Cold War was a "structural change" along that dimension. Both cooperative and conflictual cultural structures exist only in virtue of state actors having certain ideational properties, but the former are not reducible to the latter. It should be emphasized, however, that to say that

structures are defined intersubjectively is not to say they are inevitably mal-
leable, since they confront actors as obdurate social facts. Sometimes struc-
tures cannot be changed in a given historical context. My idealism is that of
Durkheim and Mead, not that of Pollyanna and Peter Pan.

In the constructivist view, therefore, the structure of the states system
contains both material and cultural elements. The relationship between these
elements is too complicated to enter into here, but in general constructivists
give priority to cultural over material structures on the grounds that actors
act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings
are socially constructed. A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing
from one in the hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, rela-
tion.

So far I have argued that the structure of the states system is dependent
on but not reducible to the properties and relations among state actors, a
claim only the most atomistic student of world politics would have difficul-
ty accepting. More contentious perhaps is the claim of supervenience in the
opposite direction ("mutual" constitution), namely that the properties of
states are dependent on the structure of the states system. In saying this I do
not mean the proposition, virtually a truism at the level of the individual,
that the properties of state actors are causally generated through interaction
among states. Rather, the claim is that having certain properties at any given
moment *presupposes* or is *constituted* by the structure of the states system.
This claim is not asserted by Waltz, for whom the material capabilities of
states preexist the distribution of power into which they are aggregated, and,
indeed, it is difficult to see how units might be supervenient on the system
when talking of material structure. When speaking of cultural structure,
however, such a claim might make more sense.

The hypothesis (and it is that) that states are constituted by the cultural
structure of the states system can take various forms. The strongest claim,
arguably made by poststructuralists, is that state agency is *entirely* consti-
tuted by practices of differentiation and representation at the systemic level,
and that as such there is no "originary presence" that forms the essential
basis of state subjectivity (Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 1992). My somewhat
weaker claim is that some properties of the state are "self-organizing" rela-
tive to other states (much as rationalists would argue, for whom actor prop-
erties are exogenous to the system), and some are dependent on cultural
structures at the systemic level. To make this point I distinguish the corpo-
rate from the social identities of state actors, which parallels the distinction
between the "I" and the "me" in symbolic interactionism.[6] The result is an
"essentialist" or "weak" constructivism that leaves the terms, but not the
fact, of state individuality open to negotiation.

Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor
individuality. For people this means the body and personal experience of
consciousness; for organizations it means their constituent individuals and

the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which those individuals can act as a "we." In the particular case of state actors, corporate identity has its roots in domestic politics, which I am assuming are in general "self-organizing" or ontologically prior to the states system; empirical statehood is (in general) prior to juridical statehood.[7] The corporate identity of the state generates several basic interests or "appetites": (1) physical security, including differentiation from other actors; (2) ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities; (3) recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force; and (4) development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level.[8] These corporate interests provide motivational energy for engaging in action at all and, to that extent, are prior to interaction, but how a state defines and satisfies them depends in part on how it defines the self in relation to the other, which is a function of social identities at the systemic level.

Social identities (or "roles") are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others—that is, as a social object. In contrast to the singular quality of corporate identity, actors normally have many social identities that vary in salience. Also in contrast, social identities have both unit-level and social structural properties, being at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine "who I am/we are" in a situation, and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations. As such, they are ontologically dependent on relations to others; for example, one cannot be an "anticommunist" if there are no communists around, nor a "balancer" if there is no one to balance. In this respect, social identities are a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure, embodying the terms of individuality through which corporate agents relate to each other.

These terms lead actors to see situations as calling for taking certain actions, and thus for defining their interests in certain ways. The United States had an interest in resisting Soviet influence in Angola because the Soviets were an enemy, not because the United States has a portfolio of essential interests that included Angola. Social identities and interests are always in process during interaction. They may be relatively stable in some contexts, in which case it can be useful to treat them as given, but this is an ongoing accomplishment of practices that represent self and other in certain ways (Ashley, 1988), not a given fact about the world.

The dependence of certain properties of state actors on cultural structures—the supervenience of identity on structure rather than just vice versa—differentiates the approach to identity and interest taken by authors in this volume from the more individualistic approach that a rationalist would take. In the rest of this chapter I will explore the relevance of this framework to the problem of theorizing structural change in world politics.

ANARCHY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Anarchy is the absence of authority. Authority—which may or may not be centralized in a single actor—is, in turn, an institutionalized fusion of power and common purpose (Ruggie. 1983:198), such that actors identify with and feel bound to act on behalf of some larger collective enterprise. Collective action alone does not imply authority; as formulated by Mancur Olson (1965) and adopted by mainstream IR theory, the collective action "problem" is one of getting exogenously given egoists, who do not identify with each other, to cooperate. This is perfectly compatible with anarchy, and a great deal of the cooperation in which state actors engage in the real world has nothing to do with structural change away from anarchy. However, if state actors develop a collective identity this becomes the basis for "common purposes" or interests, and this in turn is a necessary (but not sufficient) social psychological condition for an internationalization of political authority. We can study the emergence of international authority out of anarchy, then, by studying collective identity formation among states, and this in turn means problematizing self-interest as a seemingly essential attribute of state agency—that is, as stemming from states' inherent, corporate identity rather than from a contingent social identity.[9] In this section I define some of these terms.

"Self-interest" is sometimes defined so as to subsume altruism, which makes explanations of behavior in such terms tautological. Instead, I define self- and collective interest as effects of the extent to and manner in which social identities involve an *identification* with the fate of the other (whether singular or plural). Identification is a continuum from negative to positive, from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to seeing it as an extension of the self. It also varies by issue and other; I may identify with the United States on military defense, but with the planet on the environment. In any given situation, however, it is the nature of identification that determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn.

In the absence of positive identification interests will be defined without regard to the other, who will instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for the gratification of the self. Such an instrumental attitude toward the other I take to be the core of "self-interest" (note this does not preclude action that benefits others, as long as it is done for instrumental reasons).

Though little discussed in recent IR scholarship, an extensive literature exists on collective identity in sociology, social psychology, philosophy, and even economics.[10] It refers to positive identification with the welfare of another. such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the Self rather than as independent. Because of corporate needs for differentiation this identification will rarely be complete (although some people do sacrifice their lives for others), but to the extent that it exists there will be an empa-

thetic rather than instrumental or situational interdependence between self and other (Keohane, 1984:122–123; Russett and Sullivan, 1971:851–852). This is a basis for feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty, and thus for collective definitions of interest. Having such interests does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits, but rather that they do so on a higher level of social aggregation. This facilitates collective action by increasing diffuse reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives, an effect supported by empirical research in various fields.[11] This is not surprising: If collective action depended solely on coercion or selective incentives, it would be a miracle that society existed at all. The state itself is testimony to the role of collective identity in human affairs.[12]

The distinction between alliances and collective security arrangements provides an instructive illustration. Alliances are temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat. Once the threat is gone the coalition loses its rationale and should disband. In contrast, in collective security systems states make commitments to multilateral action against nonspecific threats. Collective identity is not essential (or equivalent) to such a multilateral institution, but provides an important foundation for it by increasing the willingness to act on "generalized principles of conduct" and diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie, 1993a). Less identification would be necessary in pluralistic security communities, in which the commitment is merely not to settle disputes by war, and more in amalgamated security communities, in which states join formal unions.[13] Is NATO merely an alliance or also a collective security system? There are good reasons for thinking the latter, but data on collective identification would help us decide.

The difficulties of achieving pure collective identity make it unlikely that the motivational force of egoistic identities among states can be eliminated, as the recent debate over the Maastricht Treaty made clear. The tension between particularism and universalism is not specific to IR, however, being inherent in the relationship of individuals to groups.[14] Identifying with a group can be costly to the individual, and can even lead to his being killed, even while identification is highly valued. Identification is a continuum along which actors normally fall between the extremes, motivated by both egoistic and solidaristic loyalties. The existence of multiple loyalties is at the heart of the debate over "European identity" and may generate substantial role conflict. Resolutions of such conflicts are never permanent or fixed, however, and their evolution cannot be studied if we take interests as given. Thus, I am *not* suggesting that collective interests replace egoistic ones as exogenously given constants in a rationalist model, but rather that identities and interests be treated as dependent variables endogenous to interaction. This would allow us to treat collective action as not merely a problem of

changing the price of cooperation for self-interested actors but as a process of creating new definitions of self. And that, in turn, is crucial to structural change in the states system.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AMONG STATES

States, of course, often do define their interests in egoistic terms. The probable causes of this fact are well known, and include both domestic and systemic factors.[15] Constructivists would emphasize that these are always in process, sustained by practice rather than inherent to stateness, but to the extent that practice is stable, the rationalist assumption that interests are given may be useful. The forces disposing states toward particularism, however, sometimes confront others disposing them toward collectivism. Collective identities vary by issue, time, and place, and by whether they are bilateral, regional, or global. I cannot examine such variations here, nor can I assess the weight of their determinants relative to those of state egoism; as such, I specifically do *not* impute any directionality or teleology to the historical process. I merely identify some causal mechanisms that, to the extent they are present, promote collective state identities, although their impact may be more lumpy than linear. In view of my concern with endogenizing identity change to systemic theory, I limit my focus to factors at the systemic level, even though domestic factors may matter as well. I differentiate three types of mechanisms by the causal roles they play—structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practice—and address two factors under each. The discussion is suggestive rather than exhaustive.

Structural Contexts

The structures of regional or global international systems constitute interaction contexts that either inhibit or facilitate the emergence of collective identity formation, and as such they play an indirect causal role. Whereas neorealists define structure in material terms, constructivists emphasize intersubjective structure, while leaving room for the emergent effects of material capabilities.

Intersubjective structures help determine how much "slack" exists in a states system for dynamics of collective identity formation to develop. The greater the degree of conflict in a system, the more states will fear each other and defend egoistic identities by engaging in relative gains thinking and resisting the factors that might undermine it, discussed below. In a Hobbesian war of all against all, mutual fear is so great that factors promoting anything but negative identification with the other will find little room to emerge. In the Lockean world of mutually recognized sovereignty, however, states should have more confidence that their existence is not threat-

ened, creating room for processes of positive identification to take hold. The ability of states to create new worlds in the future depends on the old ones they created in the past.

Intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act. British nuclear capabilities are a very different social fact for the United States than Soviet capabilities. Nevertheless, material structures can have sui generis effects on collective identity formation. On the one hand, within a conflictual intersubjective context actors will tend to infer intentions from capabilities. To this extent, material capabilities may be part of the problem in a conflict, inhibiting the emergence of positive identifications. On the other hand, material structure can facilitate the latter when it provides incentives for collective problem solving, as Dan Deudney argues with respect to nuclear weapons (Deudney, 1993a), or is so asymmetric that powerful states can coerce weaker ones to identify with them.[16] Such coercion may produce hegemony in the Gramscian sense, but hegemony is a form of collective identity, one less easily created when material power is balanced.

Systemic Processes

Structures are always being reproduced or transformed by practice, and as such are not static background conditions for collective identity formation; to the extent that practice does reproduce them, however, they merely inhibit or facilitate collective identity formation. The remaining factors have more direct causal impacts. By "systemic processes" I mean dynamics in the external context of state action. Both arguments in this section are long-standing liberal ones. My point is that they relate to identity, not just behavior, a point lost in neoliberalism's rationalist approach to "idea-ism."

The first process is rising interdependence. This can take at least two forms. One is an increase in the "dynamic density" of interactions due to, for example, trade and capital flows (Ruggie, 1983; Buzan, 1993). A second is the emergence of a common external threat (Lasswell, 1972:24), whether personified in an external aggressor or by a more abstract threat like nuclear war or ecological collapse. While the one generates "dilemmas of common interests" and the other "dilemmas of common aversions" (Stein, 1983), both increase the objective vulnerability and sensitivity of actors to each other, and with these the thickness of systemic structures. This reduces the ability to meet corporate needs unilaterally, and increases the extent to which actors share a common fate. These changes in the context of interaction will sometimes affect only the price of behavior, as rationalism assumes (Stigler and Becker, 1977), but they may also change identities and interests. Indeed, dependency, whether intersubjective or material, is a key determinant of the extent to which an actor's identity is shaped by interaction, as reflected in the fact that a child's development is normally far more influ-

enced by its parents than by other actors. As the ability to meet corporate needs unilaterally declines, so does the incentive to hang onto the egoistic identities that generate such policies, and as the degree of common fate increases, so does the incentive to identify with others. As interdependence rises, in other words, so will the potential for endogenous transformations of identity, with consequences that go beyond those analyzed by rationalists.

A second systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation is the transnational convergence of domestic values. Two of the most salient are cultural (the rise of global consumerism), and political (the spread of democratic governance, welfare statism, concern with human rights, and so forth). Societal convergence can result from rising interdependence, but it may also stem from demonstration effects, diffusion, and lesson-drawing. The effect is to reduce the heterogeneity (or increase the similarity) among actors. As with interdependence, this change in the interaction context may sometimes affect only behavior, but it may also change identities and interests. As heterogeneity decreases, so does the rationale for identities that assume "they" are fundamentally different from "us," and the potential for positive identification increases on the grounds that "they're no different than us, and if it could happen to them. . . ."

Despite the incentives that rising interdependence and societal convergence may create to adopt more collective forms of identity, however, neither is a sufficient condition for such a result. The vulnerabilities that accompany interdependence may generate perceived threats to self-control, and rising similarity may generate fears that the state has no raison d'être if it is not different from others. States may respond to these systemic processes by redoubling their efforts to defend egoistic identities. (This may be one reason why students of intergroup relations have found that increased contact alone does not ensure cooperation.) The key to how states deal with the tension between corporate fears of engulfment and the growing incentives for collective identification, therefore, lies in how they treat each other in their changing interaction context.

Strategic Practice

In the last analysis, agents and structures are produced or reproduced by what actors *do*. Systemic structures and processes may affect the context of interaction, but specific actions are rarely dictated by them. Actors sometimes act as though they were in a "game against nature," but more interesting here is strategic practice, in which others are assumed to be purposive agents with whom one is interdependent. This is, of course, the traditional province of game theory, which normally does the rationalist "two-step" of treating identities and interests as exogenous to interaction.[17] Without minimizing the usefulness of game-theoretic models when identities and interests are stable, I want to suggest that more is always "going on" in strategic

interaction than such models convey, namely the production or reproduction of identities and interests. I will now focus on two forms of interaction that differ in their form of communication: behavioral and rhetorical.

The first argument involves a constructivist rereading of Robert Axelrod's "evolution of cooperation" (Axelrod, 1984). Taking an iterated, two-person Prisoner's Dilemma as his model, Axelrod shows how a strategy of reciprocity, or "tit-for-tat," can generate behavioral cooperation. Axelrod's basic model assumes that actors remain egoistic[18] and as such that interaction only affects expectations about others' behavior, not identities and interests. This gives the argument greater generality, applying to pigeons as much as to people, but it brackets the possibility that interaction may transform the interests constituting a game.

In contrast, if we treat identities and interests as always in process during interaction, then we can see how an evolution of cooperation might lead to an evolution of community. This can occur as an unintended consequence of actions carried out merely to realize self-interests, or as a result of a conscious strategy of collective self-transformation. Repeated acts of cooperation tend to have two effects on identities and interests. First, the symbolic interactionist concept of "reflected appraisals" or "reciprocal typifications" suggests that actors form identities by learning through interaction to see themselves as others do.[19] The more significant these others are, as measured by the material and/or intersubjective dependency of the self upon them, the faster and deeper this process works. By showing others through cooperative acts that one expects them to be cooperators too, one changes the intersubjective knowledge in terms of which their identities are defined. Second, through interaction actors are also trying to project and sustain presentations of self (Goffman, 1959). Thus, by engaging in cooperative behavior an actor will gradually change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new *identity* for itself. By teaching others and themselves to cooperate, in other words, actors are learning to identify with each other, to see themselves as a "we" bound by certain norms. As with Axelrod's argument, this process may be attentuated in an n-person context, but the fact that humans do associate in communities suggests that repeated interaction can transform an interdependence of outcomes into one of utility.

The discussion so far has focused only on the potential effects of strategic behavior on identities and interests, and as such it is consistent with the concept of a noncooperative game in game theory. This may be realistic in situations in which actors do not have available more direct forms of communication (as in the prison of the Prisoner's Dilemma), but typically this is not the case. What might be called rhetorical practice may have effects similar to those of behavioral practice, but it does so through a different mode of communication, variously enacted as consciousness-raising, dialogue, discussion and persuasion, education, ideological labor, symbolic action, and so on.[20] Despite differences, all of these presuppose that the social world

is constituted by shared meanings and significations, which are manipulable by rhetorical practices. These practices may involve power, but of the third- rather than first-"dimensional" kind, that is, they are efforts to change others' conceptions of their interests (Lukes, 1974). The goal of rhetorical practices in collective action is to create solidarity, and as such they may have an important expressive function independent of their instrumental value in realizing collective goals.

A good part of the "action" in real world collective action lies in such symbolic work. When leaders of the G-7 hold annual but substantively trivial meetings to discuss economic policy, or European statesmen talk about a "European identity," or Gorbachev tries to end the Cold War with rhetoric of "New Thinking" and a "common European home," or Third World states develop an ideology of "nonalignment," or the United States demonizes Saddam Hussein as "another Hitler" states are engaging in discursive practices designed to express and/or change ideas about who "the self" of self- interested collective action is. These practices may ultimately serve an instrumental or strategic function, but they cannot be understood from a strictly rationalist standpoint, since they are at base about redefining identity and interest.

Rival Hypotheses

There is nothing inevitable about collective identity formation in the international system. It faces powerful countervailing forces, and I do not mean to suggest that the logic of history is progressive; there are too many examples of failed collective identities for that. My point is only that *to the extent that* mechanisms are at work that promote collective identities, models that ignore them will understate the chances for international cooperation and misrepresent why it occurs. In that sense, my argument is a rival to the rationalist hypothesis about collective action. My claim is not merely that states might acquire collective interests, which dissents from realism, but that they might do so through processes at the systemic level, which dissents from rationalist versions of systemic theory, realist *or* liberal. Indeed, by focusing on the systemic origins of collective identity, I have made systemic rationalism rather than realism my primary target here.

Which hypothesis is more appropriate in a given context is an empirical question that may change over time. Two strategies for comparison suggest themselves. One would avoid the direct measurement of identities and interests and focus instead on testing the different behavioral predictions of the two models about how much collective action should occur and, taking into account problems of revealed preference, on that basis infer whether interests are collective or egoistic. A problem with this strategy is that it is difficult to specify exactly how much collective action even a well-worn theory like Olson's would predict (Green and Shapiro, 1994), and it also tells us lit-

tle about the process and causes of collective identity formation. Thus a second strategy would be to focus more directly on identities and interests as the dependent variable and see whether, how, and why they change. The challenge here, of course, is to construct measures of state identity and interest capable of sustaining inferences about change, which I cannot take up here.[21]

THE INTERNATIONAL STATE

The substantive argument here so far has been a creature of the "anarchy problématique" (Ashley, 1988), which theorizes about states in anthropomorphic terms as purposive actors interacting under anarchy. Despite my "sociological" departure from the dominant "economic" vocabulary, like rationalists I treat states as agents having identities, interests, rationality, and so on. There are important objections to this analogy, but I believe it is legitimate for many purposes.[22] It becomes problematic, however, if it so dominates our thinking that we automatically treat whatever is external to territorial state actors as "not-state" and therefore anarchic. This may obscure the emergence of state powers at the international level that are not concentrated in a single actor but distributed across transnational structures of political authority, and constituting a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system. Collective identity formation is an essential aspect of such a process.

In response to this challenge, some scholars advocate non-state-centric thinking on the assumption that the concept of the state is inherently tied to centralized authority.[23] Others emphasize the mutability of state forms, differentiating the state from sovereignty and even territoriality.[24] One way to develop this latter suggestion would be to define the state as, at base, a *structure of political authority* that performs governance functions over a people or a space (Benjamin and Duvall, 1985). The enactment and reproduction of this authority structure may or may not be centralized in a single actor. In the Westphalian system state agents and authority structures did coincide spatially, which leads to the familiar billiard ball imagery of "states" (actors, under which authority structures are subsumed) interacting under anarchy. But the two concepts need not correspond in this way: Political authority could in principle be international *and* decentralized. Following Robert Cox we might call such transnational structures of political authority that lack a single head "international states."[25]

The concept of authority has a dual aspect: legitimacy, or shared purpose, and coercion, or enforcement. This suggests that the internationalization of the state requires the development of two qualities: identification with respect to some state function, be it military security, economic growth, or whatever; and a collective capacity to sanction actors who disrupt the per-

formance of that function. The result of such developments would be an institutionalization of collective action, such that state actors treated as normal or routine that certain problems will be handled on an international basis. This expectation is likely to be expressed and met in various ways: in norms, rules, and principles that define expectations for behavior; in routine discussions of collective policy; and in interorganizational networks among bureaucracies.[26] By themselves these forms are not international states, but to the extent they are manifest and contribute to collective identity and enforcement, they will be part of an internationalization of political authority.

This is present today in various degrees among advanced capitalist countries in both security and economic issues. The provision of security, and more specifically the maintenance of a territorial monopoly on organized violence, is a key function of the state. "Monopoly" normally refers to control by a single actor, but it can also denote control by multiple actors if they are not rivals and engage in institutionalized collective action. A collective security system is just that: *joint* control of organized violence potential in a transnational space. NATO has long been characterized by such control with respect to external security, and recently EC states have begun to internationalize internal security as well (Den Boer and Walker, 1993). This system has a high degree of legitimacy among its members, as well as some capacity for enforcing its policies on them. It is based on multilateral norms that give even the weakest members a say in decisions; its leaders routinely formulate policies together, and its militaries are linked organizationally for both operations and procurement. Its capacity for institutionalized collective action is certainly also lacking in many respects, as the recent difficulties of defining a European defense policy attest, but the internationalization of political authority is a continuum, and NATO is far from anarchy along it.

The provision of an institutional framework for capitalist production is another function of the state that is today being internationalized. Historically, capitalism was largely a territorial phenomenon in which capitalists could direct their political efforts toward corresponding domestic authorities. As competition drove them to expand overseas through trade and investment, however, they created a demand for international rules and regulations. State actors responded with a network of regimes: a trade regime to govern the flow of goods and services; a monetary regime to govern the value of transactions; and, increasingly, a "capital regime" to govern property rights and capital flows (Duvall and Wendt, 1987). Today these regimes do more than merely affect the price of certain behaviors, but embody a degree of collective identity ("embedded liberalism"), routinized discussions of collective policy, and networks of interorganizational linkages. Their principal weakness remains enforcement, but even here there are emerging sanctioning systems that enable us to speak of an internationalization of political authority with respect to global capital.

Let me emphasize that I am *not* saying that international state formation has gone very far, any more than has the formation of collective identities that is one of its prerequisites. It is a process, and even if it continues we are only in its early stages. It is issue-specific (though it may "spill over" into new issue areas), mostly regional in nature (so there are potentially many international state*s*), and a matter of degree. Moreover, there are strong arguments for thinking it will not continue, since it creates fundamental tensions between the national and transnational functions of state actors.[27] My point is merely to suggest some ways of thinking about certain dynamics in the contemporary world system that do not privilege the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy in statist theory (or its counterpart of intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism in integration theory). The key to such thinking is recognizing that political authority need not be centralized, a point recognized implicitly long ago by the integrationists and, after the neorealist interregnum, one being rediscovered by a variety of scholars today.

The internationalization of political authority has at least two broad implications for IR theory. First, it points toward a gradual, but structural, transformation of the Westphalian states system from anarchy to authority. The basis of that system is the institution of sovereignty, which constitutes an anarchy of mutual recognition. Even when international state formation does not involve the formal cession of sovereignty to supranational institutions, it does relocate individual state actors' de facto sovereignty to transnational authorities. The result in practice might be a "disarticulated" sovereignty in which different state functions are performed at different levels of aggregation,[28] and/or a "neo-Medievalism" in which political authority is shared by both state and nonstate actors (Bull, 1977:254–294). Either way, the result is neither anarchy nor hierarchy, but the emergence of a new form of state and thus states system, which breaks down the spatial coincidence between state-as-actor and state-as-structure. As such, the erosion of individual state sovereignty does not imply the erosion of the state. Sovereignty is not an intrinsic feature of state agency, but one social identity a state may have. By transferring it to a collective, states may actually strengthen their capacity to solve problems. Internationalization is a way of reorganizing and redeploying state power, not a withering away of the state.

A second implication is how this calls into question the premises of contemporary democratic governance. The Westphalian approach to sovereignty allowed democratic and IR theorists to ignore each other. The former were concerned with making state power democratically accountable, which Westphalia constituted as strictly territorial and thus outside the domain of IR theory; the latter were concerned with interstate relations, which were anarchic and thus outside the domain of political theory. Under this worldview democrats could celebrate the "end of history" with hardly a peep about democracy at the *inter*national level.

The internationalization of the state makes this silence problematic.[29]

As state actors pool their de facto authority over transnational space, they remove it from direct democratic control. Territorial electorates may still retain the formal right to "unelect" their leaders, but the ability to translate this right into tangible policy change (versus merely changing the faces in power) is constrained by the commitments state elites have made to each other. New elites could, in principle, break those commitments, but often only at the cost of external sanctions and reductions in their own effectiveness. Various interpretations of the threat this poses to territorial democracy can be imagined. The current debate in the EC over the "democratic deficit" treats it in largely liberal terms as one of controlling an emerging centralized power, but radical democratic theory might be more relevant for the more decentralized authority structures cropping up all over the international system. In either case, the attempt to solve international collective action problems by creating collective identities among states creates an entirely new problem of making those identities democratically accountable, a problem ultimately of transforming the boundaries of political community.[30]

CONCLUSION

It is widely thought that statecentric systemic IR theory cannot explain structural change and so ought to be abandoned. In my view, the problem lies not with statism but with two other commitments that inform contemporary understandings of structural theory: realism and rationalism. The essence of the former is materialism—*not*, as its proponents would have it, a willingness to confront the ugliness of world politics. If system structure is reduced to a distribution of material power, structural change can mean nothing more than shifts in polarity that will not end the dreary cycles of conflict and despair over the millennia. Since authority is an intersubjective concept, the nature and implications of its internationalization will elude a materialist theory. The essence of rationalism, in contrast, is that the identities and interests that constitute games are exogenous and constant. Rationalism has many uses and virtues, but its conceptual tool kit is not designed to explain identities and interests, the reproduction and/or transformation of which is a key determinant of structural change. We should not let our admiration for rationalist methodology dictate the substantive scope of systemic IR theory, leading us down the path of "method driven" social science.[31]

Scholars should not ignore the state as they grapple with explaining structural change in the late twentieth century, but for their part statists should recognize that much more is going on when states interact than realism and rationalism admit. Yes, international politics is in part about acting on material incentives in given anarchic worlds. However, it is also about the reproduction and transformation, by intersubjective dynamics at both the

domestic and systemic levels, of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created. Integration theorists appreciated this suggestion long ago, but their nascent sociology of international community has been lost in the "economics" of international cooperation developed by realists and rationalists. This cooperation has contributed important insights into the dynamics of interaction under anarchy, but is ill-suited as a comprehensive basis for systemic theory precisely because it brackets some of the most important questions such a theory should address. Constructivists bring renewed interest and sharpened analytic tools to those questions.

NOTES

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1. This is a modified version of an article previously published as "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."

2. For overviews see Adler 1991a; Keohane 1988; Kratochwil 1989; and Wendt 1992.

3. Other traditions of international theory that might fall under this heading include poststructuralism, world society theory, neo-Gramscianism, Deutschian integration theory, and perhaps the English School. For elaboration of this and other issues in this section see Wendt forthcoming.

4. This structure might also be described as "intersubjective," "knowledge," or "social"; for further discussion of "cultural" structures in IR see Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1994.

5. Compare Ashley 1987 and Walt 1987.

6. See especially Mead 1934.

7. See Jackson and Rosberg 1982; those cases where it is not, like those analyzed by Jackson and Rosberg, are less amenable to the essentialist argument I am making here. Note that in treating domestic politics as the source of state corporate identity I am modifying somewhat the analysis in the paper on which this chapter is based.

8. For discussion of basic needs at the individual level see Turner 1988: 23–69.

9. For a helpful discussion of the overall explanatory strategy here see Calhoun 1991.

10. See, for example, Melucci 1989; Jencks, 1990; Calhoun 1991; Chase 1992; Morris and Mueller 1992; Taylor and Singleton 1993. Collective identity was a centerpiece of classical integration theory, but the latter's insights have been pushed aside by the realist and rationalist approaches that dominate contemporary IR theo-

ry. For recent IR scholarship that revisits the concept see Keohane 1984: 120–134; Alker 1986; and Caporaso 1992: 617–620.

11. For overviews see Caporael et al. 1989 and Dawes et al. 1990.

12. Although collective identification operates at the level of social identity, by enhancing the capacity for collective action it can help create corporate identity, which in one sense is simply a (temporarily) "solved" collective action problem. The distinction between the corporate and social identity of groups, therefore, is itself a construction, signifying the higher self-organization of the former, rather than being timeless and essential.

13. On security communities see Deutsch et al. 1957.

14. For various interpretations of this tension see Brewer 1991; Wartenberg 1991; and Chase 1992.

15. For an overview see Wendt 1994: 387–388.

16. See, for example, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990 and Wendt and Barnett 1993.

17. An interesting exception is the rationalist literature on "endogenous preference formation"; see Cohen and Axelrod 1984.

18. Later in his book Axelrod discusses the possibility of actors internalizing new interests, but this important point has not been picked up by mainstream regime theorists in IR.

19. See Mead 1934 and Berger and Luckmann 1966.

20. For discussion of some these effects see Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Caporaso 1992; Hall 1986; and Johnson 1988.

21. For further discussion see Wendt forthcoming.

22. See Geser 1992 and Wendt forthcoming.

23. See, for example. Ferguson and Mansbach 1991.

24. See Milner 1991; Walker 1990a; and Ruggie 1993b.

25. See Cox 1987: 253–265. My own thinking on this score owes much to conversations and work with Bud Duvall; see Duvall and Wendt 1987.

26. On the latter see Hopkins 1978 and Geser 1992.

27. For a thoughtful discussion see Taylor 1991.

28. On the latter suggestions see Pogge 1992.

29. For an early appreciation see Kaiser 1971; the recent literature includes Held 1990; Connolly 1991a; and Walker 1991.

30. See Lasswell 1972; Linklater 1990; and Wolfe 1992.

31. On this point see Shapiro and Wendt 1992.

4

Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory

—————— *Naeem Inayatullah & David L. Blaney* ——————

> Whatever you are is never enough; you must find a way to accept something however small from the other to make you whole and save you from the mortal sin of righteousness.
>
> —*Chinua Achebe* (1987:142)

Why do we travel? What motivates us to seek others? Which meanings do we seek and which do we bring to our encounters with others? While these are not the usual questions motivating international relations theory they are, nevertheless, consequential and perhaps crucial. This may be true not only for alternative perspectives inspired by notions of culture and identity but also for standard "rationalistic" accounts (Keohane, 1988).

Standard accounts ground seeking others in the need for power and profit. While these motives are surely an important part of the picture, the elaborate theoretical constructions needed to demonstrate these drives themselves suggest deeper accompanying motives. Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979) employs Rousseau's stag hunt to tell the all-too-familiar story of self-interest overriding cooperation. Yet, no compelling account is given of how and why strangers come together to stage a hunt in the "state of nature." Alexander Wendt (1992) provides a revealing constructionist critique of Waltz's use of Rousseau's stag hunt. Yet, his own "alien contact" counterexample begs questions we wish to highlight: Why do aliens come to earth? And what is the full scope of our interest in encountering them?

Our thinking on these questions may be introduced by the following assertions. Sensing that we are not complete, we travel in search of self-knowledge, which helps make us whole. This seeking has an internal, dynamic tension. On the one hand, it is determined by a desire for confirmation of the worldview that constitutes our self and our culture. We seek validation that our vision is indeed correct, universal, and valuable. This conviction is, on the other hand, laced with doubt. We suspect that our

worldview, our culture, and our self are partial, parochial, and perhaps invalid in some significant way. Travel, then, works through this tension. Through critical conversation we require others both to affirm the veracity and to expose the limits of our vision. Thus the discovery of the other is not incidental but necessary to our quest for meaning and wholeness.[1]

We take our inspiration from two authors who directly confront the issue of cultural encounter. Tzvetan Todorov (1984) and Ashis Nandy (1983, 1987a) both weave narratives around a series of contacts: Todorov between Spaniards and Aztecs in the Americas; Nandy between and within British and Indian responses to colonialism. We read them to suggest that the elemental motive for travel, discovery, and contact is not the drive for relative or absolute gains, but the working out of inner projects, fears, and myths that require contact with the other. In their analyses, both the image and the reality of the external other serves first and foremost as a source of knowledge and identity for the European self. This quest for knowledge is a quest to construct meaning in a dual sense: constructing a meaningful self that can find a home in the wider world and constructing the wider world such that the self can be at home. The problem is that others (who experience themselves as selves) are also engaged in the process of meaning construction. As meanings, interpretations, and projects come into contact—as the self discovers the other (both external and within)—we find conflict and cooperation, love and hate, denial and empathy, and many other shades of feeling, judgment, and action. In short, we temporarily bracket motives of competitive gain and the long tradition of "economism" (Ashley, 1983) in which they are nested. Our aim is to uncover deeper motivations for international/intercultural interactions and then to place more conventional concerns with gain or national interest within this broader understanding. Such an exercise formulates a theory of international/intercultural relations[2] that is truer to our sense of history, makes culture a central rather than a peripheral category, and takes seriously the difficulty and possibility of noncompetitive and nonviolent cultural contact.

Our assertions and inspirations suggest three commitments: First, we believe that actors' understandings of their world are central to social theory and therefore to IR. Second, this focus helps us to detect the way meanings are disregarded and obfuscated by "rationalistic" themes in IR theory. Nevertheless, third, even when covered by the jargon of modern social science, these meanings shine through. We hope to extricate the meaning-laden core of rationalistic accounts by highlighting the theoretical space for meanings within them. We hope thereby to demonstrate that such accounts are amenable to the theoretical return of culture and identity.

We will proceed in several steps: First, we offer a qualified critique of Waltz and Wendt, retaining their insights on the importance of "third image" analysis and social constructivism, respectively. For both authors we first note the pull of the state-of-nature conception and then try to excise this

influence from their analyses. Second, we explore the work of Todorov and Nandy, paying attention to the actual historical conditions of "original contact" and to the resulting possibilities for the growth of self-knowledge. We close by noting three principles that emerge from a juxtaposition of Waltz and Wendt with Nandy and Todorov: We endorse the epistemological principles of social constructivism, we call for a turn to "world history" as a way of making third image analysis meaningful, and we insist that a discussion of ethics become an explicit part of every debate in world politics.

THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

To remove the given is to socialize the world.
—*J. M. Bernstein* (1984:32)

Our argument against Waltz and Wendt is that, for both, something is inappropriately presupposed and, because of this, something is missing. More precisely, what is missing in their theories is suppressed or overlooked because what is presupposed displaces that which is missing. To be less abstract, in both Waltz and Wendt an appeal to a state-of-nature condition is required to fill the gap in determinacy left by an undertheorization of international society; that is, an ahistorical and acultural state of nature displaces a more specific analysis of international society as a world of cultures and cultural interactions.

Kenneth Waltz and the Antisocial State of Nature

A long tradition of international relations theorizing—beginning with Hobbes and finding its way to Kenneth Waltz—assumes that the ahistorical, acultural, and individualist deductive assumptions of the state of nature allow us to problematize contact between cultures and peoples in terms of competitive losses and gains. For Waltz, a permissive structure of "anarchy" compels the actions of autonomous states to be consistent with seeking their advantage relative to other states. Thus cultures and peoples, like individuals in Hobbes's popular version of the state of nature, are or must become competitive and acquisitive—which, if undeterred, results in outward expansion, conquest, and war.

We read the rhythm of Waltz's argument in *Man, the State and War* as follows: In the first image a varied and changing world confronts an immutable human nature as a fixed principle of explanation. Here Waltz (correctly, in our view) opts against the fixity of the principle. In the second image, a mutable principle of explanation—the changeable nature and learning capacity of humans and states—is made to confront two critical obser-

vations by Waltz: (1) The second image does not take into account the way in which the larger international structure socializes and thereby fixes the character of states; and (2) the learning capacity implied in the second image confronts an overwhelming situation, in which life is so precarious that, practically speaking, no further learning is possible. Our strategy, much like Wendt's, is to affirm the first of Waltz's observations and deny the second. That is, we agree that the international context must be taken into account in a theory of international politics or political economy. However, and against what we see as Waltz's structural determination—more clearly elaborated in *The Theory of International Politics*—we argue for the possibility that actors may learn about the system of anarchy and change it. This means, however, bringing motivations, purposes, ideas, and intentions—that is, meanings—back into the picture.

Our criticism (and Wendt's) is based in the logic used by Waltz himself. Waltz's third image contains the same problem as the first image. It highlights what can be explained by using a single fixed principle (that is, the structure of anarchy), but sacrifices the ability to understand variation or difference. With no pretense to being exhaustive, we offer the following examples of phenomena that remain unaccounted for using Waltz's filter of abstraction. While Waltz can explain why war continues as a feature of the system, he cannot say much about the immediate causes of conflict, including the varying ideological justifications for wars. While he focuses our attention on powerful states and suggests conditions under which stability might be established, he says very little about the different role of weaker states, and cannot address in any clear way questions about the situation of the Third World—the injuries done to it through conquest and colonialism and the justice of its demands. Although Waltz predicates his system on the existence of autonomous states, he cannot treat the numerous meanings attached to being or becoming a state within the state system: the implications of the idea of sovereignty; why we have a system of nation-states; and whether or not we should defend it as a value. In addition, because states— via imitation and structural effects—function as "like units," Waltz cannot incorporate cultural variation or geographical categories of states, as in the role of the Islamic world, African states, or the "new" European Community of states.[3] If, as we suspect, Waltzian structural theory is unlikely to address itself to such concerns, then we are left with a profound sense of emptiness, an intuition that something has gone wrong. Surely this is not all that international theory is or needs to be.

Turning this sense of emptiness immediately into criticism, however, would be unfair to Waltz. He is aware that "maximum abstraction allows minimum content" (1979:97), disallowing such elements as ideology and culture from theory construction because he considers them a feature of second image analysis. Such elements, in his eyes, are not aspects of the international system but merely of its parts, of states; therefore, we must abstract

from such attributes in order to construct a (purely) structural theory (Waltz, 1979:80). For Waltz the imperatives of a structural theory and a need for greater social content necessarily are at odds. But are they? What precludes thinking of the system as possessing a social content, as having attributes and interactions? Waltz himself provides hints that the system does have greater social content. Does not the structure of international politics contain a socialization process to which he often refers? In Waltz's thinking the structure of anarchy affects the behavior of states through competition and socialization. While he devotes only a few pages to the latter, his account of "socialization" is suggestive and revealing because of its similarity to both Wendt's constructivist account and our "cultural" approach. Waltz begins by describing conversation between two people as a feedback loop of communication. After a series of communications it is no longer simply the case that A and B are influencing one another. Rather, the structure created by their communication begins to influence them both. Waltz extends this imagery by citing Paul Watzlawick's analysis of Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*:

> That which is George or Martha, individually, does not explain what is compounded between them, nor how. To break this whole into individual personality traits is essentially to separate them from each other, to deny that their behaviors have special *meaning* in the context of this interaction—that in fact the pattern of the interaction perpetuates these [meanings]. (Waltz, 1979:75, quoting Watzlawick, emphasis added)

We underscore the word "meaning" because it suggests that while a structure may not have an orderer or designer in any simple sense, it may still have meaning and purpose to those involved in the process of constructing (and simultaneously being socialized by) that structure. Waltz appears to suggest no less in his claim that "in spontaneous and informal ways, societies establish norms of behavior" (1979:75). But as soon as this hint is offered it is summarily dropped and he concludes only that "socialization reduces variety" (ibid.:76). But is this all that socialization accomplishes? Surely socialization also gives meaning and purpose to our actions and thoughts. It grounds our ethical, aesthetic, and metaphysical meanings, helping us make sense of life itself. It seems necessary to connect socialization to meanings, as Waltz himself hints.

The function of competition in Waltz is also limited to the reduction of variety. But we may also extend the logic of "meanings" implicit in Waltz's idea of socialization to his discussion of competition. Competition can be seen as a response to (or a characterization of) a theoretical and historical problem—the tension created by the appearance of the idea of equality where the idea of hierarchy is still prevalent. In such a situation, equality comes to mean arriving at a ranking (an expression of hierarchy), but through competitively "fair" individual effort (where equality is conceived

as "equality of opportunity"). If, in spontaneous and informal ways, individuals are socialized to think and act in terms of this understanding of competition, then we have a structure created through competition that (1) is ordered but without an orderer, yet, importantly (2) is a structure of meaning and purpose.[4]

In sum, if meanings are part of both socialization and competition, then international political systems and markets are spontaneously generated and unintended, and at the same time ideational, meaningful, and purposive.[5] We suggest that we can respect the imperatives of the third image and still have a theory of international politics that is meaningful. The challenge is to construct such a theory that is consistent with the context demanded by the third image, but that incorporates the "reflectivist" or "constructivist" insights of the second image, that the social world, and the meanings central to its patterns, are continually created and recreated by human beings.

Waltz's attention seems deflected from this path by the powerful pull of the state-of-nature imagery, especially as staged in Rousseau's stag hunt, a hypothetical state of original contact prior to society. Waltz adopts the problem of explaining cooperation in this way:

> Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they "agree" to cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate *interest* prevails over consideration for his fellows. (Waltz, 1959:167–168)

As is the case with most state-of-nature examples a critical examination reveals that the story is more complex than it seems; an implicit social context can always be uncovered. Why do the five men happen to come together? Waltz's answer (and we are not sure it can be Rousseau's) is that hunger forces them together. But here Waltz assumes a way of thinking admonished by Rousseau. Why assume that the state of nature is characterized by less than plenty? Economic anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has shown that the problem facing hunting and gathering societies is boredom, not scarcity.[6] But even given hunger as a motivation, the stag hunt abstracts from the issue of how individuals acquire language (a troubling problem for Rousseau as well). We might think that it takes some effort for five men to learn each other's languages, or to establish a common language in order to understand each other. If hunger is the critical motivation, why would they expend effort on the more difficult and long-run task of learning/forming language prior to concerning themselves with the task of hunting? Such problems direct our attention to the serious difficulties in deciphering, understanding,

and translating meanings across ontologically different units (individuals, cultures, planetary civilizations). It is done by trying to follow theoretical leaps of faith that posit abstract notions of a universal rationality. For some traditions of thinking—of which the "rationalistic" school of IR theory is a young if not unimportant member—the most useful purpose of "state of nature" constructs is precisely that they allow a ready gloss over the following questions: Why do strangers seek others? How do they communicate with them? Through what processes do they formulate an understanding of others?

Let us summarize our analysis of Waltz. We acknowledge the value of third image thinking but note that, in Waltz's hands, international structure is emptied of meaning. However, we show that Waltz's hints on "socialization" allow for a retrieval of meaning. Following this line of thinking we suggest that even "competition" might be seen as a structure of meaning. Finally, we suggest that Waltz is deflected from this fruitful line of thinking because of his weddedness to the state of nature.

Alexander Wendt and the Presocial State of Nature

Alexander Wendt has challenged Waltz's conception of the implications of third image thinking on similar grounds. Wendt problematizes Waltz's understanding of "interest"—an understanding that allows Waltz to conclude that the immediate interest of the individual actors will prevail in the structure of anarchy. In effect, Wendt argues that the rationality of the situation cannot be determined a priori. How individual actors will learn to speak and understand each other, to agree, disagree, or agree to disagree cannot be known at the outset of their interaction. Rather, the rationality of the situation will be determined contextually; specifically, by the nature of the interaction between the individual actors faced with anarchy. Interests and identities of actors emerge only in an interactive process. The asocial outcome ascribed by Waltz to the stag hunt as an exemplary structure of anarchy reveals not an abstract universal rationality but Waltz's unexplained inclusion of antisocial motivations. The conclusion to draw, according to Wendt, is *not* that a competitive anarchy system will not, or cannot, emerge from this situation. Rather, the argument is that it *need not* emerge. If the point is to demonstrate the necessity of competition under anarchy, then Waltz's system is underspecified. Explaining competitive anarchy requires further specification—the elaboration of a theory of "socialization" (a constructivist third image theory) that can provide a fuller understanding of competitive as well as less- and noncompetitive anarchies.

Despite his critique of Waltz's reading of the state of nature, Wendt continues to employ this methodology, but in a version in which the influence of the state of nature is more difficult to detect. Rather than abolish the state of nature fiction, Wendt hopes to eliminate the asocial elements smuggled

into that condition by Waltz (Wendt, 1992:402). Wendt imagines what we might call a pure or a pre-interaction state of nature. He identifies two of its conditions: (1) The preexistence of agency, materially given or self-constructed prior to interactions; and (2) a motive, the need to preserve this material agency.[7] Based on this understanding, Wendt provides two exemplary stories that parallel and displace Waltz's reading of the stag hunt. The first is the parable of "alter" and "ego"; the second imagines first contact with extraterrestrial aliens. We need to quote at some length:

> Consider two actors—alter and ego—encountering each other for the first time. Each wants to survive and has certain material capabilities, but neither actor has biological or domestic imperatives for power, glory, or conquest (still bracketed), and there is no history of security or insecurity between the two. What should they do? . . . Most decisions are and should be made on the basis of probabilities, and these are produced by interaction, by what actors *do*.
>
> In the beginning is ego's gesture, which may consist, for example, of an advance, a retreat, a brandishing of arms, a laying down of arms, or an attack. For ego, this gesture represents the basis on which it is prepared to respond to alter. This basis is unknown to alter, however, and so it must make an inference or "attribution" about ego's intentions and, in particular, given that this is anarchy, about whether ego is a "threat." Alter may make an attributional "error" in its inference about ego's intent, but there is also no reason to assume a priori—before the gesture—that ego is "threatening." Social threats are constructed, not natural. (Wendt, 1992:404–405)

Wendt illustrates this logic again with a story about contact with aliens:

> Would we assume *a priori* that we were about to be attacked if we are ever contacted by an alien civilization? I think not. We would be highly alert, of course, but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched an attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security—if only to avoid making an immediate enemy out of what may be a dangerous adversary. The possibility of error, in other words, does not force us to act on the assumption that they are threatening: action depends on the probabilities we assign, and these are in key part a function of what the aliens do; prior to their gesture we have no systematic basis for assigning probabilities. If their first gesture is to appear with a thousand spaceships and destroy New York, we will define the situation as threatening and respond accordingly. But, if they appear with one spaceship saying what seems to be "we come in peace," we will feel "reassured" and probably respond with a gesture of our own intended (even if not necessarily interpreted) to reassure them. (Wendt, 1992:405)

Wendt's stories, like Waltz's stag hunt, beg important questions and appear underspecified. Wendt employs first contact, but perhaps without considering its significance or deeper heritage.[8] What brings alter and ego to contact? Why do aliens bother to come to earth? Why do alter and ego take any "interest" in the other, and what is our "interest" in contact with aliens?

It is important to problematize not only the conditions of "original contact" and "discovery" but also the often presupposed motivations for discovery. In this articulation, Wendt appears, like international relations and international political economy theory in general, to presume motivations rooted in the materiality of agency and in the self's motive for protection and survival. His silence on the deeper motivations of contact continue to limit international relations inquiry to the question of whether material gain and power will be pursued competitively or cooperatively.

Wendt's analysis is a gain in comparison to Waltzian neorealism, in which the pursuit of cooperation is at best elusive and quixotic, and at worst impossible. Nevertheless, Wendt still does not arrive at the meaning and purpose of travel and contact. While he claims to focus on the "social construction of subjectivity" (1992:391), his social constructivism remains thin because the agency of actors and their most basic motives are given prior to, and largely independent of, social interaction. The self encounters the other accidentally; the need for the other is incidental and external to a preconstructed identity and predetermined ends. Absent in Wendt's theorizing is any necessary, internal, and deeply felt need to find, contact, and converse with the other.

Thus, Wendt defends a "social constructivism" where actors are constituted within a more fully specified social structure that results *from their interaction.* However, Wendt says next to nothing about the actors "prior" to their interaction. Haven't actors already constructed some sense of self and some understanding of others prior to contact? Surely, this is the point of the study of "orientalism"—that actors (usually falsely) construct "others" long before actual contact (Said, 1978). The existence of such preconceptions suggests that a socially constituted structure depends, at least in part, on the motivations, ideas, purposes, intentions, and images actors *bring to* contact. Wendt leaves these motivations unexplored, arguing that "states do not have a conception of self and other . . . apart from or prior to interaction" (1992:401). Wendt's belief in actors as cultural "blank slates" prior to contact, or as presocially acquisitive, suggests the influence of "state of nature" thinking in his work. The gravitational pull of a "state of nature" leaves Wendt's constructivism socially and historically underspecified. The result is threefold. First, it leaves Wendt unwilling to challenge the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive, "self-help world" (Wendt, 1992:396).[9] Second, it leaves unexplored the full range of motivations guiding the actions of actors—from treating the other as a "thing" to treating the other as a fully human agent. Third, it limits our imagination about the future of the human condition. While Wendt's efforts are an important break from "rationalistic" international relations theory, nevertheless, in significant ways his work remains analytically and politically tied to that orthodoxy.[10]

Despite our criticism of Wendt's work the reader should be alert to the

overlap and complementarity between Wendt's pioneering efforts and what we offer below. Indeed, in certain respects our venture may be seen as an extension and deepening of his labor. Before considering our alternative vision it may be worth pointing out that we do not mean to eliminate from view the motives of material gain and power so evident in our historical experience. Rather, we wish to suggest that we may attain a richer understanding of these motives if we envision them as aspects of the social construction of human agency in a culturally full international society where the search for identity and meaning *requires* that the self discover the other.

DISCOVERING THE OTHER AND
THE SCOPE OF CULTURAL INTERACTION

Growth is an apprenticeship in exteriority and sociality.
—*T. Todorov* (1984:247)

Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy both have made the discovery of the other the centerpiece of their studies of colonialism. For Todorov, it is the discovery and conquest of America that serves as case and exemplar of the ubiquitous process of "the discovery *self* makes of the *other*" (Todorov, 1984:3). Nandy, too, traces the origins of the contemporary problem of the other to Columbus (Sardar et al., 1993), but focuses his attention on, in his terms, the "political psychology" of British colonialism in India (Nandy, 1983, 1987a).

Todorov tells the story of the discovery and conquest of America through a series of characters and their narrations of the events.[11] He begins with Columbus, not merely because he comes first chronologically, but also because he appears as the least capable narrator of "otherness" among Todorov's characters. Columbus is not without relative virtues: He is an astute observer of nature and, while he is careful to report ample possibilities for plunder, his own motivations seem more connected to the "discovery" and Christianization of the world. At the same time, Columbus fails as an observer of the "other." He does not really see the Amerindians; instead, he engages them as merely a category of otherness as revealed in the authoritative texts with which he is familiar—the Bible, Marco Polo's *Travels,* Pierre d'Allys *Imago Mundi,* the works of Pliny. Dissociated from the impact of actual Indians, he is driven by his (pre)conceptions and a vivid imagination to conceive the Indians alternatively as "noble savages" (human beings with rights, though abstracted from any form of society) or as "dirty dogs" (different from himself and therefore subhuman and suitable for enslavement). To put it differently, the other is discovered but never seen (Todorov, 1984:Chap. 1). In contrast to Wendt, we see here that it is not so

much the gestures that signal the quality of the contact but rather the pre-conceptions that construct both the gestures and the contact.

Todorov argues that these paradoxes—discovery without seeing and the counterposing of contradictory myths of noble savages and subhumans—are congruent elements of Columbus's egocentric confrontation with the other; that a common pattern of meanings emerges in situations of initial contact. He calls this pattern a "double movement." Columbus's construction of the other is exemplary:

> Either he conceives the Indians (though without using these words) as human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals but also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in his case, obviously, it is the Indians who are inferior). What is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of being not merely an imperfect state of oneself. These two elementary figures of the experience of alterity are both grounded in egocentrism, in the identification of our own values with values in general, of our *I* with the universe—in the conviction that the world is one. (Todorov 1984:42–43)

However strong our need to make sense of the world in our own terms, "discovery" reveals difference, that the world is *not* one. Yet otherness is not immediately or readily recognized. The initial revelation of difference by the self is "translated" as the "inferiority" of the other. Further contact may lead to the discovery or construction of commonality. However, this commonalty (and purported equality) is established at the price of the disregard of difference, leading to a projection of values on the other, a demand for assimilation.

It needs to be stressed that it is within this frame of the "double movement" that the self comes to know and act toward the other. Here, Todorov's Cortes and Las Casas are cases of the two sides of the double movement. Cortes, unlike Columbus, has an interest in the other; yet, like Columbus, he is not merely a plunderer, hungry for gold. Rather, Cortes is driven by a desire to comprehend the Indians; it is crucial that his "first important action . . . is to find an interpreter" (Todorov, 1984:99). Cortes even comes to admire the creativity and artisanal skills of the Aztecs. However, as much as Cortes values Indian goods, he "does not acknowledge their makers as human individuals to be set on the same level as himself" (ibid.:129). It is this unquestioned sense of superiority that limits his understanding of the other and permits their destruction. As Todorov writes:

> Cortes understands relatively well the Aztec world that appears before him—certainly better than Montezuma understands the Spanish realities. And yet this superior understanding does not keep the conquistadors from

> destroying Mexican civilization and society; quite the contrary, we suspect
> that destruction becomes possible precisely because of this understanding.
> (ibid.:127)

Thus knowledge does not immediately produce sympathy and a fuller understanding; it does not necessarily transcend the double movement. Rather, Cortes's knowledge of the other within the frame of difference/inferiority entails (in the conquest as an exemplary case) enslavement and destruction—a denial of the very humanity of the other.

Las Casas, in contrast with Cortes, claims to "love" the Indians (Todorov, 1984:Chap. 3). He sees them as natively Christian and potentially better realizations of a mature Christianity than the Spaniards. Likewise, Las Casas does not see the Indians as inferiors, but equal in their identity with the Spanish as Christians. His "love" leads him then to develop a knowledge of the Indians in the service of conversion to realize that equality. However, Las Casas's knowledge is polluted by his inability to see the Indians as they really are, as different; in the end, he not only knows them less well than Cortes, but he participates in the destruction of their culture in the name of "love." Again, the double movement is operative, but in its alternative moment. Knowledge of otherness within the frame of equality/ assimilation creates a relationship of colonization and "seizure," where the humanity of the other is admitted, but only at the cost of cultural destruction—requiring conversion or acculturation (Todorov, 1984:177).

For Todorov, the treatment of others continues to occur within the double movement; contemporary cultural interactions are limited by the persisting *in* capacity to relate to and know the other, as equal *and* different (Todorov, 1984:4–5). We can observe this limitation in operation in Wendt's analysis: The knowledge gained in interaction—the interpretation of gestures and the assignment of probabilities—seem, for Wendt, calculations of danger or possibilities for gain. This treatment suggests that both the danger and opportunity for gain are defined in relation to determinations of the status of the other as either inferior and an object (a means to an end), or equal but assimilable. Perhaps the first step to transcending the double movement is to imagine or uncover interactions where both equality and difference of the other are affirmed. Here the work of Nandy is particularly significant.

Nandy's analysis runs parallel to that of Todorov, although Nandy examines a much later period in the history of European conquest. For Nandy, the British organized their relationship to the Indian other in terms of the two themes of "sex and age," but this construction tells us as more about the peculiarities of Victorian England than it does about India (Nandy, 1983:4–18). The Victorians, in Nandy's telling, had drawn strict demarcations between both the male and the female (purifying gender identifications by denying the cross-cutting of masculine and feminine traits in individuals) and the productive and unproductive years of life (setting in apposition an economically productive adulthood and an unproductive childhood and old

age). By extension, British colonial dominance was constructed as masculine in relationship to India's feminine submission. Similarly, Indian culture was portrayed as at once in childhood—an earlier stage of development—and aged, decrepit, and archaic. Thus, in the colonial construction, the Indian self requires Britain as a strict and domineering headmaster and doctor to whose tutoring, discipline, and healing India must submit. Here, India and the colonial project become an extension of Victorian thinking about the self.

For Nandy, this relationship remains paradigmatic of the interactions of the modern West and the Third World, center and periphery. The vision of the West, backed by "its secular power and its modern technology," appears as an "hegemonic, parochial vision," devouring the "other" in its wake. This occurs "paradoxically by rejecting the otherness of the latter and by 'accepting' them as earlier stages of the evolution of the self." Therefore, the vision of the West "is seen as the framework, tool or theory for understanding the other," reflecting "a pecking order of cultures in our times which informs every dialogue of cultures, visions and faiths and which tries to force the dialogue to serve the needs of the modern West and its extensions within the non-West" (Nandy, 1987a:12–15). This characterization of contemporary cultural interactions bears a striking resemblance to Todorov's double movement.

We might conclude from our discussion of Todorov and Nandy thus far that cultural interactions are intrinsically conflictual and necessarily hierarchical. We might suggest something like a pessimistic version of first image thinking that conflict, conquest, domination, and subordination have a fixed ontological status in human cultures and cultural interactions.[12] Optimists likely would find the solution to the inherent clash of cultures in the establishment of a universal culture and might see trends in that direction (Fukuyama, 1992). But to the extent that cultural difference will remain with us into the foreseeable future, we seem left with conflict as an ineliminable feature of international/intercultural relations. Thus, optimism is eternally frustrated as in Waltz's own assessment of first image thinking.

However, neither Todorov nor Nandy accepts cultural conflict as a fixed condition. Both uncover the possibility of nonviolent cultural interactions. Todorov endorses the capacity humans display to learn to adopt the perspective of the other. Las Casas, in his own life, represents the kind of learning and growth (however limited in his case), that stretches the double movement into new forms. Later in his life, Las Casas's "love" for the Indians leads him to discover in the particularities of Indian religious practice (including human sacrifice) examples of the religiosity that underlies all religious practice. This reasoning reveals an advance in self–other thinking: a relativizing of religious experience that allows Las Casas to place Christianity and the Indian religions side by side without demanding identity (Todorov, 1984:188–189). Likewise, in Bernadino de Sahagun, a sixteenth-century teacher and historian, Todorov finds another figure who has

advanced beyond Columbus and Cortes: He takes the Indians to be equals but he does not ignore their differences; nor does he translate these differences into a vision of a "noble savage." Rather, he deems the Indians, like all human groups, possess a distinct combination of virtues and failings. Thus Sahagun cannot justify colonization; he, unlike so many others, condemns the Spanish conquest (Todorov, 1984:237–238). While Todorov notes the failings of Las Casas and Sahagun (their inabilities to allow the voice of the other a full equality as a partner in self-reflection and cultural criticism [ibid.:240–241]), they, nevertheless, do represent the possibility of growth.

Todorov claims, then, that "growth is an apprenticeship in exteriority and sociality" (1984:247), that learning involves discovering the other in ever greater degrees. He writes that

> The other knows several degrees, from the other-as-object, identified with the surrounding world, to the other-as-subject, equal to the I but different from it, with an infinity of intermediary nuances. (ibid.:247)

That is, between treating the other as a mere object and recognizing the other as fully equal yet different, Todorov's figures, from Columbus to Sahagun, represent a hierarchy of self–other relations. More precisely, Todorov's characters present ever-greater possibilities for nonviolent and dialogical relations of self and other—a progression of an increased ability to understand *and* a lessened capacity to subjugate the other. Dialogue is valued because it makes possible a search for "truths" not as a "point of departure" that subordinates one participant to the other's "point of view," but as a goal of establishing "understanding," a "common horizon" that transcends "one's own partiality and one's parochialism" (Todorov, 1987:160). For Todorov, this remains an ideal: Realizing nonviolent cultural interactions requires us to learn to step beyond the limits of contemporary forms of self–other relations.

Nandy, too, suggests the possibility of cultural interactions that transcend the frame of domination and subordination. He finds in the figures of C. F. Andrews and Mohandas Gandhi a capacity to reach out to the other as an ally in a common battle against oppression. Both Andrews and Gandhi were able to uncover the other within the self as a source of critical self-reflection and cultural transformation. Their sensitivity to their own suffering allows them not only to discern the suffering of the other, but also to make overcoming of that common suffering central to their thought and action. For Nandy, these figures exemplify the problem and prospects for cultural interactions in a world of oppression (Nandy, 1983:36–37, 48–51).

Nandy sees cultures as more or less "shared cultural visions," but these visions exist as "open-ended text rather than as a closed book" (Nandy, 1987a:2; 1987b:118). To be more specific, rather than homogeneous, fixed

entities, Nandy describes a "vision" as a layered phenomenon, comprising "different levels or parts," or, perhaps, dominant and recessive moments (1987a:17). This layering necessitates a dialogue internal to the culture, among competing orthodoxies and heterodoxies, dominant and suppressed voices, and provides a source of creative tension within the culture:

> The gap between reality and hope which such a vision creates becomes a source of cultural criticism and a standing condemnation of the oppression of everyday life to which we otherwise tend to get reconciled. (Nandy, 1987a:3)

This dialogical process within a culture can only be sustained in conjunction with a dialogue of cultures. Nandy at once recognizes the difficulty of such a dialogue of cultures and shows its necessity in a world of cultures. On the one hand, he sets strictures on cultural integration, warns of forced uniformity, and notes the presence of "carefully built cultural defenses against disturbing dialogues." On the other hand, Nandy links his stress on difference, his sense of "cultural relativism," to the acceptance of the "universalism of some core values of humankind," to the existence of an "intercultural communion" denying the complete alterity of cultural visions (Nandy, 1987a:54–55).

It is within this space of differences and commonalities that cultural interactions occur. Commonalities are present in that certain basic values and cultural traditions are shared by all cultural visions because they "derive from man's biological self and social experience" (Nandy, 1987a:17, 22, 54–55). Of special importance, Nandy assigns to the species a constant struggle to "alter or expand its awareness of exploitation and oppression." Thus, cultural communication can be established "among social criticisms"—each vision's more or less articulated understanding of and response to oppression. A "cultural closeness" of otherwise diverse civilizational experiences is made possible by this "experience of co-suffering," in Nandy's evocative phrase. In fact, Nandy makes the realization of a civilization's "authentic vision of the future and its own authenticity in future" depend on a recognition of this unfortunately ubiquitous experience of human suffering, exploitation, and oppression, whether as victimizer or victim (1987a:13, 22, 54).

While commonalities may make communication possible, it is the different voices and visions present in the other that make dialogue necessary and valuable. It is by finding links between the "different levels and parts" of various cultures (as between the oppressed of both the center and the periphery) that a cultural dialogue can most usefully be established (Nandy, 1987a: 17, 22–23, 48, 52). As Nandy puts it:

> The search for authenticity of a civilization is always a search for the other face of the civilization, either as a hope or a warning. The search for a civ-

ilization's utopia, too, is part of this larger quest. It needs not merely the ability to interpret and reinterpret one's own traditions, but also the ability to involve the often-recessive aspects of other civilizations as allies in one's struggle for cultural self-discovery, the willingness to become allies to other civilizations trying to discover their other faces, and the skills to give more centrality to these new readings of civilizations and civilizational concerns. This is the only form of a dialogue of cultures which can transcend the flourishing intercultural barters of our times. (1987a: 55)

Thus Nandy suggests that cultural visions, rather than by nature fixed and closed entities, possess an openness to—or, even stronger—a *need* for other visions as part of their own authentication. For Nandy authenticity seems to imply establishing an internal "accountability and self-exploration," self-criticism rather than inquisition, making the cultural vision alive as a guide for the future, for creating a "plural, more human polity" (Nandy, 1987a:7).[13]

What do we take Todorov's and Nandy's works to mean? We read their works as responses to Wendt's and Waltz's understanding of "initial contact." For Todorov and Nandy, actors bring to the contact a knowledge of self and other, giving structure *and* content to the contact of cultures. Thus the motivations for and the logic of cultural interactions cannot be captured in terms of a state-of-nature situation, bereft of all but the minimum content necessary to prescribe the actors' given and fixed motivations. Rather, the interactions of cultures and peoples are necessarily content-full: an interaction of selves and others—of meanings and interpretations, of intentions and projects. Thus, as if in response to Waltzian structuralism, Todorov and Nandy suggest that cultural interactions are not structured according to a fixed plan or universal essence. Rather, cultural interactions admit of growth, the creation of new structures of self–other relations. If cultural interactions are governed by a structure that shapes the actions and natures of cultures, it is also a structure that cultural actors construct, within which they struggle, and which they transform. The structure of cultural interactions exhibits a series of possibilities that include but also transcend the absorption with danger and gain. It is possible to uncover domination and conquest, but also movements to equality and communication. Our task, then, is to suggest the importance of these insights for a theory of intercultural relations.

CONCLUSION: KNOWING ENCOUNTERS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

There exists therefore a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the same as the struggle for cultural unification of the human race. What the idealists call "spirit" is not a point of departure but a point of arrival.

—*Antonio Gramsci* (1971:445–446)

Steering clear of the state-of-nature construct and following Nandy and Todorov, we suggest that the deepest motivation for human contact is self-knowledge. Selves and cultures come to know themselves, construct their identities, in relation to a world beyond themselves. A sense of the world—a cosmological scheme, a vision or a representation of the world—sustains the culture or self, constituting its particular conceptions of what it means to be human (and a human community) in the world.[14] This sense of self (and, by implication, "otherness") is the basis for action in and on the world. Because the identity of cultures necessarily depends on the social construction of both self and world, cultures—with different but also similar understandings and projects—can be thought to come into contact by the very process of seeking self-knowledge. What can we say about such contact?

While Nandy's and Todorov's ideas are suggestive of work toward a cultural theory of international society, they are not that work itself. Nevertheless, we need not start de novo: From Waltz we can retrieve a version of the third image; from Wendt, social constructivism. The third image brings our attention to the important idea that intended projects need not produce expected results.

Waltz argues that the disjunction between intentions and results is due to the structure of anarchy. Acknowledging this disjunction we nevertheless differ with Waltz in two ways. First, we reject his strict notion that "outcomes *cannot* be inferred from intentions or behavior" (1979:73). Waltz goes too far in disallowing human learning about the value of ends and the ways of achieving ends. We offer instead a softer version of his structural dictum: While outcomes may not be inferred readily from intentions and actions, it remains possible and necessary both for actors qua actors to sustain some connection between intentions and results and for scholars to understand the human process of learning about intentions and results, even when results seem unintended. Thus, regardless of their origins, understanding social outcomes always requires an analysis of actors' intentions, purposes, ideas, and projects. Second, to the degree there is a disjunction between intentions and results we attribute it to the cultural interaction of meanings and actions, rather than to the structural imperatives of anarchy. That is, if differing cultures act on the world in deliberate opposition to each other, if they are not aware that their projects are interacting in such a way as to frustrate each culture's intentions, or if their joint or opposing projects are internally self-contradictory, then a disjunction between intentions and results is likely. This disjunction is, however, mutable. Opposition and competition may give way to, or may work simultaneously with, coordination and cooperation. Greater harmony between projects and results may be due to humans' coming to consciousness of the complexity of their projects and cultural interactions. In contrast to Waltzian neorealism, conflict is not fixed by the structure of the international system. Instead, learning is possible.

Following Wendt's social constructivism, we defend the idea that the

past, present, and future are socially constructed according to meanings actors hold about themselves and their world. These meanings and the world change as the interaction among cultures proceeds. However, unlike Wendt we suggest that the changing structure of meanings is not the result simply of cultural interaction *after* first contact. Rather, each culture brings to the interactions (changeable) images of itself and others that are prefigured by myths, texts, and traditions. In this sense there is no such thing as "first contact."[15] A commitment to a constructivist IR theory requires, therefore, a comparative and historical analysis of how cultures conceptualize others.

What do these claims suggest for the study of what we still refer to as international relations theory? First, the argument highlights the epistemological principle of social constructivism: Studying international society is properly the study of meanings held by actors about their roles in constructing and living within this society—its purposes, ethics, and aesthetics. This does not mean we move in a straight line from such meanings to historical results. We also need to study how these meanings refract, harmonize, compete, and conflict with each other, creating various levels of disjunction between intentions and results.

Second, by allowing Waltz's third image to become meaningful we arrive at cultural "world history."[16] As suggested by the work of Nandy and Todorov, cultural interaction necessitates understanding the historical shifts in the mythical, textual, and traditional views of cultures prior to, during, and after sustained physical contact. That is, we need to move away from state-of-nature constructions and toward the actual world history of cultural contact.

Third, again following Nandy and Todorov, a cultural understanding of international society means bringing ethical questions back into the picture. An ethical approach has several implications. First, we must determine how cultural understandings of the "other" can be improved. Specifically, we must determine which historical figures and which aspects of various cultures were/are/will be able to understand and incorporate others in what we might consider a just and dignified manner. Second, we must turn the axis of study away from the North American fixation with competition and order to that of suffering, exploitation, and injustice. Nandy's and Todorov's concern with colonialism is not incidental; it is perhaps through the study of exploitative interactions that North American IR theory can recover from its myopia. Third, we must explore the hegemony of the motive of competitive gain as well as the sustained disciplinary imperialism of "economism." We need to treat this hegemony as an explicitly cultural phenomenon. Specifically, we need to ask why and how the culture of "economism" became so powerful and what types of cultural resistance effectively limit its reach.

We are aware that significant questions remain for such a cultural project. For example, what makes us think that conversation across cultural dif-

ference is really possible? Is it plausible, following Nandy's lead, that an ethical understanding of suffering anchors communication between self and other, even victim and victimizer?[17] Most important, what type of institutions can we imagine and construct that are appropriate for the practice of conversation among cultures? As one commentator points out, this is where most of the work must be done.[18] It remains only to add that this cultural project is not ours alone; such a project must itself be intercultural.

NOTES

1. Whether this dynamic is universal or, as argued by Charles Taylor, a problem image to the modern self or even a dynamic triggered by modernity's circumnavigation of the planet is an important question we hope to take up in a separate essay. For the second of these interpretations, see Taylor 1989.

2. We join international and intercultural together in a fashion that is now a subject of much discussion and dispute. Our argument is that despite the limits of our current categories and practices in containing cultures, cultures still primarily "imagine" themselves as nations (bounded in relation to others as sovereigns), as nascent nation-states, or as relatively autonomous cultures within a multinational state. To put it differently, we bracket this question in order to explore the logic of international relations as contact among cultures.

3. See Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil in this volume. These authors also suggest the failure of neorealists to come to grips with the nation, culture, identity, and nationalism as an ideology.

4. Inayatullah and Levine 1990 give a fuller treatment of the idea that even the economy can be a realm of meaning. See also Inayatullah and Blaney 1994 for an elaboration of the meaningful character of competition. The central claim of this latter paper is that "competition is not merely a consequence of the structure of anarchy. Rather, competition is a social construction, a particular structuring of meaning and purpose which informs social practices and gives competition its role within the cultural logic of modern society" (8–9).

5. For a fuller treatment, see Inayatullah 1994.

6. No "state of nature" has yet been found. Nevertheless, theories have often considered hunting and gathering societies the closest analog.

7. Wendt distinguishes this agency from the "internationally negotiated terms of individuality." He also takes the "quasi-state" as an empirical exception, suggesting the failure of Third World states to generate their own material agency, as distinguished from the international recognition of their sovereignty. See Wendt 1992:402 and footnote 40.

8. Wendt notes that a study of first contact would be interesting, but does not regard it as crucial to his project (Wendt, 1992:404, footnote 47). Rather, he regards first contact as a readily available rhetorical device for examining the dynamics of identity formation. It is important to recognize, however, that rhetorical devices and metaphors systematically structure our thinking in ways that highlight some avenues of thought while hiding others (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:3–14).

9. It is the explanation, not the description, of a competitive, self-help system Wendt disputes.

10. Wendt seems to admit such ties (1992:424).

11. We limit our discussion to the Spanish narrators. This move is in part to

simplify the discussion, but is also a reflection of the limited recording of the Amerindians' response to the Spanish. Todorov does attempt to tell the related story of the Indian confrontation with the European "other," where possible.

12. Some make arguments not far from this (Bozeman, 1984).

13. Nandy's argument displays a number of similarities to that of Fanon 1963. Fanon, like Nandy, refuses the idea of culture as a "stock of particularisms" (Fanon, 1963:223) and locates peoples' struggle against oppression as central to cultural self-definition (ibid.:235). Also in parallel to Nandy, Fanon cites "consciousness of self" as the possibility of the opening of a culture to communication with others (ibid.:247). These similarities do not deny other real differences in viewpoint as in their respective views on violence. See Nandy's discussion of this difference (Nandy, 1987a:33–34).

14. This has been discussed by Alan Gilbert 1992:6 as the "enduring human project of attempting to envision and achieve a good life," in response to the question: How am I or how are we to live? The universality of such an ethical project might be questioned. However, Gilbert's response—that "even unreflective cultures" respond to this question in some fashion—parallels Nandy's argument that even visions of the world envisioning time as an endless repetition possess a utopian element, giving the culture a basis for self-reflection (Nandy, 1987a:17–18).

15. There is historical support for this proposition (Altman and Butler, 1994:487–492; Axtell, 1992:104).

16. The concept of "world history" is described in the following way by the advertising supplement to the *Journal of World History:* "Historical scholarship traditionally has dealt with the experiences of national communities. More recently, however, historians have recognized the need to examine processes whose effects transcend the boundaries of nations, cultures, and civilizations. Their efforts have produced an exciting body of literature increasingly recognized as world history, that is, historical analysis undertaken from the viewpoint of global community rather than from that of national states."

17. Friedrich Kratochwil (Chap. 10) suggests both the difficulties and possibilities of establishing ethical obligation across borders of citizenship and identity.

18. We are grateful to Friedrich Kratochwil for alerting us to these questions.

5

Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension[1]

Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic

This chapter examines some elements of the recent engagement with culture in international relations theory. In particular, I will consider two attempts at reconsidering the neorealist conception of anarchy, one critical and one sympathetic. I suggest that the recent works of Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1994) and Barry Buzan (1991 and 1993), in their modifications of the standard realist formulation of the international system, involve an implicit introduction of cultural considerations. Although neither author specifically relies on the concept of culture, I argue that a culture-based interpretation of their work serves as a fruitful starting point for exploring an explicitly cultural conception of international systems. Additionally, I propose that a systems perspective, rather than the essentially actor-based approaches of both scholars, enables the theorizing of an explicit relationship between culture and systems. In sum, I wish to bring both systems and culture back into international relations theory.

As realism's answer to the question of systems, the Waltzian standpoint asserts that systemic relations are reducible to the relative positions of states on a systemwide map of capabilities. In an anarchic world, both system and relations are constituted by the distribution of material power. This understanding has encouraged the broad-ranging tendency to categorize different kinds of systems and relations as various constellations of states with superior capabilities. In the neorealist world, social and cultural factors are relegated to the domestic realm, where they remain irrelevant to the workings of international relations. Frustration with the asocial, acultural perspective of this dominant paradigm has led to an important new emphasis on the sociality of state interaction, even in a technically anarchic world. The recently revived focus on shared understandings points to a "culturing" of theory, retrieving the idea that international relations and systems are indeed *social* relations and systems.

Against the background of the neorealist tradition, the turn toward culture in explorations of the complex question of systems is fully understand-

able. Alex Wendt's constructivist approach to anarchy and collective identity formation and Barry Buzan's revival of "international society" are, however, insufficient because their particular conceptualizations of state sociality reveal the persistence of realist and rationalist[2] assumptions. For both authors, systemic relations can be understood on the basis of (1) preformed, unitary actors; and (2) purely interactionist accounts. I argue that the persistence of these assumptions arises out of Hedley Bull's very limiting idea that states, under the duress of technical anarchy, only engage in the social out of an "interest" in maintaining order. Therefore, in understandings of the social life of states, practice informs only to the extent that it reflects or engages interest. Indeed, this idea characterizes the theoretical fashion of both realism and rationalism in which the whole, or the system, is simply the sum of interacting parts, and anything nonstate is asystemic. Consequently, theoretical boundaries such as state/society and domestic/international are unproblematically maintained.

"International Society" especially, has become a signal for a particular, usually the so-called Grotian tradition in international relations, bringing with it the above set of rather well-formed theoretical proclivities. The problem with the notion of society in general is that it is both vague and slippery. Even with the constraints of rationalism, it allows for a huge variety of conceptions of what constitutes international life. The resolution, however, does not lie in Buzan's attempt to marry the concept to structural realism, nor does it lie in the abandonment of social conceptions of international relations altogether. The problem of fuzziness seems to correlate with a hesitation to place social interaction in an explicitly cultural context. Therefore, the dilemma of indeterminacy can be managed by extending theory from implicit dealings with culture to much more explicit ones.

Serious consideration of culture connotes the notion that actors are only formed by their immersion or participation in a normative milieu—that is, their culture. Consequently, a cultural departure point cannot take actors as fully formed, eager interactors or processors; their dispositions are inseparably connected to their cultural context. A cultural perspective then demands that one consider the characteristics of actors as products and producers of their culture. This perspective not only allows us to imagine more richly constituted, contextualized actors, but also the very process of doing so demands a theoretically fertile notion of systems and a consistent systems perspective. Not confined to state walls, culture also entails shared understandings of groups or systems. It is for this reason that systems, though hard to imagine, are crucial to international politics and therefore to theory. Too often, systems are mistakenly reduced to some kind of mechanical, material, or logical "priority" that is erroneously considered a secure starting point for theory-building. An explicitly cultural conceptualization of international systems, however, does offer hope for richer, more relevant theories.

As a preface to my own arguments, I begin in the next two sections with

specific critiques of Wendt and Buzan. Then, in the final section, I consider the more explicitly cultural views of the non-Bullian societalists in the British School, such as Martin Wight and Arnold Toynbee. Unfortunately, due to the predominantly historical perspectives of these scholars, their work suffers from a certain lack of conceptual clarity. Despite this, I begin with their assumptions and propose that one possible way to proceed with theorizing about culture and international systems is through the concept of civilization.

WENDT AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

In his important article on anarchy, Alexander Wendt (1992) adopts ideas from constructivism to argue that the anarchy identified by neorealism is itself a consequence of normatively informed state interaction. He maintains that states as social entities partially learn about themselves, about each other, and about behavior from relating with others. Shared meanings, seen as mechanical cognitions of social acts (signals and interpretations), are converted to a series of cognitive templates that are concretized by repeated interaction. This complies with earlier theorizing in suggesting that norms and rules do guide behavior, even in a technically anarchic world.

These points are important but the standard overemphasis on unitary state actors and their interaction is a real drawback. Quandaries associated with the idea that meanings both constitute behavior and are constituted by behavior abound, rendering this particular argument about meanings circular and lacking in explanatory value. Constructivist "meanings" merely tell us that this translates into that; this word conveys that, this act signals or can be interpreted as that, this requires that response, and so forth. The main contribution of this notion of shared meanings is the idea that behavior is guided by norms and that the language of interaction promotes and stabilizes systems operation. Constructivism limits its potential to go further with the concept of shared meanings by making the implicit but extreme assertion that only practice informs. Using this type of approach to understand the basis of shared meaning inevitably leads us into the loop of imagining the first social act between states. As Wendt admits, the argument puts enormous weight on the first act, since initial interaction determines so much about the way things go afterward.

The constructivist focus on interaction-based, interpretive norms represents an implicit but important theoretical turn to culture. The emphasis on cognition, however, belies a serious contradiction in constructivism. Here, evaluation of the social construction of power politics takes place in a social, historical, and cultural vacuum; the social world in which states live is not explicitly engaged. Wendt problematically shelves the very persistent reality that, at any given point in history, there are always sociocultural prefor-

mations that affect the construction of other social formations and their interactions. Indeed, the relatively recent historical emergence of states systems and their particular cultural contexts should allow an understanding of shared meanings without having to imagine first acts. The constructivist idea of meanings reduces the study of politics to strictly behavioral terms, as if behavioral norms were generated from a tabula rasa. This line of theorizing hides the more important contributions of antecedent social meanings, meanings that inform interpretation of the interaction-based cognitive templates with which Wendt is concerned.

Moreover, the lack of a systems perspective in a theory trying to explain the workings of a social system represents a primary problem of Wendt's constructivist approach. States share ideas, but more important than the point that they *do share* is the question of what is entailed by the notion of "sharing." Indeed, the notion of shared meanings points well beyond individual actors and their interaction to the idea of a group: *How, why, and among whom does the sharing take place, in the first place? What is the identity and boundary of the group within which the sharing is taking place?* While constructivist methodology, in emphasizing the sharedness of meanings, points toward a "system" out there, it tells us little of the system's characteristics. It evades the reality that the "social"—even for states living in a technically anarchic world—indicates a group. It is here in the realm of the larger whole or system, and the "we" or shared identity questions necessary to conceptualize the system, that this argument loses its footing altogether, even though the importance of shared identity questions is not lost on Wendt's constructivism.

In "Collective Identity Formation and the International State" Wendt explores state identity issues by dividing them into two separate categories: "corporate" (or what we might refer to as individual state) and "social" (or collective) identities. He defines corporate identity as "the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality . . . for organizations, it means their constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as a 'we'." This corporate identity generates four basic interests, according to Wendt: (1) physical security; (2) ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world; (3) recognition as an actor by others beyond pure survival issues; and (4) development of the state's role in meeting the human aspiration for a better life. According to Wendt, the corporate or individual identity of a state is distinguishable from "social identities" or the identities and interests that states generate through interaction with other states. These social identities are "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object" (Wendt, 1994:385).

Although Wendt's state has multiple and changing identities and interests that are affected by more than the distribution of material power, Wendt

still begins at the statist departure point of both realism and rationalism. His analysis of collective identity formation begins with states as usual, and conceptualizes them as "corporate bodies" whose only theoretically determinate qualities are territory, physical resources, and so forth. After the material characteristics of state identity, the remaining "intrinsic, self-organizing qualities" are deeply social and socially contingent. The difficulty does not lie in pointing this out (indeed, it is a very important point), but rather in having no concrete conceptualization of identity formation that engages the actually social levels of states' sociality.

It seems that in evaluating the corporate identity discussion, we can return to Wendt's own criticisms of realism, rationalism, and the asocial world in which they live. Wendt's statism and largely realist/rationalist conceptualization of corporate identity presents us with materially constituted, uncomplicated, preformed state actors whose only determinable interest, as they enter the arena of interaction, is survival. It is true that he does profess the desire to avoid an "oversocialized approach" (Wendt, 1994:385). By allowing himself to imagine uncomplicatedly preformed actors, his theory can proceed to engage what he considers the more important level of state sociality, their systemic interaction. Even though an abundance of theorizing on nationalism and other societal factors has taken place, Wendt's justifications for their general dismissal propagates the mainstream understanding that these levels of analysis are systemically exogenous, empirical/ historical, or simply unnecessary for theory. He argues:

> Foreign policy role theorists, as well as more recently a number of neoliberals have emphasized the domestic (and thus systemically exogenous) roots of state identities. I am interested in showing how state identities may be endogenous to the system, but this is ultimately an empirical question that depends on the depth of structures at each level of analysis [and] corporate identities have histories, but these do not concern me here; a theory of the states system need no more explain the existence of states than one of society need explain that of people. (Wendt, 1994:385–386)

It is clear that for the sake of scientific clarity, Wendt's "social" theory of corporate identity formation hesitates to engage that which he considers overtly social and, therefore, atheoretical. In other words, he hesitates to explicitly engage culture. This hesitation induces the imagination of static actors and the stubborn maintenance of tenuous boundaries (state/society, domestic/international) set by the field of international relations. Wendt continues his theory of collective identity formation at what he believes is the real level of state sociality, the level of state interaction, or the system. States' social identities, or those that take into account the perspective of others, are multiple (unlike the singular corporate identity?) and vary in salience. Wendt argues that they are situational and involve cognitive schemas that at once enable the actor to determine "who am I" and "who are

we?" as well as positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations (1994:385). Here we have returned to the foundations of Wendt's anarchy paper. Social identities for a given state, like shared meanings, are cognitive schemas determined by a process of situational interactions with other states. As with shared meanings, the "social" in social identity formation exists without a notion of society and is, then, simply a by-product of repeated state interactions. As well, the realist/rationalist notion of system as simply interactive parts is maintained in this discussion. Consequently, the intuitive notions that "collective" indicates a group, and "collective identity" indicates the identification/differentiation of groups are not addressed in this theory of collective identity formation.

Wendt's constructivism fails to reveal much about identity at either the state or the system level. Like realism and rationalism, it does not engage a very basic reality: Like an individual's, a state's social learning does not begin and end with the fact that it occasionally runs into similar units that have some effect on it. Beyond interaction, a historical bombardment of influences from social and cultural institutions comes to constitute what we call identities and interests for individuals and, even more so, states, since states are in their entirety social arrangements. Given the complexity of these processes, static conceptualization of identity and interests simply from the standpoint of narrowly conceived interactive actors becomes very problematic indeed.

Now we turn to another engagement of the social life of states, in which sympathy for structural realism engenders the introduction of systems-level components into the analysis of collective identity formation.

BUZAN AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

In a recent article Barry Buzan (1993) revives the concept of international society. He argues that the concept, once made more precise, can add important dimensions and possibilities to systems and regime theories. Buzan recognizes that there is an emerging globalism that he calls world society and distinguishes it from international society. Next, he notes that clearly identifiable signs of normative arrangements, formal and informal, are undeniably present in the international system, despite technical anarchy. The goal of his paper is to show that the concept of international society, qualified by tenets of structural realism, explains how the presence of norms is theoretically possible under the logic of anarchy.

First, Buzan claims that the distinction of system and society established by Bull and Watson is central to theory building. International society denotes "a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but

also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements." Qualifying the Waltzian notion of system (interacting units structured according to some ordering principle) with Bull and Watson's definition of significant or "systemic" interaction (the behavior of each state is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others), Buzan presents his understanding of system. He argues that system is logically the more basic and prior idea to society since an international system can exist without a society, but not vice versa (Buzan, 1993:330–331).

Next, Buzan takes on the task of explaining how a society can come into being under the logic of anarchy. He does this by using the distinction made in sociology between the *gemeinschaft* (community, civilizational) and *gesellschaft* (society or association, functional) conceptions of society. Here, Martin Wight is held up as the primary advocate of the gemeinschaft view, since Wight argued that a "states-system"[3] will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members. Buzan argues that Wight's cultural unity view is shaky for two reasons: (1) As Wight's—and later Adam Watson's—research showed, there are only eleven or so historical cases of such societies having emerged,[4] and (2) it does not explain how shared-culture international societies develop close relations with states outside their civilizational sphere (Buzan, 1993:333–334).

Given the difficulties of a gemeinschaft approach, Buzan adopts a functionalist argument based on his particular understanding of gesellschaft societies to substantiate his final thesis: "International society could evolve functionally from the logic of anarchy without preexisting cultural bonds. Buzan posits that in an increasingly dense and interactive international system, "whether or not units share a common culture, at some point the regularity and intensity of their interactions will virtually force the development of a degree of recognition and accommodation among them." Under the survivalist logic of anarchy, society emerges out of a common interest in or desire for order. Realizing the "disadvantages of permanent chaos" and recognizing "mutual self-interest," leaderships will be pushed into "pursuing common objectives" and "constructing an international order." Summarizing Adam Watson's notion of *raison de système*, Buzan concludes that the regulating rules and institutions of a system emerge and in turn develop among the members a consciousness of common values necessary for the system to become a society (Buzan, 1993:334–335).

Unlike Bull and Watson, however, Buzan recognizes that the key problem with this functionalist line is that it evades the question of common or shared identity central to the concept of society. In other words, his functionalist account still has not done what he complained the gemeinschaft accounts did not do—explain how unlike units develop *really* close relations. He argues that societies, "to deserve the label . . . have to contain an element of common identity, a sense of 'we-ness' that comprises more than

mere shared goals" (1993:335). For Buzan, the primordial system cannot become a true society until this shared identity emerges. While noting that the "who are we?" questions are left out of Wight[5] and Bull,[6] Buzan argues that a complete functionalist model must have a conceptualization of shared identity: "In the gesellschaft model, it can be argued that shared goals and identity converge at some point; that is, that the development of common norms, rules, and institutions—of a sense of raison de système—must eventually generate, as well as be generated by, a common identity. A community arrived at by this route would be a narrower, more conditional, and more fragile one than that formed by a common culture. Unless there is a sense of common identity, however, society cannot exist" (Buzan, 1993:336).

To make amends for the omission of shared identity, Buzan curiously turns to Waltz:[7] "Anarchy generates like units. . . . As interaction makes units more similar, it becomes easier for each to accept that the other members of the system are in some important sense the same type of entity as itself" (Buzan, 1993:335). To pinpoint the exact instance where and when this sense of similarity emerges and reproduces itself, when the prior system (simple interaction) evolves into the latter society (shared identity, goals, values), he posits the key role of sovereign equality. For Buzan, sovereign equality demarcates the evolutionary boundary between international system and international society by serving as the "clear-cut" criteria for shared identity. He elaborates:

> In order to work in the functional model, this shared identity needs to be rooted at least initially in the behavioral criteria of gesellschaft rather than in the cultural ones of gemeinschaft. By these criteria the defining boundary between international system and society is when units not only recognize each other as being the same type of entity but also are prepared to accord each other equal legal status on that basis. Mutual recognition and legal equality signify not only a turning point in the development of rules and institutions but also acceptance of a shared identity in which states accept each other as being the same type of entity. (Buzan, 1993:345)

Thus, "pure gesellschaft societies" resolve the problem of a common identity not by starting out as or even becoming like units. They resolve the problem of unlike units through the rule of sovereign equality. In other words, in Buzan's conceptualization of international society sovereign equality is the vehicle of common identity (ibid.:335–348).

A first problem is the distinction between system and society and the idea that the former always precedes the latter. Clearly intended as a heuristic distinction, the general maintenance of the two as separate categories is theoretically indefensible. Buzan declares the same as he contradicts his own premises: "It is possible to imagine a primitive international system existing in this mode for a long time but difficult to imagine it doing so without developing at least a few basic elements of international society"

(1993:341). Therefore, by Buzan's own admission, a "pure" system minus society is difficult to conceptualize, certainly as difficult to conceptualize as Wendt's "first act." Yet it is on the basis of this distinction that Buzan builds his functionalist model of international society, with the notion of sovereignty as common identity drawing the boundary between system and society.

A second problem in this exposition is Buzan's misconstrued use of the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft conceptions of society. Buzan, certainly not the first to use this distinction in a discussion of international society, draws some peculiar conclusions. His idea is that the gemeinschaft view represents societies that naturally grow from traditional, cultural, or primordial sentiment, while the gesellschaft view represents societies that arise from contractual agreement or acts of will. The peculiarity lies in the understanding that the second type, gesellschaft, which Buzan uses to represent his functionalist account of the formation of modern international society, can arise on its own without the existence of prior shared understandings. In contrast, in *The Nature of International Society* C.A.W. Manning questions the appropriateness of the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction in discussions of international society. Although he defines the two similarly to Buzan, Manning notes:

> What in practice this has meant is that, international society at the present time being so palpably *not* a *Gemeinschaft*, a *Gesellschaft* it therefore is taken to be. And the goal to be envisaged by rightminded men in their constructive thinking on the problems of human advancement is prefigured as the gradual transmutation of the global *Gesellschaft* of today into the global *Gemeinschaft* of an eventual tomorrow.
>   The idea is intriguing, and few seem to have voiced about it any theoretical doubt. Yet challenged it can be. (Manning, 1962:176)

Subsequently, Manning points out that the distinctions are not separable from one another as gesellschaft relations and institutions, or the "body corporate," can only arise *within* a preexisting gemeinschaft, or "national society":

> The body corporate is typically an institution of domestic law. It is an artificial drawing together of persons all having already in common a relationship to the overarching constitutional order. As members of a national society they are already in principle a *Gemeinschaft:* for their national community is not due to a contractual coming together. And it is within, and as between members of, the pre-existing national *Gemeinschaft* that the contractual arrangement, the contrived *Gesellschaft,* is brought into being. The international society, by contrast, was never the body corporate. And yet, very true, it is not the *Gemeinschaft* either. However, and here is the crux, it *corresponds* in the field of multi-sovereign-state co-existence, to the "family," the *Gemeinschaft,* as we meet it in the ordinary experience of fleshly men. (Manning, 1962:176–177)

Manning thus argues that the kinds of internal, analytical distinctions that Buzan makes in discussing gemeinschaft and gesellschaft conceptions, as well as the general tendency to draw comparisons between them and international society, may arise out of sound intentions but are conceptually problematic.

The reliance on sovereignty as the vehicle of common identity is a third problem in Buzan's analysis. First, identification and differentiation by states based on the mutual recognition of form only sketches the outlines of both sovereignty and common identity. This is like saying human beings have a common identity because they can identify each other as humans, as opposed to dogs or cats. While this statement is true, it tells us very little about the numerous and much more complex social identities people possess. Moreover, in terms of states, sovereignty is not at all a biological form, but rather a completely social institution. Its reality demands consideration beyond the "physical" structure it confers on the international system.[8]

Second, even though the institution of sovereign equality is a systemic institution, Buzan does not consider what it says about the system beyond the structural form (statehood) it confers on its actors. Here, sovereign equality is simply not considered from a social systems perspective even though the rule of sovereign equality, at its very simplest level, indicates membership in a group. The conceptualization of common identity based on sovereignty clearly points to a whole as well as to parts, but Buzan's discussion says nothing explicit about the identity, boundaries, and basic characteristics of the group.[9]

A last point about the sovereignty as common identity approach involves its relevance to general systems analysis. It is clear that only in reference to the postcolonial global system can we even talk about this kind of extended identity. It does not apply to historically prior or regional international systems.

The final and perhaps most important problem with Buzan's analysis is his unidimensional understanding of culture. This might have arisen from his particularly narrow reading of Martin Wight's *Systems of States* (1977) or a more general unwillingness to engage the complications of culture.[10] Either way, Buzan dismisses Wight's explicitly culture-based take on international systems as basically historical and not explanatory in regard to intercultural or intersocietal relations. This hasty dismissal results from the understanding of culture especially as shared religion and language, thus leaving few historical examples of unities based on such an understanding. Indeed, with such a definition, the acceptance of a common culture in India or the United States is problematic, as these are multilingual, multireligious, multiethnic societies. Yet there would be consensus on the point that "an Indian culture" or "an American culture" exists.

In *Systems of States* Wight never clearly defines his concept of system or culture; rather, he gives a series of suggestions as to what they may entail.

In examining cultural unity, which he argues is a key factor in the development of international systems, he suggests ranges of possibilities as to its contents, from common religion and language to common ethos and ideology to a common "way of life." Additionally, Wight's historical discussions range beyond the Greeks to include unities like "Europe," whose essence cannot be captured by a mechanical understanding of shared language and religion. Theoretically and empirically, Wight introduces a broad and complex spectrum of commonality encompassed in the word *culture*.[11]

The difficulty Buzan has with Wight's gemeinschaft views lies in Wight's inability to show how shared-culture societies develop close relations with states outside their civilizational sphere. This is not really a serious problem with Wight, given a broader understanding of culture. This issue, at least, is no less resolvable than the issue of how multicultural states in Europe developed a shared identity. Indeed, Buzan mentions that the European case is one of an imperial legacy of shared culture, not an "original shared culture" like the Greeks, yet he persists in arguing that the civilization or culture-based notions cannot explain the expansion of international society beyond its "original cultural domain" (see my note 8).

Buzan is willing to see the correlations between culture and international societies, even to accept that international societies are identifiable as different cultures interacting with each other. His shortcoming is that he essentializes the cultural view of society, seeing culture as monoculture, something primordial or original. He does not recognize the fact that culture is also the result of extended relations between "primordial" groups that enable the inclusion of larger and larger groups. Indeed, the external relations between cultures are "cultures" as well. Buzan accidentally encounters this when he notes that, despite the multicultural units with which it was constituted, Europe's imperial legacy and the legacy of the Church enabled a shared culture.

The vehicles of expansion of the European world system, such as capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and Christianity surely have constituted other shared-culture systems. If Buzan's notion of culture were a broader one, he might recognize this. Additionally, closer analysis of these kinds of phenomena might realistically engage the question of how intimate relations developed between societies from different civilizational spheres, at least more realistically than the static sovereignty approach to the question that Buzan promotes.

In short, explicitly cultural conceptions of international systems or societies may provide insight into how "unlike units" develop intimate relations. Although the relationship of culture to international relations inquiry needs further and more explicit examination, the cultural approach seems to offer a more logical and realistic alternative to systems/societies theorizing than Buzan's idea of the pure gesellschaft type of development.

TOWARD THEORIZING ABOUT
CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

The Legacies of the British School

The constructivist emphasis on norms and shared meanings as well as the current revival of the concept of international society not only reveal proclivities consistent with realism, they reflect the legacies of Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. In many ways, these recent works reflect the same rationalist approach to theorizing about the social life of states as the so-called "Grotian" tradition in international relations inquiry, an approach to norms, rules, and institutions that constitutes an important but implicit engagement of culture.

Unfortunately, both the contemporary approaches and their British rationalist predecessors are fraught with problems. Hedley Bull's preoccupation with the question of order leads the study of systems and societies into overly behavioral or interaction-based directions. For Bull, the undesirable qualities of anarchy induce the desire for order in states. Next, this general "interest" in order instigates "an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values" (Bull, 1977:4). The question of systems/societies gets framed by the particular, interest-oriented way in which Bull interprets the question of order. Here, social life is the *willful* ordering or arranging of international life by states. This legacy leaves Wendt, Buzan, and realist/rationalist societalists in general with several recurrent themes: (1) the persistence of preformed, rational actors; (2) the persistence of the idea that only practice or interaction informs; and, most notably, (3) the persistent analysis of the whole, international system, completely from the level of its interactive parts.

These analyses, in their valiant efforts to either reject or modify Waltzian materialism and determinism, seem to throw out an important Waltzian baby with the bath water—the whole idea of a systems approach. Although Bull and his followers make important points about cooperation under anarchy, the interactionist orientation leaves out the more important realities of cooperation: The fact that its normative bases and the forms they take do not appear and operate by chance. As Manning so nicely points out, cooperation or contractual agreement (formal and informal) can only take place within the context of preexisting relationships or a shared culture. Thus, even social arrangements contrived under technical anarchy have everything to do with systems level and societal factors.

An interesting disciplinary development has been the tendency to refer mainly to Bull and Watson when engaging the "societalists" in the English school. In fact, the Royal Institute contained a number of other societalists, including Wight, Manning, and Toynbee, who adopted very different approaches from Bull and Watson. Despite the fact that they all pay him

homage, neither Bull nor his lineage take the particular kind of historico-cultural systems approach that Wight did in *Systems of States*. Even though Martin Wight engaged the issue of order, his conceptualization of systems as cultural unities is not order-based in the Bullian sense. Rather, Wight defined order as "a system of relationships for certain common purposes" (1979:105). He does not stress willful ordering so much as he does the idea that the question of international order is the question of how international life is ordered or organized. Wight's use of the word "purpose" could mislead us into thinking that his approach is again based on the "interests" of states, but his use of the words "systems" as essentially cultural unities and "relationships" to imply more meaningful association than simply the rationalist understanding of "relations" as interactions, point out important contrasts. Clearly, conceptual differences separate Martin Wight's holistic, cultural view of international systems from Bull's parts-oriented, rationalist view.

Even when reliance on culture is explicit, as in Martin Wight's work or that of the forgotten Royal Institution, Arnold Toynbee, the studies tend to become historical narratives. Neither Wight, who implied that systems are historical and culture-bound communities, nor Toynbee, the grand master of the civilizational historians, manages to lay out systematically in theory his cultural conceptions of international systems. Both simply assume the association and proceed with the analysis of world politics understood as the encounter of cultures or civilizations.

Extending Theory Beyond the British School

States as concrete political entities came into existence recently and in a historically specific context. Born of and in a complex social environment, there were numerous intra-, inter-, and extrastate influences that helped to constitute the European states system that eventually emerged and exported itself throughout the known world. I suggest that these influences, mainly ideational and not necessarily state- or state behavior-based, profoundly contributed to the formation of states and states systems. Given the "real" life of states, I propose that an overtly social, explicitly cultural orientation promises a deeper understanding of states and state relations than traditional approaches have heretofore offered. A cultural approach enables us to leave behind unitary state actors, purely interactionist accounts, and unnecessarily limiting conceptual boundaries such as domestic versus international and state versus society. A cultural approach demands that theory live where states live, highlighting the rich social reality of states systems by illuminating the cultural context from which they emerge and in which they flourish.

My specific interest here is to explore an explicitly cultural conception of international systems. Starting with the contributions of the cultural his-

torians in the British School, I will conceptualize the relationship between culture and international systems that they evidently assumed. Clearly, Spengler, Toynbee, Wight, and others adopted a very different category from "state" in trying to understand world politics. Influenced by thinking on culture as a way of classifying systems, Toynbee and his contemporaries used "civilization" (often used in conjunction or synonymously with "culture") rather than "state" as the major category in assessing international politics and relations. Civilization studies, grounded in the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers (Herder, Rousseau, Voltaire), embedded in the works of nineteenth- and twentieth-century cultural historians, and crystallized in the works of early twentieth-century cultural anthropologists and sociologists, reveal how the essentially mythological and value-laden cultural construct of "civilization" became a referent for the unity of large political systems.

The implication of these large bodies of work is that ideas stemming from the beliefs, traditions, and institutions of Christian Europe profoundly contributed to the *idea* of a "Europe," the notion of one common civilization with a common past and a common future. Also serving as a frame of reference for the unity of that essentially mythical community, the civilization concept (Christian to European to Western) had great impact on the practical formation of the European states system. Civilization constituted a collective identity that gave a deeper meaning to the association between the various states within this system, a process that contributed profoundly to what Martin Wight called "international legitimacy" (1977: Chap. 6). Legitimacy signals the presence of shared understandings, implicit or explicit, about who is in, who is out, what matters, what does not, what is important and meaningful, what is not, as well as the sense of a common mission. The latter, for Europe, revealed itself so dramatically in the processes of colonization and the mission to "civilize" the known world.

The historically evolving idea of Europe, strengthened by contact with Others,[12] had a concrete incarnation in the institutions of the European states system. It is not an accident that until recently scholars of world history and politics envisioned the world map as clusters of civilizations rather than as clusters of states. Indeed, the reason to study the civilization notion goes entirely beyond the contribution the idea had to the formation of the European states system. Important historical balls were put into play when European scholars conceived, characterized, and deemed other groups civilizations. Not randomly, but through a process of differentiation, they recognized other networks of communities presumed to historically share a culture and a value system in the same way that Europe did. This particular brand of cultural geography and its resultant cognitive maps still form the basis of many imagined areas, regions, or subsystems in our world today; while constructs such as "the West," "Eastern Europe," "Latin America," the "Middle East," "South Asia," the "Far East," and others occa-

sionally make geographical or structural sense, they are in essence cultural constructs.

In terms of a definitional tracing, the literature reveals a pattern of associating and disassociating the term "culture" with "civilization." Toynbee (1934) simply saw civilization as "human society." For the grand historians who saw world history as the birth, flourishing, and death of civilizations, the term intuitively implied large, informally institutionalized communities of people, larger than nation or state, whose more profound connections stemmed from shared ideas and ideals and, above all, a notion of a common history. J. G. Herder, one of the philosophical forefathers of the cultural history tradition, identified language, shared symbols, values, customs, and norms of reciprocity, religion, and myth as the cultural determinants of collective identity (Barnard, 1969). Ray Williams argues that culture and civilization have been so intertwined that the following synonymous set of meanings can be extracted: (1) a general state or habit of mind, having close relation with the idea of human perfection; (2) a general state of intellectual development in a society as a whole; (3) the general body of the arts; and (4) a whole way of life—material, intellectual, and spiritual (Williams, 1958:xiv). By necessity dynamic, and including as its components social and cultural determinants that are always in flux, exact meanings for terms such as civilization must be context-specific. As a category in understanding world politics, it is more important to see civilization as informal organization, a mythological cognitive construct like "race," "ethnicity," "nation," or "state" that enables the perception of social unity upon which social organization is always grounded.

From a reading of the cultural historians and philosophers, we can gather that civilization serves as a culturally constructed referent for an imagined collectivity, identifying the collective and differentiating it from others. It is in its capacity as a group-identifying referent that civilization is most useful for conceptualizing states systems as essentially cultural systems. I will now elaborate on one possible way to proceed with theorizing the connection between culture and international systems using the concept of civilization.

CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEMS: A CIVILIZATIONAL APPROACH

My thinking on systems begins with the contention that the way states relate to one another is intimately tied to the notion of "relations" as perceived "relationships." I suggest that systems are systems of perceived relationships, where the term "relationship" denotes a set of understandings that constitute a quality of association extending well beyond the simple mechanics of behavior.

Templates of interpretation are first necessary for norms, behavioral or

otherwise, to be generated. The constructivist idea of shared meanings (definitions, signals, and their interpretation) that guide and enable states' interaction must have as their antecedent ideas of sharedness, of the common or the collective that stem from preexisting, nonstate institutions in society (formal, informal). These ideas serve as the basis for the imagined unity, and subsequent identity, of any social formation. Held notions of unity and identity lend "meaning" (value, purpose, importance) or quality to the associations between states that we call systems. The constitution of system relies so heavily on these antecedent notions to make the association meaningful that systems in generic terms can simply be postulated as "systems of meaning." These meaningful ideas of unity and identity convey to the system and system relations a social legitimacy without which these formations could not maintain and reproduce themselves.

To illustrate these points, the analogy of "family" is very useful. Family members do not understand their roles through repeated interaction with each other but rather through ideas of family and family relations that stem from the social community; the institution of "family" is always informed by a cultural and religious context. Values about family stemming from value systems in society inform the identity and boundaries of family and, subsequently, the understanding of roles within families. Feelings of tradition, obligation, duty, and love differ from person to person, across historical and spatial context, but are always influenced by held notions of the "meaning" (value, purpose, importance) of family and the quality of family relations it implies. In analytically similar ways, identity and role for the members of the institution we call a states system are informed by the understanding of the whole, the collective identity and boundaries of the group.

To summarize, then, individual state interpretation of identities, roles, and relations are constituted by the understanding of the larger collective or "system." This, in turn, is informed and transformed by the ideational influences of other institutions in social life. Ideas of unity and differentiation, inclusion and exclusion, provide a basis for the interpretation of a system's collective identity and boundaries, as well as the meaningfulness of systemic relationships. They serve as building blocks for understanding what is shared in systems of meaning.

The next question is how, as researchers, can we come to understand the historical evolution of ideas that endow systems with meaning? I propose that the substantive content of "meaning" would be provided by culture in varying historical and spatial contexts. In other words, state (national) and system (supranational) identities are socially constructed via historicocultural calls for unity. In this framework, "shared meanings" are then extended well beyond the realm of state interaction to a realm of constitutive ideas and understandings involving who and what the system is (system identity and boundary) and who the members of the system or states are (state identities).

Ideas of the unity of historical communities, both national and supranational, are in essence mythological. In *Imagined Communities* Benedict Anderson argues that the essence of nationalism is the imagining of the political community: "If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future" (1983:11–12). Social recall of the past, or history, is then the tool through which mythical communities are imagined. Turned around, this idea suggests that within histories lie implicit arguments for community. In an extension from Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ranajit Guha (1988), I hold that arguments for the unity of imagined communities are most notably detectable in recorded social memory or writings of history. Historiography is then an essential tool in locating shared understandings of political community, national and supranational.

Although we know political communities are essentially mythological, we also know these myths to have very real expression in social life. What accounts for the tremendous power of these ideas? From language theory, we know that the power to convince depends on positive emotional reaction to symbols and imagery. Cultural symbols evoke powerful sentiments because they tap into and represent fundamental concepts, but express beyond the cognitive dimension fundamental values and attachments.[13] Subsequently, appropriate metaphorical pointing through symbols serves as "evidence," if what is being implied through the pointing is consistent with the general conceptual system of the culture being addressed (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: Chaps. 1–5). The success of historical arguments for unity/identity lies in appropriate use of cultural symbols and imagery that come to (1) serve as referents for that unity and identity and (2) symbolically represent that "community."

Summarily, through creative uses of recall and symbolic cultural referents historical texts capture the historical imaginations of the audiences they address. They concretize essentially mythical notions of community and render possible sociopolitical organization around these cultural constructions. In nationalist histories, arguments are made for the unity, identity, and boundary of a particular kind of culture-based political community we call the "nation-state." In larger histories, the argument proceeds on the basis of divisions of the world map into accepted cognitive constructs such as "empires," "civilizations," and "systems of states."

CONCLUSION

My argument here ends with the contention that the relationship between cultural constructs, such as civilization, and historically conceived supranational communities provides one starting point for an explicitly

"systemic" conception of international systems based on culture. In many regions of the globe, Europe and beyond, the civilization notion seems to underlie the more secular notion of the states system. Although it is beyond the scope of a short chapter to draw all the necessary connections, research along this line may provide richer, more practically relevant theory.

History has shown cultural and civilizational constructions to have very real expression in the organization of modern international life. Notably, the power of ideas of community has revealed itself dramatically in the integrations and disintegrations of states and states systems that have characterized international affairs since 1989. It has become clear, sometimes in painful ways, that the prevailing acceptance of states as perennial structures in international life must be reassessed. In terms of integration, it is clear that the EU is not a mere attempt at regional cooperation; it is the institutional realization of the historically evolving idea of "Europe." In terms of disintegration, the respective breakups of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the tragedy of Yugoslavia, and the potential downfall of many Third World states due to persistent ethnic conflict, all signal that states, even with stores of military might at their disposal, only survive if the historical arguments for unity within them continue to convince an audience.

Certainly the integration of Western Europe warrants a look at extrastate notions of community like "civilization." Even the reality of disintegration does not relegate the importance of ideas of community to a subordinate position. On the contrary, the contemporary disintegrations of states highlight the return of older civilizational claims in newly emergent or emerging states. The general staying power of the idea of political argument and its expression in notions of community such as civilization, nation, and ethnic group continues to dominate politics as it always has.

Although the "clash of civilizations" is not just a recent phenomenon, practical realities, both historical and contemporary, point out the important influences of culture on world politics. These realities reinforce the prudence of reacquainting international relations theory with culture. Further reconsideration of the concept of civilization may provide a fertile basis for understanding one kind of relationship or connection between culture and international systems. The civilizational approach combined with historiography saves us from the onerous requirements of realist/rationalist theorizing, such as the imagining of first acts and asocial systems. A civilizational approach argues for the importance of systems theory while at the same time relieving the systems notion of the burden of its previous grand and iron-like structural characteristics. Here, states systems—like the many systems or institutions of social life—are not rigid and static structures. They are loose but dynamic formations organized around the hegemony of certain ideas. This looseness or ambiguity makes the task of understanding social systems extremely difficult; however, the difficulty cannot be managed by a rush to oversimplification. Social life is highly complex and social systems research

must examine that complexity rather than rely on the currently fashionable but largely misdirected notion of parsimony.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Friedrich Kratochwil and Amir Pasic at the University of Pennsylvania for their assistance.

2. This term is used in this chapter to refer to Hedley Bull's and Adam Watson's brand of theorizing. It is a categorization of a logic that says states behave "rationally" or seek to establish order under the survivalist dictates of anarchy. For this or similar characterizations of Hedley Bull's order discourse see Iver Neumann and Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition," and A. Claire Cutler, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations," both in *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991).

3. Buzan claims this term reveals "terminological confusion" on the part of Wight as system in *Systems of States* is taken to mean what "now means" society to us. The assumption of a clear line between system and society is challenged in my critique of Buzan.

4. Curiously, Buzan (1993:336) upholds this criticism of the gemeinschaft view, while simultaneously admitting that his gesellschaft view has "no fully documented historical model."

5. They are omitted because Wight's "gemeinschaft line takes such an identity to be a historical precondition for international society" (Buzan, 1993:335).

6. "Curiously, Bull does not follow his own logic down this line . . . he does not discuss common identity as an element of international society at all" (Buzan, 1993:336).

7. This is curious, as neither culture nor shared identity questions are even broached by Waltz.

8. In practice, this extended identity goes far beyond form to include broader cultural linkages (historically formed over centuries of colonial/imperial and capitalist expansion). This would be something moving toward a "global identity," which, along with sovereignty, simultaneously conditions both the system and its individual states. These processes complicate the notion of a common identity in the whole of international society, at least to a point beyond states' mutual recognition of each other's viability as states. Buzan hints at something like the idea of global identity in his notion of "world society" but, due to the actor-based perspective on sovereignty that he maintains throughout the discussion, he indicates an unclear distinction between this notion of "world society" and what he means by common identity in international society.

9. For an attempt to conceptualize the authority of international society as a whole, rather than as an emergent quality of the "prior" interaction of separate sovereigns, see Amir Pasic, *The Question of Authority in World Politics: Sovereignty and Evolution in International Society,* doctoral thesis, University of Pennsylvania, in progress.

10. This is despite his admission that the gemeinschaft or civilizational models are historically more relevant and powerful (Buzan, 1993:333–336).

11. Buzan (1993:336) elaborates some of these points himself.

12. Colonization induced the subsequent categorization of most of the known world into "areas" based on cultural understanding, often as other "civilizations" separate from Christian Europe. This, in turn, concretized the idea of "Europe." For

a theoretical discussion of similar ideas about encounter and identity, see Inayatullah and Blaney, Chap. 4.

13. A system of values expressed through the basic concepts of a culture is referred to as a "conceptual system" in Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

6

Revisiting the "National": Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?

Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwil

It is remarkable how little international relations theory has to offer for understanding the constitutive role of the national in sociopolitical affairs. But as events in the post–Cold War era evolve, "the one option that scholars and diplomats alike do not now have" is to persist in the traditional neglect by ignoring "the problem of nationalism, or by calling it something else while passing by on the other side" (Judt, 1994:51). However, the exercise of precisely this traditional option by scholars of all persuasions has resulted in "the most striking example of a general failure among experts to anticipate social developments" (Jalali and Lipset, 1992–1993:585). It is indeed strange but hardly overstated that, in an age of nationalism, international relations and most other social disciplines seem to have converged on little else but the sustained exclusion of the national problematic from their respective research agendas, relegating it to a fringe phenomenon.

To the extent that this theoretical failure not only resulted in faulty predictions but is likely to lead to mistaken policy advice, a serious reengagement with the "national" is imperative. Such a need for rethinking seems particularly necessary in international relations, which, as a discipline or field, should generate its object of study through a careful and comprehensive monitoring of the "national." The very suspicion, therefore, that somewhere along the way inter(national) relations has lost its constitutive "national" component by becoming overwhelmingly statecentric is quite embarrassing.[1] Indeed, IR scholars may find it difficult to explain why they so easily disengaged their analysis from probably the most explosive political force shaping domestic and global constitutional orders at the end of the twentieth century (Pfaff, 1993). This strategy seems even more incomprehensible as scholars in comparative politics documented during the same time period the failure of "nation-building" by states, thereby calling into question both the facile identification of state and nation in the "unit" for international relations analysis as well as the supposedly preordained trajec-

tory of societal development in accordance with the constraints exerted by the international system.

A serious theoretical reengagement with the "national" seems particularly urgent for "realism," the still-dominant school of thought in international relations research. Despite its long-standing fascination with the anarchy versus survival problematic and with conflictual group fragmentation in general (Berki, 1981; Hoffmann, 1965; Gilpin, 1986), realism, in its neorealist incarnation, has effectively denied the theoretical import of the national category and of the international/interstate distinction. In other words, neorealism has historically played a key role in this disengagement of IR theory from the "national" and in reproducing realism as an exclusively statecentric discourse.

Fortunately, recent neorealist scholarship has taken an active role in reorienting the debate in the field by focusing on the nature and implications of the "new nationalism" (Snyder, 1993a:179). This readiness to reconsider formerly dismissive attitudes toward national phenomena contributes to an end of the strange silence in IR theory and, at the same time, opens up new opportunities for a revitalized realist research program. However, as we argue below, these desirable goals will not be fully achieved without a detailed metatheoretical discussion of the promises, perils, and stakes involved.

In this context, we argue that the emerging theoretical encounter with the "national" can be successful only if it facilitates something like a "fruitful" rather than a "degenerative" Lakatosian problem-shift (Lakatos, 1970) in the neorealist research program. The new set of "puzzles" that has not only to be added but *integrated* into the paradigm addresses specifically the hitherto neglected role played by identity-driven dynamics in global affairs.

Using the late Kenneth Boulding's suggestive typology of three interactive but analytically distinct "systems" (1978:333), this advocated problem-shift could be seen as a new but logically necessary stage in the historical development of the realist research program. In Boulding's terms, classical realism was a deliberate reaction to the idealism of the pre–World War I and interwar periods. It concerned itself mainly with the implications of the "the threat system" (that is, the strategic dimension of international politics). Neorealism constituted then a deliberate reconstruction of classical realism, while adding the concerns of the "exchange system" (that is, the economic dimension) to a rapidly expanding list of legitimate realist puzzles. Until recently, however, one would have been hard-pressed to locate within the realist/neorealist ambit an explicit concern with Boulding's "third system" that covers issues of identity, culture, and legitimacy (that is, the "integrative" dimension). And yet, Boulding (an economist by training) insisted on the primacy of this "third system" in sociopolitical affairs.

To substantiate this thesis of the potential for a heuristically fruitful problem shift and to assess its prospects, our argument will proceed in the

following order. In the next section, we develop a typology of responses deployed by the dominant theory's encounter of serious empirical and/or intellectual challenges. Using these metatheoretical tools, three of the sections below critically examine recent works by John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Barry Buzan, and Ole Waever that represent different ideal-typical replies of neorealism to the "anomaly" of a resurgence of ethnonationalism.[2] In the final section we assess these theoretical attempts in terms of our interest in an identity-oriented problem shift in the neorealist research program and offer some further glimpses at the promise of a revitalized identity agenda in IR theory.

However, a brief discussion justifying our metatheoretical approach seems in order before we can critically examine the various neorealist contributions. In view of the deeply ingrained disciplinary self-image of IR as an empirical science, and considering the lingering skepticism in regard to "second-order" (meta-) analysis, we anticipate possible misunderstandings of, and resistance to, our project. Even scholars who share our interest in promoting the study of contemporary nationalism may lack sympathy for our decision to focus on "other people's studies" rather than on the "real" world. According to the standard empiricist position, the present resurgence of nationalism era constitutes an important change in the real world of international relations and, hence, "our first order of business" (Van Evera, 1994:7) should be to expand our stock of testable hypotheses concerning this development.

Without denying the import of solid empirical work as an antidote to "speculative nonsense" (Gurr, 1994:15), we argue that some of the most interesting intellectual challenges posed by the current resurgence of nationalism are metatheoretical rather than empirical (Lapid, 1994:20–21). While we cannot provide here an elaborate defense of metatheory and its usefulness in international relations[3] we want to suggest that metatheorizing seems particularly promising when two conditions prevail. The first involves the sudden occurrence of some fundamental shift in the conception of the subject matter that requires a radical remapping of the discipline. The second, often interrelated condition is the perceived failure of a discipline to progress by integrating discovered anomalies in a theoretically meaningful fashion instead of accounting for them through *ad hocery,* or through the construction of auxiliary hypotheses that shelter some problematic elements of the program's hard core. When these conditions combine, as they do in the current IR nationalism debate, scientific practitioners are well advised to venture into the realm of metastudy (Zhao, 1991).

Affirming the merit of metatheory, however, is only the first step in restoring its role for resolving difficult disciplinary problems. Like theorizing, metatheorizing comes in different forms. Consequently, understanding these differences is essential to the assessment of a metatheory's capacity to facilitate theoretical growth.[4] Our purpose in employing metatheoretical

tools in this chapter is not to demonstrate that the existing responses follow a certain ideal-typical logic that can be taxonomically mapped. Rather, we want to suggest that the theoretical pieces we will examine are not equally likely to result in valid theoretical growth. For example, whereas "theoretical reconstruction" opens the door for a progressive problem-shift in the neorealist research program, strategies of "exclusionary" or "inclusionary control" in regard to the "national" phenomenon effectively block such a project and thereby abort further theoretical development.

FROM THEORY TO METATHEORY:
EXCLUSIONARY/INCLUSIONARY CONTROL
VERSUS THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION

The rise of postpositivism in social theory has witnessed some radically new conceptions of which type of dynamics are involved in the rise and decline of theoretical orientations. According to one version of "positivism"-—empiricism—theories live and die through "evidence." Logical positivism, on the other hand, is more critical, by emphasizing the "theory dependence" of empirical data and by suggesting that it is not the "amount" of confirming evidence but rather the (falsification) (and corroboration) that propel scientific development. Thus, second order consideration such as parsimony, rigor, fruitfulness, and so forth, become important and theoretical discussions increasingly move to the metatheoretical level, as the data alone no longer provide decisive criteria for adjudicating conflicting theoretical claims. As philosophers critical of logical positivism such as Kuhn, Lakatos, Agassi, and others have shown, even experimental falsification rarely disproves a general theory. Rather, scientists are likely to employ defensive strategies such as restrictions in the scope of a theory, the claim of a measurement error, or the simple neglect of an anomaly in order to go on with "science as usual."

Building on these postpositivist insights, Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy (1991:41–44) point out that theory-building in the social sciences follows a similar pattern. Alexander and Colomy, too, distinguish between "core" positions of social theories that are considered essential to a theory's identity, and are hence highly resistant to change, and more peripheral zones that are subject to continuous variation. This distinction is central to their typology of ideal-typical responses to empirical or intellectual challenges. Faced with disconfirming evidence, social theorists will choose one of three ideal-typical responses labeled "elaboration," "revision," and "reconstruction."

Elaborative work proceeds on the premise that the original tradition is internally consistent and relatively complete. Therefore, such projects see no reason to go beyond minor theoretical refinements. Revisionary work has

a keener sense of paradigmatic limits and weaknesses and, therefore, ventures into more creative modifications of noncore theoretical commitments. However, because both elaboration and revision show great reverence to established theoretical cores, they belong to Kuhn's "normal science," well defined by its (dogmatic?) assurance that the established theory can solve all the problems that arise (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993:194).

Reconstructive work, by contrast, may involve significant changes in theoretical cores without an intention, however, to sever all links with the established theoretical tradition. As explained by Alexander and Colomy, "Reconstruction differs from elaboration and revision in that differences with the founder of the tradition are clearly acknowledged and openings to other traditions are explicitly made" (1991:42). Since reconstruction can culminate in either the revival of a troubled tradition or the birth of a new one, this ideal-typical response is not inconsistent with Kuhn's depiction of revolutionary scientific developments (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993:197–206).

For our present purposes, we augment Alexander and Colomy's typology with a slightly different classification developed by Michael Smithson (1989:30–40). This alternative scheme refers to "exclusionary control" (or "banishment"); "inclusionary control" (or "reductionism"); and what we will call "reconstruction." The primary objective of the exclusionary strategy is to avoid difficulties by adopting definitions and criteria that bar potentially challenging evidence in principle. As long as the refusal to acknowledge the existence or the relevance of "anomalies" is effective, exclusionary control manifests itself in a sustained silence in regard to the excluded phenomenon.

When outright exclusion or banishment fails, individual scholars and scholarly communities can move to a strategy of "inclusionary control" whereby the previously excluded phenomenon is admitted into the paradigm on the condition that it does not disturb the coherence of the established theoretical core. Such a gambit is preemptively deployed by practitioners of a discipline when proliferating anomalies threaten the basic regulative premises and assumptions (Smithson, 1989:30–40). Smithson calls this strategy "reduction" because one of the main goals here is to demonstrate the derivative character of the recalcitrant phenomenon by reducing it to some other, allegedly "more basic," element of the theory. In terms of Alexander and Colomy's typology, we note that "inclusionary control" can operate through either "elaboration" or "revision." If elaboration is chosen, the inclusionary control strategy will be rigidly deployed. Most putative anomalies will be treated as troublesome nuisances for the old framework. If revision is preferred, minor anomalies will be allowed to serve as a springboard for some new theorizing, provided that the integrity of the "core" is not thereby called into question.

Smithson's third strategy is fully convergent with Alexander and Colomy's counterpart. In both cases, "reconstructive" work operates on the premise that "Good science allows its theoretical modeling of the world to

be surprised" (Agger, 1994:85). This strategy does not dismiss anomalies as nonproblems; rather, it acknowledges them as potent stimulants for theoretical growth (Burawoy et al., 1991:8–28). Furthermore, in addition to their mere admission into the paradigm, reconstructive theorization also involves what Ferdinand de Saussure termed the assignment of "a proper (theoretical) place" (in Ellis 1993) for the formerly silenced anomalies, even though such a strategy might require far-reaching theoretical reconstruction.

Armed with these metatheoretical tools we will make the following related arguments. First, we posit that Waltzian neorealism has opted for a strategy of exclusionary control that effectively precluded a genuine theoretical engagement with the national problematic.[5] Deeply entrenched regulatory assumptions—such as state centrism, "actor" rationality, sharply demarcated anarchical/hierarchical forms of order, postulated transhistorical continuity in international politics, and so forth—have exercised an awesome "disciplinary" power on nationalism. These "assumptions" reassured neorealist scholars that a sustained strategy of exclusion is both feasible and theoretically justifiable. Under the impact of this neorealist "logic," key queries posed by the resurgence of nationalism became unimaginable or, as Todd Hopf put it, "one would have had to operate outside the paradigm to ask such questions" (1993:207).

Second, we suggest that epochal events since 1989 have eliminated exclusionary control as a viable strategy for dealing with nationalism. This development has forced neorealist scholars to turn to inclusionary control as a safe substitute for the original strategy. Below we refer to John Mearsheimer's and Barry Posen's works as respective exemplars of the "elaborative" and "revisionist" variants of the inclusionary control strategy.

Third, we note that "theoretical reconstruction" provides a possible replacement for the exclusionary control strategy. Here we highlight the promise held by theoretical reconstruction as exemplified in recent contributions by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Finally, we pull together the separate threads of this analysis by reiterating the merits of an identity-oriented problem-shift and flesh out some items of special interest to an expanded IR "identity agenda."

FROM EXCLUSIONARY TO INCLUSIONARY CONTROL: ELABORATION AND REVISION

Since nationalism continues to figure as only an omission in Kenneth Waltz's theorization of the currently "emerging structure of international politics" (Waltz, 1993:44), it remained to a second generation of followers to address this issue by shifting from exclusionary control to inclusionary damage limitation. John Mearsheimer, for instance, concedes that "no discussion of the causes of peace in the 20th century would be complete with-

out a word on nationalism" (1990:32). And Barry Posen goes even further by admitting that the traditional lack of interest in nationalism has impaired "our" (viz., the neorealist) "ability to explain our current predicament" (1993a:80). Both remarks confirm that a departure from exclusionary control of nationalism is well underway in neorealism.

Thus Mearsheimer and Posen, although card-carrying neorealists, make considerable efforts—unlike Waltz—to derive major nationalism-related problems in contemporary world politics from neorealist premises and constructs. However, by failing to acknowledge or to address crucial aspects of contemporary nationalism that cannot be easily subsumed under core neorealist categories, these scholars confine their respective projects to the strictures of the elaboration/revision modes of theory development. Let us engage in a detailed reconstruction of these defensive gambits to highlight their respective limitations.

Starting with Mearsheimer, we notice his insistence that far from being exhausted by the collapse of strategic bipolarity, neorealism derives further confirmation from this historic development. Furthermore, what holds true for the demise of the Cold War system in general is equally valid for nationalism in particular. In buttressing these claims and in combating "overly optimistic" scenarios in the aftermath of the Cold War, Mearsheimer relies heavily on the notion of "hypernationalism." This construct figures prominently in substantiating each of his three counterpoints—that is, the enduring vitality of the state system, the continuing relevance of military competition, and the expanding—as opposed to contracting—role of violent disorder in the post–Cold War era (1992:214).

First, for Mearsheimer it is through nationalism—the ideology that each nation should have its own territorial state—that the persistence of the state system as well as the primacy of the state as the "principal actor in international politics for a long time to come" (1992:217) are postulated. Second, the role of nationalism in animating security concerns is more obliquely, but still quite forcefully, stated. According to Mearsheimer—and true to the neorealist "logic"—it is *anarchy,* rather than nationalism, that "compels states to worry about their security" (ibid.:221). Nevertheless, hypernationalism—the artificially generated "belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening"—exacerbates tensions, since it produces hatred among states while helping them to "build formidable killing machines" (ibid.:221). Finally, nationalism is part and parcel of the expanding global disorder that replaced the tight control of unruly forces during the Cold War. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seem to confirm such an analysis and Mearsheimer deftly capitalizes on the swelling nostalgia for the *sancta simplicitas* of a bygone era (Fukuyama, 1994).

Keeping in mind these central references to nationalism one is tempted to conclude that the "national" has firmly established itself at the very top of Mearsheimer's research agenda. After all, is he not on record that he is a

"realist" *because* of nationalism?[6] And don't some of his policy recommendations intimate the same thing?[7] However, further reflection suggests a negative answer to these questions. Mearsheimer's vigorous retrofitting of nationalism into his "back to the future" scenario does not qualify as a careful theorization of this important but elusive force. At best, it is an elaborative effort premised on an unreasoned certitude that contemporary nationalism can be properly understood with unreconstructed neorealist tools. As such, it represents a selective appropriation designed to prevent a progressive embarrassment of the neorealist hard core. Mearsheimer evidently wants us to believe that if "bad things" continue to happen in the world, that automatically confirms neorealism as a "theory." And if many of these "bad things" are related to nationalism, this should then be considered sufficient evidence that realism can provide satisfactory solutions to any empirical or intellectual challenges entailed in the current resurgence of this phenomenon.

Under Mearsheimer's elaborative strategy of inclusionary control, the national phenomenon mutates magically into a docile avatar of the neorealist paradigm. The neorealist "logic" screens out any anomalous aspects of modern nationalism. Reduced to a set of safe distributional puzzles—that is, the "better fighting machines" that national armies provide—ethnonationalism (Connor, 1994) cannot possibly destabilize, or "surprise," this confirmed neorealist. On the contrary, the "national"—now making its appearance as "hypernationalism"—can only affirm with ever greater vengeance the "verities" of a "hyperneorealist" version of the ruling paradigm.[8] Far from acknowledging nationalism as a primary factor in the dynamics of international politics, Mearsheimer reduces it to a "second order" variable, an epiphenomenon of the interstate system and its anarchical structure (Mearsheimer, 1990b:32). If, however, nationalism is merely a reflection of more "basic" forces—such as the security dilemma and power balancing among the preexisting "like units"—one is truly at a loss if one suspects that the "reduced" factor itself (viz., nationalism) may hold the key to a better understanding of contemporary world affairs. Regrettably, it is typical of the inclusionary control strategy in its "elaborative" variant to insist that the established theory is internally consistent and stands in no need of major conceptual or theoretical reconstruction, even when its empirical scope of reference is considerably expanded.

Barry Posen offers a more nuanced neorealist analysis of contemporary nationalism that remains, however firmly, within the penumbra of the revisionist variant of the inclusionary control strategy. To begin with, he uses Waltzian neorealism to account for the accelerated spreading of the nation-state model across modern Europe. This proliferation is explained by the need for "balancing" and "sameness" in an anarchical system that, in the aftermath of the French revolution, had witnessed the emergence of powerful mass armies. In Posen's own words, "nationalism can be expected to per-

sist whenever military security of states depends on mass mobilization" (1993a:87). While nationalism enters the picture as a critical power asset— as it does in Mearsheimer—it is clearly the distributional "power thinking" and the generative logic of (interstate) "anarchy" that drive his analysis. In other words, with respect to state nationalism, Posen's work is primarily elaborative and consists in an effort to apply a Waltzian logic to the expansion of the nation-state.

Posen's main revisionist contribution consists in grafting the (interstate) logic of anarchy to the interethnic level by postulating a "security dilemma" that arises "when proximate groups . . . suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security" (Posen, 1993b:27). Here, Posen recasts imperial disintegration along ethnic lines as an "emerging anarchy" of sorts in which ethnic groups become survival-oriented "self-help" units (1993b:27). Regrettably, however, the promise of this revisionist gambit— that is, his move away from state centrism toward an exploration of "anarchic" arenas populated by nonstate (ethnic) actors—quickly dissipates. It is followed by a regression that strongly suggests that all "units" in "anarchy" (be they individuals, castellans, city-states, nations, or states) can be expected to behave in accordance with the very same neorealist logic (see also Fischer, 1992:463; Krasner, 1993:235). To that extent Posen fails even to accept Waltz's recent (and admittedly reluctant) concession that "systems populated by units of different sorts in some way perform differently, even though they share the same organizing principle" (Waltz, 1990:37).

It follows, therefore, that for Posen the "likeness" of units under anarchy does not really matter or, alternatively, that state-controlling and stateless nations are "unlike units" only in a temporary and superficial sense. If so, Posen's revisionary departures from the classical neorealist agenda— including his suggestive recasting of anarchy—are not driven by a serious dissatisfaction with the neorealist hard core. On the contrary, like Mearsheimer he insists that at both the interstate and interethnic levels the *same* systemic logic of anarchy takes causal precedence over unit-level characteristics (Posen, 1993a:29). Conceptually the neorealist logic is staunchly defended, making it difficult to conceive of a nontautological relationship between "nation" and "state." The internal/external distinction, so essential for neorealist thinking, is kept despite its obvious awkwardness in the study of the "messy" profile of the national phenomenon. The postulate of transhistorical continuity in international politics—correctly lamented by Ruggie (1983) and other critics—is reaffirmed, thus depriving nationalism of any generative or transformative (as opposed to merely reproductive) capacity. Finally, at both the system and the unit level, nationalism is exclusively subsumed under power-related distributional categories, rendering invisible the important *constitutive* role of nationalism as a global ordering principle that can effectively rival territorial sovereignty (Lapid, 1994).

There are some notable problems with these two variants of inclusion-

ary control for theory-building purposes. First, this mode of engagement with the national is excessively asymmetrical. On the one hand, neorealism, taken as a given, is invoked to deepen our understanding of national phenomena. On the other hand, the "national" is never used in the same way to highlight the limits of neorealist categories. This is, of course, an entirely implausible strategy in an era when "the classic form of the nation state is . . . disintegrating" (Habermas, 1992:2). The term "hypernationalism," custom-tailored by Mearsheimer to neorealist specifications and uncritically endorsed by Posen, clearly bears out the dangers of the inclusionary mode of engagement. Aside from the fact that this concept is badly out of tune with the broader social science literatures on nationalism and group conflict (Haas, 1993), it is based on a common, yet mistaken view of nationalism that "grants validity only to its extreme interpretations and identifies it with fanaticism, violent struggle and disaster" (Tamir, 1993:78). The point is not that such extreme cases cannot be found, but that they should be more carefully adduced as evidence for the "correctness" of the neorealist paradigm. Consider also, in this context, Posen's suggestion that under emerging anarchy, "unless proven otherwise, one group is likely to assume that another group's sense of identity . . . is in danger. But, he continues, "proving otherwise is likely to be difficult" (1993b:31). Here neorealism's "generative logic" of anarchy automatically descends into Hobbesian pessimism. Why, one wonders, are more benign outcomes simply ignored? What blocks, for instance, the possibility that after many years of coexistence in the same polity the process of "emerging anarchy" will find a stable resting point along Karl Deutsch's model of a "pluralistic security community"? Contrary to evidence that shows that ethnic groups might find a viable compromise even after the disintegration of the controlling center (as in Spain), that they might work out a tension-filled but nevertheless peaceful coexistence (as in Quebec), or that they might even be fortunate enough to agree on a "velvet divorce" (as in the former Czechoslovakia, or in Sweden and Norway in 1905), Posen lets the neorealist structure do most of the explaining by relying implicitly on a worst-case scenario.

However, in all of the above cases the presumption that conflict is "structural" and that worst-case analysis has therefore an automatic claim to validity is either a metaphysical belief (which is useless to debate), or demonstrably false (Haas, 1993). Besides, as a general maxim for action fear that underlies worst-case analysis is a poor counsel, as we well know.[9] If theories are to be helpful for such purposes then it is clearly their task to inform us under which circumstances "structural" oppositions lead to conflict escalation, and under which circumstances a modus vivendi can occur. It will not do, for "scientific" as well as for moral reasons, for this problem to be "solved" by a virtually automatic "presumption."[10] Much of the "strength" of neorealist theory thus turns out not to lie in its explanatory

force but rather in its preying upon a common fear in the face of the unknown.

A second problem arises in Posen's use of history—in particular, his reading of the Yugoslavian/Bosnian case. He simply accepts the journalistic characterization of this conflict as "ethnic," despite the fact that the warring factions belong to the same "ethos" according to the standard criteria of common descent and language—save "religion," which, of course, is neglected de rigueur in neorealist analysis. There is, however, a distinct possibility that Bosnia is an instance of warlordism or gang warfare rather than ethnic conflict. Similarly, underlying Posen's narrative is the thesis that the conflict brings to the fore "primordial" (that is, original and unchangeable) loyalties, blithely neglecting both the role of the Yugoslav state in constructing these identities and the cynical rewriting of history that is taking place to fit present political purposes. Furthermore, given the Hobbesian premises of realism and the overriding role of fear in motivating action, it is not quite clear why people under conditions of "anarchy" hold on to their group identity even if it is indefensible and often fatal. It was precisely Hobbes's point that group loyalties and social bonds disintegrate under the fear of death, which in turn provided the reasons for Hobbes's limitations on political obligation, permitting, for example, desertion in the face of the enemy.

What neorealists have yet to provide is a coherent account of why actors in such situations do not band together according to the requirements imposed by military necessity and geography. Here, as in the Middle Ages, defensibility of a valley or a stronghold, rather than culture or a sense of origin, should serve as the organizing principle. While some of the behavior observed in Bosnia fits the implications of Posen's argument, although loosely (e.g., the flocking of refugees to strategic havens), other phenomena remain puzzles for his neorealist logic, such as the continued existence and *resistance* of "multicultural communities" (Sarajevo). Conversely, if the "primordial" argument is believed, one sees the service of Serbs in the Bosnian army. In short, without an explicit theoretical treatment of the bases of group differentiation, which, in turn, generate the "anarchical environment," structural arguments do not explain conflict, they merely redescribe it.

Finally, contrary to Posen's chronology and thesis one would be justified in arguing that the dissolution of the central authority was not the "cause" of the outbreak of the conflict. Rather, its roots are to be found, among other places, in Serb ultranationalist schemes to subvert federal constitutional arrangements. These were given fateful support by key Serb intellectuals with the now-notorious memorandum of the Serbian Academy in 1988, which bemoaned the erosion of Serbia's hold over its traditional and "sacred" territories. Clearly, the violent end of the South Slav state finds one

of its major causes in the continued and repeatedly successful use of armed intimidation by Milosevic and his cohorts to fulfill an extortive warrior ideology. For all these reasons, one has the sneaking suspicion that the case is made to fit the theory rather than proving the applicability of neorealist "logic" to this conflict.

This leads us to the third major problem with the strategy of inclusionary control, namely, the opportunity costs incurred by neorealism in its asymmetrical engagement with the national phenomenon. After all, neorealism may have more to gain from nationalism than vice versa. Whereas scholarship in ethnic and national studies has recently experienced sustained progress (Hobsbawn, 1990:183), the neorealist enterprise has suffered some serious explanatory and predictive setbacks (Buzan et al. 1993; Rosecrance and Stein, 1993; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Kratochwil, 1989). Those who believe that neorealism has erred in its neglect of domestic variables, in its dismissal of ideas and norms, in its preoccupation with structural continuity at the expense of epochal change, in its mistaken fascination with "parsimony" (Dessler, 1991), in its excessive dependence on capability-driven and anarchy-sustained explanations and, above all, in its neglect of the subjective underpinnings of the international system, have good reason to look forward to a true reconstructive theoretical encounter between neorealism and nationalism. Below we move to a project of theoretical reconstruction that exemplifies and lends preliminary credence to this assessment.

FROM INCLUSIONARY CONTROL
TO THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION

The transition to a reconstructive mode of engagement is exemplified by Buzan's and Waever's efforts to reconstruct neorealism and to broaden the agenda of security studies. These projects involve extensive innovation while avoiding a decisive break with the realist tradition. These efforts betoken an astute recognition that, in the post–Cold War era, neorealism can no longer defend itself by refusing to entertain serious theoretical modifications.

The distinction between "inclusionary control" and "reconstructive theorization" acquires clear meaning when we compare the Buzan and Weaver projects with those of Mearsheimer and Posen. Although the latter also acknowledged the relevance of nationalism, the theoretical significance of this recognition is emasculated by their asymmetrical mode of engagement. As suggested, in their case, the "national" was invoked primarily to buttress a beleaguered statecentric premise and to demonstrate the ability of neorealism to explain phenomena in traditionally untapped domains. It is then, of course, neither accidental nor insignificant that in these references the reen-

gagement with the "national" invariably ended as a mere stand-in for the same old (Waltzian) orthodoxy.

The situation is, however, different in the case of the projects by Buzan and Waever. The remarkable promise of their treatment of the national phenomenon is most evident in the recent work on societal security." Introduced as "the most effective tool for understanding the new security agenda (Waever et al., 1993:ix), this construct deals with threats to ethnonational identity. Such concerns, both scholars argue, are rapidly replacing purely military threats as the main reasons for insecurity in the post–Cold War era.

The underlying rationale is as follows: The gravest security problems will have, at least in the foreseeable future, "society" as opposed to state, as their referent. Society is mostly about identity (that is, the ability to survive as a viable "us"). And in the present historical epoch, identity is mostly about national, ethnic, and religious loyalties. By considering up front what needs to be changed and what can remain the same within a reconstructed theoretical framework (ibid.:27), Buzan and Waever successfully avoid some pitfalls that trapped Mearsheimer's and Posen's parallel efforts. Consider, for instance, Waever's painstaking effort to keep the key conceptual triad of society/identity/nation apart from the gravitational force of statecentrism.

> The close link between state and nation presents us with a dilemma: . . . [If] we conceive of "society" as a partner to the state, their relationship gets locked into a single formation in which societal security is precluded from being an independent subject. If society means "the [emotional] foundations of the state," then societal security . . . [becomes] at best a useless repetition of the whole argument around state security. And if "nation" is defined as a community that strives for statehood, we cannot include in the study the role of nations that settle for some other situation, which might . . . be an increasingly relevant phenomenon in Europe." (Waever et al., 1993:19-20)

The contrast with Mearsheimer, who invokes nationalism as a warrant for assuming an enduring state-centric world—or with Poser's "emerging" anarchy indicating the transitory nature of anarchies among nonstate groups—could hardly be more pronounced.

Another telling difference is the reluctance of Waever and Buzan to dispose of the complexities of present-day nationalism by crude definitional exercises such as "hypernationalism" (Mearsheimer) and "groupness" (Posen). Instead, they acknowledge national entities as "exceedingly complex phenomena" (ibid.:27), and turn for enlightenment to the field of ethnic and national studies. Despite the lack of an uncontested definition, this move does result in a more sophisticated understanding of the "national." It is attentive to its unity and diversity, its "modern" and "perennial" roots, its "constructed" and "essentialist" dimensions, its beneficial and malignant

facets, and its reproductive and transformative implications. To be sure, Buzan and Waever have less difficulty than Mearsheimer and Posen in acknowledging the multifaceted nature of contemporary nationalism because they are less constrained by a (Waltzian) framework that is so inhospitable to allegedly redundant complexities. Their massive theoretical reconstructions of the "too narrow" and "too static" brand of Waltzian structuralism are in fact quite successful in transcending many of the familiar and frequently lamented limitations of the founding neorealist exemplar.

In this context it is critically important that "societal security"—the theoretical "lens" designed to capture security-related dimensions of ethnic, national, and religious identities—can be integrated into an expanded neorealist framework, such as the recently published *Logic of Anarchy* (1993). Due to its centrality to "societal security," the "national" figures among the most important issues awaiting theorization in the post–Cold War era. Should empirical considerations justify it—as may already be the case in the European Community—the "national" is well situated to prompt additional reconstructions of the neorealist hardcore.

On the basis of their Western European research, Buzan and Waever indeed suggest a reconceptualization of security predicated on a "duality" of "state security" and "societal security." While the former has "sovereignty" as its "ultimate criterion," the latter is held together by concerns about "identity." As Waever points out: "Both concern survival. Sovereignty is the name of the game of survival for a state. . . . Survival for society is a question of identity" (Waever et al., 1993: 25–26). Interestingly enough, both components of this bifocal reconceptualization of the security field are expected to generate their corresponding—but only partially overlapping— "logics." Thus, whereas Posen quickly conflates the dynamics of a "security dilemma" between states and ethnicities, Buzan insists that "the situation at the sub-state levels is different from the situation in the international system" (ibid.:46). Having recast the singular logic of Waltzian neorealism— which monitors only the political sector of the global system and its organizing principle of sovereignty—into a pluralized format, Buzan and his collaborators postulate a separate "identity logic" that operates in addition, rather than in opposition, to its political counterpart.

These are, of course, promising moves in the context of our interest in using nationalism-related anomalies as opportunities for theoretical reconstruction. Indeed, to posit "society" (and hence identity and nationalism) as an independent constitutive pillar of the security field comes very close to a Lakatosian problem shift in the neorealist research program. Nevertheless, two difficulties remain. The first has to do with the conspicuous absence of the "national" from the *Logic of Anarchy*. One would expect that a theoretical enterprise hoping to equip us with "theoretical tools able to address the whole history of the international system" (Buzan et al., 1993:240) would have separate index entries for "nation" and "nationalism." The *Logic of*

Anarchy does not. Nationalism is neither explicitly addressed nor does it figure among the counterfactuals that made the reconstruction of the neorealist hard core necessary. It seems, therefore, that *Logic of Anarchy* does not significantly differ from Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in giving the phenomenon a "proper place within the neorealist theory."[11]

The second difficulty is more substantive. It refers to some serious, and possibly debilitating, deficiencies of the key construct of "societal security." Situating the national within the gambit of "societal security" makes eminent sense only if one seeks to equate or to define "society" with "identity." For, as Meisler suggests, presently only a successfully "nationified" society will recognize itself as an effective "we" group (1992:636). The merits of such a move are, however, less obvious if our primary concern is not with "societies" but with strongly experienced group loyalties and identities. For recent events have demonstrated how frequently multiethnic "societies" fail to achieve successful "nationification" (identification of society with the nation). While ethnic and religious groups often have little difficulty generating and mobilizing potent "we" feelings, "societies" are demonstrably less successful in this respect. As an inclusive umbrella for conceptualizing problems of identity and nationalism, "societal security" may, therefore, be inappropriate.

Furthermore, the implicit and explicit association of "society" with the "state" runs the risk—in spite of Waever's and Buzan's precautionary moves—of leading us straight back to a narrow statist matrix. It is indeed quite odd that, having labored so diligently to delink both "identity" and "nation" from the "state," Waever and Buzan would pack these promising concepts into an equally unsatisfactory construct, such as "society" (Kumar, 1993:383–392). The suspicion that "society" becomes now the new theoretical "garbage can" is enhanced by Buzan's suggestion (1993:336) that Toennies's old distinction of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, which addressed precisely this point, can be abandoned in favor of an interactionist view allowing for a broad zone of transition. In a way such pragmatic adjustments are inevitable if one works with "ideal" types and tries to understand the more complex reality. But as Buzan himself realizes in his criticism of Watson, arguing with "transitional zones" creates two boundary problems instead of only one—in particular, the boundary between "system" and the gray zone, and the boundary delimiting the "zone" from "society" (Buzan, 1993:344). Since Buzan attempts to construct a "society" model out of a structural and interactionist view without admitting to the existence of "culture" as a background enabling such interactions, the problem of "identity" increasingly gets muddled (Chakrabarti Pasic, Chapter 5 in this volume).

On the one hand, "identity" refers to the "we" feeling of groups; on the other, "identity" is little more than mutual recognition of "like" units interacting in a system. Buzan's treatment of Japan in becoming a member of the society of nations is instructive. Allegedly this example is "suggestive of

how this process of convergence toward a *shared identity* works" (ibid.:335, emphasis added). Here we again have the Waltzian "logic." The term "identity" is used to designate little more than (sustained) membership in a set of interacting actors. This only adds confusion to our understanding of the dynamics of "systems" when self-identification and "structural constraints" are competing for the proper definition of an international actor. Such equivocal use of "identity" as an attempt to square the circle does not augur well for a heuristically progressive problem shift in the realist paradigm.

An ironic parallel to Mearsheimer becomes apparent. To a lesser degree than "hypernationalism," "societal security" seems also vulnerable to the charge of being a "custom-tailored" construct. The "customer," however, is not the scholar interested in the phenomena of identity or nationalism as such, but the IR theorist (or metatheorist?) interested in large-scale syntheses such as a "triple match" between a structural analysis, (British) international society approaches, and (U.S.) regime theories (Buzan, 1993). Admirable as this project may be in other respects, for purposes of coming to terms with nationalism and identity, the construct of "societal security" is likely to lead us astray in our efforts of giving Boulding's notion of a "third system" greater theoretical precision.

TOWARD AN IDENTITY AGENDA IN NEOREALISM?

Recent years have witnessed an international order that has been reorganizing itself faster culturally than would have been predictable from distributional changes in military and economic capabilities. The present encounter between neorealism and nationalism has the potential to move neorealism beyond its exclusive preoccupation with military and economic "capabilities" whose distribution among preexisting units does most of the explaining in the paradigm. An important message of this chapter is, however, that this potential cannot be realized by scholars who reengage the national with a purely elaborative, or narrow revisionist, mindset. For in the absence of a research program focused on culture and identity (like Boulding's "third system"), elaborative and revisionist projects will invariably end up reducing the national to some other "more basic" factor.

Because of its willingness to modify, if necessary, even the "core" elements of the established tradition, a judicious reconstructive approach seems far more promising. In other words, a broadly defined theoretical reconstruction should start with the recognition that virtually every core concept in neorealism relies on an implicit, if unauthorized, notion of identity.[12] The construct of anarchy presumes survival-oriented constituent units, and without a specification of the "self," survival, rationality (conceived as the pursuit of self-interest), security, and power are not meaningful concepts. It simply will not do to deal with such problems on the basis of a priori

assumptions because one thereby cuts oneself off from the investigation of the bases that serve as criteria of differentiation in world politics. In short, it seems impossible to harness the explanatory power of neorealism without further theorization of the concept of identity, "which the theory requires but never explicates" (Nau, 1993:18). Affirming the need to elevate identity to the center of theoretical attention is, of course, easier than devising an operational plan for achieving this objective. In the following, we can only hope to offer some general illustrative guidelines. Borrowing from Saussure, it is helpful to differentiate between the task required to "discover the truth" about identity and that of assigning this truth a "proper place" in the neorealist paradigm. With respect to the former, a first step would be a vocabulary allowing us to pay greater attention not only to

> the computable "hard" stuff—power, geography, resources, etc.—but also the "soft" stuff of what happens to people, how their needs, impulses, states of mind do or do not get translated into . . . political action. These include all the needs and drives that bear on the complexities of group identity, belongingness, self-esteem and autonomy. These . . . elements . . . are now the substance of politics everywhere, playing a role in the process of revising, reshaping, remaking every changing society, every political system. (Isaacs, 1979:49–50)

Acquiring a vocabulary that can bring into focus the intricate texture of identities that constitute political orders and drive political action at local, regional, and global levels will not be an easy task. At a minimum, the process will involve an improved sensitivity to the productivity of language in the social construction of reality (Beer and Hariman, forthcoming); a better understanding of collective identities as discursively constructed, practically enacted, and historically situated (Wendt, 1994); a deeper appreciation of the plurality, complexity, malleability, and potency of such solidarities (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1994); and a general retreat from "foundational" conceptions of identity that operate with some preexisting and nonproblematic "ontological given" (Krasner, 1992:39). In particular, we must ensure that in moving from reified modes of actor designation—for example, "states," "nations," "classes," "identity," and so forth—we are not "discarding one set of reifying concepts from our scholarly tool kit, only to find ourselves employing others in their stead" (Handler, 1994:27).

The second task is likely to prove equally demanding. In our case, "assigning a proper place" would involve a serious commitment to building analytical bridges that link identity-related phenomena to the explanatory apparatus of the realist theory (anarchy, sovereignty, rationality, self-help, balancing, and so on). To reiterate, even at this early stage it is clear that nothing short of a comprehensive reconstruction of neorealist categories will do, but that a promising new beginning has been made by Buzan and Waever.

Finally, in view of the enormous fluidity in contemporary world affairs and the emerging scholarly sensibilities that emphasize dynamic, as opposed to static, analysis, it may be useful to situate Saussure's two requirements in a change-oriented analytical framework. As aptly put by Harold R. Isaacs, the major scholarly challenge in matters of identity and power is "to see more clearly where the *new thresholds* are" (emphasis added). More specifically, "What new pluralisms, what new pecking orders are being created? And most critically . . . how do these patterns bear on the character of political institutions?" (Isaacs, 1979:52). With respect to change we shall see, once again, the difference between elaborative/revisionary and reconstructive orientations.

We now offer some additional reflections on how to embed the three tasks: building a new vocabulary (reconceptualization), linking these concepts to the explanatory apparatus of neorealism, and creating a dynamic mode of analysis in a new research agenda. As to the first task: The development of a new vocabulary is dictated by the need to respecify our epochal pattern of group fragmentation and its corresponding anarchy/survival problematic. In view of its segmented ontology this is a matter of great consequence for all versions of political realism. This semantic clarification should help us in answering a key question posed by John Ruggie: "Accepting that the international polity, by definition, is an anarchy, that is, a segmented realm, on what basis is it segmented?" (Ruggie, 1993b:168). Furthermore, are units in any epoch individuated on the basis of a single principle or are there multiple ordering principles involved? Granted that we have dwelled traditionally in segmented orders (anarchies), are these orders primarily "homonomous" (populated by "like units"), or are they predominantly "heteronomous" (driven by "unlike" members)? Does it make sense to talk about "moments of epochal change" marked by dramatic reconfiguration of ordering principles of individuation, or to hide such historical benchmarks in continuities and complex patterns of organizations?

It may be instructive to indicate how the current reengagement of neorealist scholarship with the national may relate to the agenda item under consideration. In developing his concept of differentiation, Ruggie pays central and nearly exclusive attention to the "Westphalian moment" that played such a critical role for the emergence of territorial sovereignty in modernity. Without denying the importance of territoriality in driving epochal change, greater sensitivity to nationalism, as a blueprint for geopolitical organization, highlights 1789 as an epochal moment of sorts. This moment, however, still awaits proper recognition by the IR scholarly community.[13]

As a model of global political organization, the "nation-state" blueprint is, of course, a problematic reconfiguration of its Westphalian predecessor that combines territorial and ethnic principles of sociopolitical organization (Galtung, 1980). The territorial principle manifests itself through the modern state, which, as Giannfranco Poggi points out, "does not have a territo-

ry, it is territory" (1990:22). The ethnic principle, on the other hand, operates through the "nation," which is a "creature of time" not of space (Barry, 1981:85). The problem is that these two principles become contradictory in a world like ours, which is intricately multicultural, and which stimulates and frequently necessitates large-scale movements of people across territorial space (Hughes and Hughes, 1952:116).

As far as differentiation and the "national" are concerned, one sees here how costly the failure of a clear analytical distinction between "nation" and "state" is for studies of contemporary world politics. As a matter of fact, the "national idea" was totally absent from the blueprints of Westphalia (Bull, 1990:75). The insertion of this idea by the architects of the nation-state (circa 1789) suggests the insufficiency of the state (and of "territoriality") as the sole principle of organization of segmented global orders. In addition, it becomes obvious that as a result of their profoundly different modes of structuring (one operating in strict accord with geographic vicinity, the other maintaining an unstable balance between geographic vicinity and ethnic affinity), states and nations represent qualitatively different organizational "logics." Consequently, to the extent that nations, states, and nation-states— along with other entities such as races, religions, tribes, civilizations, and so on—qualify as consequential components of a newly emerging pattern of global segmentation, Ruggie's "differentiation" must be reconfigured to account for the diversity entailed in the changing balance of territorial, semi-territorial and nonterritorial elements that increasingly structure struggles in world politics.

Since 1989 we have witnessed continuous turmoil in the subjective underpinnings of a rapidly self-transforming world order, as noted previously. Neorealists have difficulty keeping in touch with this trend because they have long been settled into a reified version of fragmentation by simply proclaiming the state as an "ontological given" (Krasner, 1992:39). Even the more refined versions—which started with the promising idea that "homo sapiens is a tribal species"—quickly stumbled into the dubious assertion that "in the modern world we have given the name 'nation-state' to . . . competing tribes and the name 'nationalism' to this form of loyalty" (Gilpin, 1986:305). In view of the fact that after so many years of vigorous "nation-building" and "national self-determination" genuine nation-states are a dwindling minority, one is driven to the conclusion that the referent for the "we" in that quotation is simply the neorealist scholarly community.

As aptly put by Eric Wolf, "Periodically raising the question of whether the unities we define are homogeneous or whether they are better understood when they are disaggregate and disassembled not only allows us to evaluate concepts we have come to taking for granted, it also allow us to think better" (1994:2). The implementation of this agenda item should help neorealism touch base again with a more "realistic" picture of the always powerful and increasingly diverse set of identities that segment, drive, and

occasionally torment the dynamics in their disciplinary domain. Notwithstanding its concern with parsimony, neorealism must prepare itself for the possibility that in the future most theoretical debates will have to be conducted in a plural register: multiple "anarchic actors," multiple "anarchic logics," multiple "anarchic consequences," and so on.

Moving now to our second agenda item, how can we assign a "proper place" to the things properly "named"? Much depends, of course, on the ingenuity of individual scholars and their willingness to engage in theoretical reconstructions. John Ruggie's work on differentiation and epochal change once again offers an instructive illustration. Ruggie initially harnessed differentiation to both demonstrate and remedy the failure of the Waltzian tripartite structure, which could not account for epochal changes. More specifically, Ruggie's actor differentiation sought to reinstate the importance of the second level of Waltz's structure. Therefore, to the extent that novel findings concerning historically shifting patterns of fragmentation are rendered relevant to neorealist theorizing via "differentiation," they are thereby assured a position of greater significance than distribution of capability. By aptly pointing out that anarchy presumes survival-oriented constituent units, Henry Nau (1993) goes even further in rendering "identity" relevant to neorealist theory at the deepest structural level, namely "anarchy." It is therefore not surprising that in his proposed reconstruction of neorealism, "identity" arises *prior* to power, interest, rationality, and even anarchy. Buzan and Waever offer a third possibility, in which "state" and "society" (that is, "identity") are allowed to serve as terminal units for two distinct "structural" logics.

Many other venues are, of course, possible. The interesting point, however, is that all of these efforts (Ruggie, Buzan and Waever, Nau, and Wendt) to find a "proper place" for "identity" (however defined) in neorealism have originated with scholars who approached their task with a reconstructive mindset. When the task was approached, on the other hand, with an elaborative/revisionist purpose, as in the case of Mearsheimer and Posen, the disappointing outcome was a mere cloning of the original neorealist formulation.

Finally, situating the proposed identity agenda in an analytical context that encourages questions about continuity and change seems highly advisable. As noted, it was the suspicion that the international system is transforming itself culturally faster than would have been predictable from changes in military and economic capabilities that triggered the interest in problems of identity. The main obstacle here is the neorealist postulate of transhistorical continuity. Neorealism is clearly constrained by a reproductive logic that highlights continuity in world politics. Establishing an identity agenda in neorealism can do much to revitalize its submerged transformative logic. Thus while Mearsheimer's and Posen's elaborative/revisionist projects converge on a pessimistic "back to the future" scenario, the recon-

structionist efforts reviewed in this research create room for positive transitions from "immature" to "mature" anarchies (Buzan), or from "criminal" to "angelic" anarchies (Nau).

We hope that these arguments are sufficient to alert the IR scholarly community to the possibility that serious opportunities exist in the current encounter of neorealism with contemporary nationalism. Despite our criticism of some neorealist efforts we concede that ultimately these efforts are testimony that neorealism need not be predestined to remain stagnant. Detractors and proponents of neorealism have long squabbled over the causes of the remarkable resilience of the realist tradition. Whereas critics prefer external, sociological, and contextual answers to this riddle (Rosenberg, 1990), proponents insist on internal, intellectual, and scholarly achievements. Our analysis cannot put this controversy to rest. But the prospect of a successful reconstruction of neorealism via an identity-oriented problem-shift does suggest that, at a minimum, the latter possibility should not be dismissed outright.

NOTES

1. For a parallel concern "that somewhere in its history Geography lost its 'Geo-'" see Peter J. Taylor 1993:181.

2. That aspects of contemporary nationalism, ethnonationalism in particular, qualify as an "anomaly-saturated-domain" for (Waltzian) neorealism is essential to our argument. Just as the Third World proliferation of (quasi) states—still frequently invoked as a valid defense of statecentrism—actually turns neorealist logic "inside out" (Jackson, 1990:169), ethnonationalism (when not "disciplined" by crude state-centrism) consistently throws up remarkable anomalies for neorealism. See Lapid 1994.

3. As vividly put by Shanyang Zhao: "Meta-study starts with an examination of problems encountered in primary study and ends with prescriptions for resolving these problems. . . . If primary study is a long journey to an unfamiliar place, then meta-study involves frequent pauses for rest, identifying directions, revising travel plans, or even having second thoughts on the final destination. The more difficult the journey is, the more pauses there will be. Thus, it is the problems in primary study that lead to frequent pauses for meta-study, not the pauses for meta-study that result in the problems in primary study" (1991:381).

4. George Ritzer 1991, for instance, identifies three variants of metatheory: (1) a means to a deeper understanding of an existing theory (Mu); (2) a prelude to new theory development (Mp); and (3) a tool to promote an overarching perspective on sociological theory (Mo). Paul Colomy 1991 adds to Ritzer's triadic topology a fourth type: "metatheorizing as adjudication" (Ma), designed to adjudicate competing claims issued by rival social scientific traditions.

5. See, however, Lapid 1994:20–31.

6. Mearsheimer's comment at the 1992 Chicago APSA Convention Roundtable: "Because of Bosnia I am a realist."

7. As an antidote to dangerous hypernationalism, he dispenses advice for a united Germany and an independent Ukraine, suggesting a carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. The fudging of the distinction between "nationalism-as-sociological-fact" and "nationalism-as-blueprint-for-global-organization" (Lapid, 1994), is critical in this context. Mearsheimer cites Gellner's definition of nationalism as the belief holding "that a nation . . . should have its own state." This is, of course, a "blueprint"-type definition. Mearsheimer rejects it, however, because "it pays little attention to how nationalism turns into a malevolent force that contributes to instability in the international system" (1990a:21). This is a curious charge. The "nation-should-be-state" belief is, of course, a very major contributing factor to global instability. Following a Waltzian logic, Mearsheimer opts, however, for a "sociological" definition that allows him to theorize nationalism in "distributional," as opposed to "constitutional," terms. And yet, the theoretical import of nationalism as an organizational blueprint exceeds that of its sociological counterpart. For whereas the latter can situate nationalism in the context of power politics, the former can theorize the impact of nationalism on the very stage on which the power game is performed.

9. True, as Freud correctly pointed out, even paranoiacs have dangerous enemies. But it is our predicament to make such fateful determinations in the light of all the facts available to inspection.

10. In fairness to Posen, he is trying to specify such conditions in his comparative study of ethnic disintegration in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. However, a set of premises leading automatically to Hobbesian pessimism is also implicit in his work.

11. Given Buzan's focus on nationalism in his security-related work, his silence on nationalism in *Logic of Anarchy* could be considered incidental. However, this does not mean that such an omission has no harmful implications. For it is *Logic of Anarchy* rather than *Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (IMMENSE), that is likely to capture the attention of those interested in the future of IR theory. And in view of the fact that the IR scholarly community is still vacillating between denial, appropriation, and theorization of the national, *Logic of Anarchy's* silence on the matter may easily be interpreted as a vote of confidence in one of the first two strategies of discursive engagement.

12. Our analysis here draws heavily on Henry Nau's recent work on identity.

13. See, for instance, Sanjay Seth's justified complaint that "IR still seems to inhabit the world created by the Treaty of Westphalia; and this, in the age of nationalism" (1993:92). The Westphalian moment indeed marks the crystallization of a historically novel principle of territorial control. On the other hand, "the critical moment in the history of nationality was when the hitherto distinguishable, if not entirely separate, ideas of cultural nation and political state moved together, and merged in one single idea" (Cobban, 1969:109). Unlike Krasner 1993:235–264, we submit that such "ideas" *do* matter and that the IR theoretical enterprise has more to gain from acknowledging additional "moments of epochal change" than from denying, in the interest of transhistorical continuity, this status also from 1648.

PART 3

NEW PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES

7

Ground Identity:
Nature, Place, and Space in Nationalism

Daniel Deudney

At the beginning of Western reflections on human politics Aristotle defined humans as *zoon politicon*, "the political animal." For the last two and a half millennia, the Western tradition has centered its energies on exploring the political side of human identity while neglecting the animal side. The idea that the nature of human politics is fundamentally grounded in the natural animal human has never totally been lost, but mainly the rational side of *homo sapiens* and the artificial or socially contracted and constructed aspects of the *homo faber* have been most foundational in political thinking. Even when aspects of human biological nature (particularly emotions and appetites) have been a factor in Western political theory, human nature is typically considered in isolation from its ecological and geophysical contexts.

Over the last several decades the natural has returned to human political life in a spectacular and largely unexpected manner. The progressivist, rationalist, and technologically dynamic societies cast in the Enlightenment mold suddenly have been confronted with massive destruction of the earth's ecological life-support system. These disturbing and far-reaching developments have stimulated an explosion of political activity and theoretical revisionism aimed at halting and reversing the deterioration of the earth's life-support system. Rising concern has led to vast expenditures, numerous new organizations, and mass public activities. Efforts at global environmental rescue cut across all existing boundaries of the subnational, the national, and the international. At the Rio "Earth Summit" in 1992 more heads of state gathered for one international congress than ever before.

Equally impressive has been the explosion of theoretical activity—the reconceptualization of existing institutions, ideologies, and traditions of thought. Within the limited sphere of political theory, a similarly far-reaching reexamination has begun as the relationships between ecology and capitalism, socialism, democracy, human rights, gender, the state, and the interstate system have been subject to intensive reconsideration.

Strikingly absent, however, has been a consideration of the relationship between ecology and the *nation* as a form of political identity and the basis for political community and state legitimacy. The absence of such rethinking is not, however, difficult to explain. In the dominant Western theoretical traditions derived from the Enlightenment, the nation (and the national) is generally understood to be a somewhat embarrassing and mysterious anachronism, a disease of the transition to universal society, and a residue of the prerational that is expected to decline and eventually disappear. Among political theorists the nation has received far less attention than other major phenomena like the state, democracy, and individual rights and duties. Even when recognized, the nation has had relatively few defenders. Among political scientists the nation has been a particularly problematic area of investigation, in part because this discipline, centered around power, interest, and practical problem solving, has difficulty with issues of identity and culture. Even among inter*national* relations theorists, the nation and the national have a remarkably undertheorized presence. Students of environmental politics have given the more elusive aspects of culture and identity insufficient attention.

NATION AND EARTH: FIVE PROPOSITIONS

This chapter advances five propositions about the role of nature in the national and the implications of rising environmental awareness and political activity on the national. First, national identities and communities are constituted by a "here-feeling" derived from the shared habitation of a *place*, as well as by a "we-feeling" of group solidarity and attributes shared in common. The "here-feeling" component of nationalism has been much less studied and appreciated than the "we-feeling" based on group attributes and differences such as language, religion, history, and institutions. National identities are based in part on an identification with particular places understood in particular ways. Nationalist rhetoric makes claims about the natural or primordial character of national identity, and claims about specific places figure prominently in these constructs. Existing national identities rely on claims about the character of the relationship between the human and the biological natural, both of race and blood and of soil and land.

Second, modern cosmopolitanism, the principal competitor and alternative to existing nationalisms, is weak and relatively ineffectual as a source of political identity and community because it is based on a sense of space, an infinite Cartesian homogenous extension that is incapable of evoking or sustaining a robust "here-feeling" of place.

Third, the constitution of national identity and community in the United States was based on a novel relationship between nature, space, and place.

These innovations were made both necessary and possible by the development of industrial technology, which simultaneously shrank a continental space into a place and made remote and extreme wonders of nature accessible to a mass public. National identity and community for the United States have come to depend on sacred national natural sanctuaries preserved in public parks.

Fourth, various radical environmentalists and deep ecologists are asserting a new identity, an *earth nationalism*. Among the "deep greens," cultural values and political identities are most intensively ecological, and this new identity is nationlike in its character. Furthermore, earth awareness as it has emerged among deep greens has six elements: (1) cosmology, (2) symbolism, (3) sacred places, (4) ceremony, (5) sacrifice, and (6) intergenerational community, all of which compete directly with comparable elements in existing national cultural and identity formations. In short, deep green environmental awareness lays claim to precisely those parts of the human culture and group identity that nationalism has held largely uncontested since the decline of traditional religion.

Fifth, these emergent claims of earth identity and community are not likely to be captured by existing state and ethno-based nationalism, but will rather either alter or displace them. By making very powerful identity claims based on alternative understandings of these nature–human relationships, ecological awareness challenges and—if strong enough—displaces the pseudo-primordial claims of existing nations and nationalisms.

PLACE, LAND, AND NATION

The "nation" and the "national" have remained elusive and problematic categories for political analysts. One reason for this is that three very different forms of identity claims are commonly conflated: (1) an *ethno-national* identity as member of a group based on shared attributes (such as language), which distinguish members from nonmembers; (2) an identity based on membership in a particular political community or political regime, which gives rise to a *regime patriotism;* and (3) an identity and loyalty based on the experience of and feeling of connectedness to a particular place or area, a sentiment dubbed *geopiety* by John Kirtland Wright and *topophilia* by Yi-Fu Tuan (Tuan, 1990).

Of these three components of the national, identities based on place have received the least attention by students of the national. Modern nation-state constructs of identity mingle these three forms of identities (O'Brien, 1988). Both the centrality of physical place in identity and the ease with which such sentiments have been conflated with particular political claims is readily apparent in the following passage from a speech before the English Parliament in 1794 by the great nationalist thinker Edmund Burke:

> Next to the love of parents for their children, the strongest instinct, both natural and moral, that exists in man, is the love of his country: an instinct, indeed, which extends even to the brute creation. All creatures love their offspring; next to that they love their homes: they have a fondness for the place where they have been bred, for the habitations have dwelt in, for the stalls in which they have been fed, the pastures they have browsed in, and the wilds in which they have been roamed. We all know that the natal soil has a sweetness in it beyond the harmony of verse. This instinct, I say. that binds all creatures to their country, never becomes inert in us, nor ever suffers us to want a memory of it. (Burke, 1901)

What is striking in Burke's argument is the central role he assigns to topophilia in "love of country." The cow does not feel itself part of a "country" because it shares substantive attributes—spots, udders, horns, and so forth—with other creatures, and the cow's sentiment of topophilia surely has no political or regime content. This is similar also to the German concept of *heimat,* or homeland (Appelgate, 1990). Yet from this core insight Burke leaps to an identity claim for a country that carries over into ethnonational and regime patriotic dimensions.

Prior to the emergence of universal and monotheistic religions, nature, land, and place were central to religion, most of which was "pagan" (from *paganus,* Latin for *rural*). The gods were autochthonous. They were numerous and situated in and identified with either particular places or natural forces. As modern nationalism sprang up to partially fill the space left by the decline in the public power of religion, it appropriated many of the most potent and evocative metaphors and socialization techniques of religion. In the earliest concepts of political identity the land is very frequently considered holy, because the land is inhabited by spirits, gods, and divine forces. Nature and its forces first caused awe in humans, and gods were originally identified as particular forces of nature that had to be revered and propitiated. In pagan cultures there was also a close identification between the political order and particular spirits and guardians of place (de Coulanges n.d.).

Evidence for topophilia in modern national identity can be found in the symbolic content of various mottos, anthems, monuments, and literary works. "National" anthems often heavily evoke the particular places. For example, the popular song of the United States of America, "America the Beautiful," evokes a domain extending "from sea to shining sea," that contained "waves of grain" and "mountain majesty."

The *rhetoric* of nationalism is also highly naturalistic, an appeal to the primordial foundations of association and loyalty that precede the historical or constructed. Some of nationalism's most basic and powerful images are biological. Herder spoke of the nation as being "as natural a plant as a family, only with more branches" (Herder, 1969). The term *nation* itself, derived from the Latin *natio,* meaning *to be born,* makes the obviously fictional claim that membership in a particular nation is somehow a biological act or necessity. In speaking of the "fatherland" and the "motherland," nationalist ideology also casts the relationship between conationals in biological terms

drawn from the familiar family unit. Foreigners aspiring to become citizens undergo a bureaucratic process labeled "naturalization." The most extreme natural national rhetoric of "race," "blood," and "soil" (that flourished with such dire results during the early twentieth century) represents the extreme limits of this pervasive pattern (Mosse, 1979; Bromwell, 1989). In all of these examples, nationalist ideology artfully conflates associations arising from biological necessity with those created by historical convention to endow the imagined community with primordiality, continuity, inevitability, and substantiality.[1]

THE PLACELESSNESS OF COSMOPOLITANISM

Western modernity embodies a cosmology that is relentlessly subversive of the claims of particularities of place. At least since the time of the Stoics, the Western tradition has contained a powerful strain of cosmopolitanism that has sought to replace the numerous particular identities and communities with a universal one. These cosmopolitan claims have repeatedly been advanced as an alternative to the nation as the main unit of political identity and community. Cosmopolitanism has a conception of *space* rather than of *place* (Agnew 1987 and 1989). The cosmopolitan view of a citizen's home is that it is vast and impersonal in character. It is not a place; rather, it is all possible places and what they share in common as places. In the modern era cosmopolitanism has been a significant component of Enlightenment political ideology, employing an essentially Cartesian notion that the human world is constituted by abstract geometric space that is infinitely extensive, utterly undifferentiated and nonanthropomorphic. It denies that any particular place is special. To be cosmopolitan is to be "rootless" and "displaced" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

Modernity applied to things and places is capitalism, and as capitalist relations have penetrated further into the fabric of everyday life, Cartesian space has triumphed over particular places. Capitalism and the market make possible the complete alienability of all material goods. In capitalism even the earth is parceled into pieces of property that are bought and sold and whose value varies only in the quantity of universal exchange units (money) they can command in the marketplace. Capitalism as a productive system relentlessly breaks down "walls of exclusion" and is essentially indifferent to place. Its relentless dynamic of "creative destruction" entails a permanent revolution in the relations among humans and between man and nature. Capitalism's most distinctive and concentrated physical embodiment, the city, is in its purest, most market-driven form a pure grid, spatially configured around transport and communication networks that homogenize the experience of place.

Prior to the industrial revolution the extent of the cosmopolitan community was so immense that its extremities vanished into the horizon. For

all but the most intrepid pilgrim or traveller it was, effectively, infinite. But the industrial revolution produced a great shrinkage of space in which the Cartesian plane of infinite extension became wrapped as a sphere, the globe. The exploration and mapping of the human habitat as global marked a closure from the open-endedness of earlier cosmopolitanism, but still stopped short of creating a sense of this global space as a home place. For most peoples globalization produced a sense of being compressed, crowded, and threatened rather than a new, larger homeland.

This disposition of modern cosmopolitanism toward place and land in part accounts for its failure as a source of identity and political community. In competing with nations, transnational and cosmopolitan norms and identities have proven repeatedly inadequate. The weakness of cosmopolitan world culture is that the content of such internationalism is thin and lifeless relative to the rich and elaborate national cultures. Thus far, cosmopolitanism is more defined by its stance of opposition to particularistic national claims than by its own substantive content. Cosmopolitanism is consistently antinational, but it lacks the richness and emotional draw of traditional national cultures—myths, heroes, narrative accounts of origins, festivals, folkways, flags, symbols, hallowed graves, and taboos. As Nietzsche pointedly noted, cosmopolitanism is hollow, sterile, and authoritative only to the rational intellectual. The "tablets of value" at the center of vital cultures spring not from the head of Zeus, but from "fear and trembling unto death," from extremes of prophetic experience and epic sacrifice.

The sheer volume of activities across international borders has certainly had consequences for identity and community, but it has not generated a very full or rich sense of either. In the second half of the twentieth century, as Mary Catherine Bateson has recently observed, a global culture now exists that is a "mixture of the Beatles and the International Geophysical Year" (Bateson, 1990). This global culture is centered around shared experiences of consumption, production, and leisure (tourism, sports, and entertainment) and woven together by telecommunications and jet aircraft, which have produced the "global village" (Rosenau, 1990b). Unfortunately, this culture is, as Anthony Smith argued, "attenuated," "essentially calculated and artificial," and "affectively neutral." It has only marginally diluted, not displaced, the psychic hold of nationalism because it is "essentially memoryless" and is "context-less, a true melange of disparate components drawn from everywhere and nowhere" (Smith, 1990).

SPACE AND NATURAL PLACE
IN AMERICAN NATIONALISM

The construction of a nation in the United States marks a new departure in the relationship among place, space, and nature, and between group iden-

tity and community. Among modern polities the United States must always hold particular interest because of its size, wide influence as a model, and its extremely modern liberal character. The role of the natural in the U.S. national is also of particular interest because it was constituted during the industrial revolution in a continental-size domain, because it was founded on land that was largely "virgin" (Marx, 1964) (and therefore, largely lacking in a previous historical landscape), and because it was created by a people whose religious orientation tended toward the more puritanical versions of Protestant Christianity. At the same time, much of the modern environmental movement began in the United States. The United States was first to create the "national park," composed of the most spectacular parts of nature, and it has been the site of much if not most of the earth pagan assertion of earth identity. The novel role of natural place in the American national identity is what makes it a prototype of the earth national identity claims now being made.

For Europeans arriving in the New World, the overwhelmingly dominant view of the land until well into the nineteenth century was that it was a wilderness that needed to be tamed, and that it held unlimited potential for economic exploitation and hence human progress. As Locke observed, "In the beginning all the world was America" (Locke, 1960) and in the beginning all America was natural, pristine, a social tabula rasa.

In the generation of the American constitutional founding, claims of America as a distinct place were used to legitimate political independence and political union. In the quintessential document of the American founding, *The Federalist Papers,* John Jay first appeals to the existence of a particular place, an evocation of a distinct "here": "It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. . . . A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together . . ." (Hamilton et al., 1961:38). Only then does Jay assert the existence of a distinct ethnohistorical "we group" and the shared regime principles that make up the other two parts of the national. Yet the orientation to the land was mainly in the Enlightenment mold, emphasizing utility and exploitation, and the natural borders were important barriers to communication and transport. The American constitutional order was based on a thoroughly Cartesian spatial ontology at the expense of diverse local and placed communities (Wolin, 1989).

In the nineteenth century there was a preoccupation with the content of a distinctively American national character and identity (Kohn, 1957). The constitution of this national identity was a reaction to and exploitation of fundamentally novel possibilities created by both the industrial revolution and the particular historical circumstances of the peoples who came to inhabit the United States. The search for a distinctive American national

identity was in part simply the by-product of the move into the interior of North America, where the aping of European modes seemed increasingly artificial and out of place. In the early years of the nineteenth century, when the American domain had expanded across the Appalachian Mountains into the great Mississippi River basin, Americans ceased to think of themselves as Englishmen across the ocean or as part of a periphery of the European metropol. The changing composition of immigrants to America also created the need in the culturally hegemonic Anglo settler descendants to develop a culture into which immigrants could assimilate without reproducing the differentiations and antagonisms that had existed in Europe. This was particularly important as Roman Catholics from Ireland and Germany came in great numbers.

Evocations of nature and natural place occupied a central position in the self-consciously American national literature and arts of the nineteenth century (Curti, 1946). As Roderick Nash explains in his classic monograph on American attitudes toward nature, "America's nature, if not her culture, would command the world's admiration" (Nash, 1982). The early American philosophical movement of Transcendentalism was a naturalism, even if a spiritualized one.

The first American school of painting, the Hudson River School, centered its aesthetic energies on evoking the unique splendors of the American landscape (Harris, 1966). The creation of a distinctive written literature has been an important aspect of modern nationalism, particularly in the wake of the print revolution that, along with the rise of the middle class, created a reading public in the West. The creation of a distinctively American literature was heavily dependent on narratives centered on place, such as Thoreau's Walden Pond, Twain's Mississippi, Steinbeck's Central Valley, and Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County (Turner, 1989). Walt Whitman, the great bard of American democracy, celebrated a diffuse nature of pantheism and paganism in *Leaves of Grass*. The evocation of place occurred in regional waves, reflecting the relative rates of settlement, first in New England (after 1820), then in the Mississippi Basin (during the last decades of the nineteenth century), and finally on the Pacific coast (from the 1920s onward). This literature, based on a distinct regional place, did not threaten the Union by reinforcing sectionalism because of the immense countervailing power of the industrial revolution. Far more than with any of the national literary identities constructed in nineteenth-century Europe, American writers made the encounter with the land and evoked the idea of place central to the notion of what it means to be an American.

The second major factor in the U.S. construction of a nation and its relationship to space and place was the industrial revolution. Far more than in any European or Asian nation the machine was constitutive of America, making the United States "the republic of technology" (Boorstein, 1978). The communication and transportation technologies of the industrial revo-

lution, of "steam and electricity," played a central role in welding the continental terrain into one of economy, polity, and—most importantly—place. The nineteenth century was the century of speed, and it brought the "annihilation of distance" that Emerson proclaimed after his first ride on a railroad (Emerson, n.d.). These changes fundamentally altered the dynamics of place and space, threatening on the one hand to homogenize all places into components of one space, not just in abstract conceptual terms but in concrete terms. On the other hand, they created the opportunity to generate and sustain an experience of place on a vastly larger scale than ever before. Much of the contestation over American identity and culture has been over these possibilities and perils, with two very different reactions—the localist reactionary and the continental national—vying against one another.

The localist reaction to industrialism sees the United States as the quintessential "rootless" society, where people are always on the move, lack depth of character and firm identity, and are incapable of generating community. As the most capitalist society, the relation to the land and place has been most mercenary, most driven by the relentless tides of international market supply and demand. Capitalism has reduced patterns of habitation to a grid, and it is least supportive of the specialness and permanence that constitute a place. Thus America seems to be the triumph of space over place, the most cosmopolitan of polities, with the most plastic of identities. This view generates calls to "re-settle America" (Berry, 1981), to undo and recover a sense of place, of separate provinces, or more recently, "bioregions" (Sale, 1985).

But American identity politics are not just localists versus cosmopolitans, for the industrial techniques were also exploited to recover a sense of place on a continental scale. The American nation not only persisted but was given a new coherence by the ability of the industrial mechanical annihilation of distance to generate a sense of place on a vast domain. Industrial technology, particularly the photograph and the railroad, made the most spectacular and remote natural settings accessible to the masses at the same time that industrial technology was "outshining" other, more traditional awe-inspiring religious and state national ceremonial spectacles. The nineteenth century was the era of great fairs and exhibitions at which the most advanced wizardry of industrial science and technology were employed to conjure spectacles of unprecedented dazzle (Badger, 1979). The religious and state sponsors of traditional identity cults were not able to offer spectacles and ceremonies nearly as evocative and awe inspiring. But even the marvels of technological wizardry paled in comparison with the splendors of nature in their ability to conjure majesty and to evoke awe. Americans began to turn to the wonders of nature, particularly in the West, as a source of ceremony and collective identity formation. Throughout the journals of John Muir, whose writings on the high Sierra catalyzed the wilderness movement (Fox, 1981), natural places such as Yosemite Valley are called

"the natural churches of God." By the twentieth century, the wizardry of technological spectacle and the most remote natural extremes had surpassed the church and state national cult of patriotism in their ability to generate majesty and evoke awe.

The closing of the frontier in 1890 posed a particular challenge to the American construction of national identity. The most comprehensive vision of the centrality of the frontier in constituting the American people and its character was proffered by Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier hypothesis" (Turner, 1947; Billington, 1966), which held that American democracy was in significant measure the by-product of the expanding frontier and the opportunities it provided. But basing a political identity and regime type on the encounter with a frontier virtually guaranteed a precarious and inevitably short-lived experience, ending in eventual crisis, because sooner or later the frontier will close and there will be no more "beyond" into which to move.

The closing led to two quite contrary reactions, both of which are still with us: (1) find a new frontier elsewhere, or (2) preserve some part of the nature that had once been so abundant as parks, and ritually use them for reenactments of the frontier encounter. One response to the closing of the land frontier was to open new frontiers—in imperial conquest, in science and technology, or in outer space. Turner had seen the frontier as a socioeconomic support for American democracy. Many feared that socioeconomic mobility would be lost, and economic growth would cease. From this experience of an open-ended frontier has come a uniquely American preoccupation with finding and opening the next frontier. Science was for the influential Bush Commission the "endless frontier" where intensification would be the functional equivalent of spatial extension for maintaining the upward spiral of wealth. Similarly, John F. Kennedy's New Frontier had aimed "to get the country moving again" and did so by seeking to open the "high frontier" of outer space.

The second response to the closing of the frontier was to ritually recreate and preserve it for its effects on civic personality. The frontier had been more than an economic treasure trove, a socioeconomic "pressure release valve," and a democratic leveler of ascriptive ranks. The encounter with raw and untamed nature had created the "rugged individual," the citizen capable of living and thriving in a marketplace society of mobile social atoms.

Thus the frontier generated American civic personality and its *paideia* more directly, and it helped answer the crucial question of liberal society— how to create autonomous, self-sufficient, and self-reliant individuals without creating social and political subservience and submission. Unlike illiberal societies, America could not rely on military discipline, the "boot camp" experience, because this would create citizens adept at taking orders and obeying commands rather than free agents.

By the turn of the century, the sense that Americans—particularly American men—were becoming decadent was widely voiced, perhaps most vividly and effectively by Theodore Roosevelt (Slotkin, 1993). If the constitutive encounters with nature were no longer possible, the American character would become decadent. The response to this fear of decadence was the uniquely American ritual of "roughing it" and of the strenuous "recreational" encounter with nature. After a long sojourn in Europe Washington Irving observed, "we send our youth abroad to grow luxurious and effeminate in Europe; it appears to me, that a previous tour on the prairies would be more likely to produce that manliness, simplicity, and self-dependence most in unison with our political institutions" (Nash, 1982). By ritually reenacting in "recreational" activities the disciplining encounter with the wilds, its character-building value could be preserved, even improved. The ritual of wilderness experience, largely created in the early twentieth century in California by the Sierra Club, has now spread into a major part of the American scene. What unites John Muir and Theodore Roosevelt is that the encounter with nature is to build character. Here, too, is the particularly American invention of Outward Bound, which seeks to build character by pitting the individual in extreme tests against nature. In these rituals nature is "reconquered" and the individual character disciplined by seemingly masochistic acts of endurance. Although preservationists and environmentalists are often considered to be subverting American values, they are actually cultural preservationists. Their rituals and educational treks aim to create the "rugged individual" and the ideals of self-reliance, discipline, and physical strength that constitute the American national identity. These must be recreated with each generation if liberal society is to survive the twin perils of collectivism and authoritarianism, and anarchy and social anomie.

Sustaining this central ritual of the American *paideia* required vast untamed areas, which only a system of publicly protected national parks could provide (Sax, 1980). The creation of a national parks system is a particularly American invention. By preserving the stage for the perpetual reenactment of the generative constitution of rugged individuals, the basis of American national identity and community was preserved. Thus the United States government began setting aside areas the size of some European nation-states as parks because they were the most spectacular and awesome places of nature, and thus alone able to evoke awe and exact discipline.

EARTH NATIONALISM?

Neither the compression of space nor the attempt to identify a natural place at a larger and more basic scale ended with the industrial revolution harnessing of steam and electricity. In the last half of the twentieth century claims about home place have been made with increasing frequency and

evocative power at a new planetary or whole earth level (Deudney, 1993b). At the root of these claims is a predicament or situation created by the further collapse of space brought about by space travel, by the sense of vulnerability engendered by global ecological decay, and by the possibilities of omnicidal technological "misfires" such as nuclear war.

In the face of these new realities, the most activist parts of the global environmental movement have started to construct and assert new communities and identities based on both a shared place and the claims this place makes on all who inhabit it. The aim is a new human cultural identity and community regrounded and placed in the biologic human body and its ecological contexts. At a rhetorical level, environmentalists propose allegiance to "mother earth" as the true "motherland" of all humans and living things. Thus every person's true "nation"—in the etymological sense of "genuine birth group"—is the human species itself. In short, an "earth nation" encompassing at least the entire human species is being asserted. Various "deep ecologists" present an image of human identity as a species identity contextualized in nature (Devall and Sessions, 1985). Like all identities, this is an imagined community, but one that has comprehensive answers to the questions of who we are, where we came from, and where we are going. These claims are as encompassing as those offered by traditional religions, and are even more so than those of modern state and ethnocentered nationalisms.

These assertions of earth identity and community have more in common with the place claims of nationalism than the space claims of cosmopolitanism, even though they conjure a community and a place more extensive than those asserted by preplanetary cosmopolitanism. Four core features of these earth identity claims deserve note: (1) whole earth iconography, (2) ritual space and ceremony, (3) intergenerational community, and (4) credible cosmology.

The primacy of place over space in earth identity claims is most graphic and evocative in the "whole earth picture," photographs taken of the earth from outer space. The picture symbolizes a home place that is soft and fuzzy, vulnerable, all alone and precious. It evokes an immediate aura of uniqueness and of a distinctive place. This "whole earth" representation is fundamentally different from that of the "globe." A globe is constituted by spherical Cartesian space within which artificial political borders are cartoonishly prominent. In contrast, the whole earth picture is an actual photograph of what the earth looks like to those with the most comprehensive vantage point. The two most distinctive features of a globe are the presence of a grid of longitude and latitude and the representation of different nation-states with different colors. Globes are spherical maps, but the whole earth picture depicts the planet as lacking in sharp lines and right angles. And the whole earth picture does not display the borders of nation-states for, as astronauts have emphasized, the lines separating state from state are invisible from space. The whole earth picture thus seems more authentic and "real" than the globe, whose spatial representations seem constructed, arbitrary, unnat-

ural, and conventional—fictions and conceits imposed on reality or mistaken for reality rather than what actually is.

This image has emerged as the unofficial icon of the environmental movement, but its influence on the culture's senses of space and place has been shaped by its extremely widespread use in advertising. At first glance such utilitarian employment might seem to devalue, routinize, or even banalize this image and its evocative potential. However, this very ubiquity and dissociation from political ideologies and programs enables it to constitute a universal vernacular symbol of the earth nation's home.

Second, environmentalists are increasingly asserting the existence of special sacred places and seeking to establish rituals for them. The religious overtones of these sacred space claims are increasingly explicit, as Bron Taylor has demonstrated with regard to the radical network known as Earth First! (Taylora, 1994). As noted earlier, a key feature of the great premodern cultures was the possibility of hierarchical space, of special locations that were deemed particularly sacred and hallowed, and that served as gathering places for ceremonial ritual and for the spiritual encounters with the extrahuman forces giving shape and meaning to human existence. A strong version of this sense of sacred space is found in the wilderness "sanctuary" (Graber, 1976). The cliche of the environmental movement—that the great wonders of nature constitute the cathedrals and sanctuaries of nature—captures an important feature of the emergent earth national identity and community. The parallel is further strengthened by the realization that increasing numbers of people are making what amount to pilgrimages to the great seats of nature all over the planet, and that this type of "tourism" has much in common with the religious pilgrimages of medieval Christians or contemporary Muslims. The movement to create these sanctuaries began in the United States and Great Britain but has become an increasingly global trend in the last two decades with the emergence of the UN World Heritage Program.

The third nationlike claim of contemporary environmentalism is the assertion of *intergenerational community*. One of the reasons that nationalism remains so much stronger than the cosmopolitan ideologies of liberalism and Marxism is that nations are intergenerational communities, bonding the present to the past and future, justifying sacrifice on the part of the present for the future, and creating a sense of identity that transcends immediate or individual self-interest. The classic statement of this intergenerational feature of viable human collectivities was made by Edmund Burke in his attack on the French Revolutionaries, who were attempting to recreate society based solely on atomistic self-interest. Burke characterizes intergenerational community and obligation based on "a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be born" (Burke, 1968:194–195). This claim, beloved by conservatives, is clearly relevant to the new deep conservation worldview of "green culture." Burke's vision of the fundamental constitution or social contract readily fits this emergent environmental sensibility. A

key slogan of earth nationalism is the American Indian proverb, "We have not inherited the earth from our parents, but borrowed it from our children." The environmentalist justification for controlling global warming and saving endangered species is that the present generation does not have the right to rob future generations of their birthright. To the extent that global environmental rescue is motivated by these intergenerational ethical considerations, it forges one of the decisive features characteristic of an earth nation.

Fourth, environmentalism is the first worldview of the modern era that presents a *credible cosmology*. The fatal flaw of the great premodern theodicies is that they are not credible in the face of modern natural science. In the West the recession of Christendom and the rise of modernity was marked by scientific discoveries profoundly subversive of the religious worldview—the Copernican displacement of the earth from the center of the universe, the discovery of deep geological time, the theory of biological evolution, and the emergence of a mechanical conception of nature hostile to supernatural intervention. From the deistic recasting of God into a retired watchmaker it was but a short step to Nietzsche's "death of God" and the end of monotheistic religion as the axis of identity and community.

A striking feature of deep ecology as a spiritual and moral system is that it can make at least a prima facie claim to being compatible with the important natural science of ecology (Oates, 1984). The most salient metaphorical structure spanning the divide between ecological science and earth identity narratives is "Gaia." For scientists this is a term for the comprehensive homeostatic system of the planet's interacting living organisms and geophysical features (Lovelock, 1991). For others it denotes an encompassing spiritual reality grounded in nature (Ruether, 1992). The simple deduction of norms and prescriptions from bodies of modern scientific knowledge remains a deeply problematic undertaking, but when linked with a simple set of normative assumptions, particularly the desirability of survival, ecology comes much closer to providing a set of broad and important norms.

Beyond these core claims are inchoate and contested issues of great scope and diverse character. Does this new identity and community extend only to the human species or does it extend outward and "downward" to encompass other species as well? One powerful tendency is to extend "rights" and the various forms of community implied in their extension into nonhuman nature (Nash, 1989). The postulate of a human species identity and community—a radical construct when juxtaposed against actual political practice—has been assaulted by environmentalist philosophers as the ultimate source of ecological problems, indicating a cleavage analogous to the traditional national versus cosmopolitan may be emerging *within* green ethics and cosmology.

Another unanswered question concerns whether this emergent earth national community has an "out-group," or needs one. A central feature of modern state nationalism is its nonuniversal character, and the role of other different, and potentially antagonistic, communities against which the

"nation" defines itself. No nationality has ever claimed to be coterminous with the entire human community. Is an "earth nationalism," encompassing at least the entire human species, something of a contradiction in terms? Or does "earth nationalism" transcend this limitation of modern state nationalism, achieving something like the universal community without an "outgroup" postulated by several of the higher religions?

Another puzzle concerns the status of heroism and sacrifice in earth national identities. Existing state and ethnic national identities and communities generate heroism and sacrifice, usually in war, and then evoke these memories. There is a strong relationship between war and modern state nationalism. The historian Michael Howard observes that "it is in fact very difficult to create national self-consciousness *without* a war" (Howard, 1979). One reason that war is such a formative experience, in fact and in myth, for national identities and communities is that war produces heroes and evokes sacrifice (Elhstain, 1991). To paraphrase Jefferson, the tree of nationalism must be periodically watered with the blood of patriots. Intergroup violence and bloodshed evoke extremes of human emotion and group bonding that give nations their continuing cohesion. What experience can "green culture" provide that can compete with war as a crucible of identity?

Perhaps the center of gravity of the emergent "green culture" will be located in the vernacular rather than in extreme situations like war. Hegel's famous quip that reading the morning newspaper is the modern nation's analogue to prayer in the Middle Ages points to the fact that an important part of national identity and community derives from routine, serially performed, and universally accessible actions of citizens. In looking for an analogue in "green culture" for war in nationalism, it is important to remember that the "ultimate test" of battlefield experience does not necessarily have to be routinely or universally experienced by everyone in a culture to generate identity and community. To the degree that environmental constraints are recognized and produce modified behavior on the part of large numbers of citizens, and such environmentally responsible behavior is perceived as requiring a sacrifice, then the identity and community claims of "green culture" could still be strong. Thus, if technical fixes alone are capable of solving environmental problems, then a sense of sacrifice that could help forge a green identity and community are likely to be reduced. Behavioral changes involving perceived personal sacrifice may be harder to achieve than cost-free technical fixes, but their political inheritance could be much greater.

EARTH IDENTITIES AND
MODERN STATE NATIONALISM

Because the nascent earth national identity and community claims have many similarities with religion and state nationalism, we must ask how this

new cultural formation will relate to the existing nationalisms that are large-
ly connected to states. Logically there are three possibilities: (1) Earth iden-
tity and community will replace state nationalism, providing a substantive
cosmopolitan community for the first time; (2) environmental awareness
will color state nationalism (the "greening" of nations), making existing
nationalist groupings less truculent and more amenable to international
cooperation; or (3) environmental awareness will be captured by existing
statist nationalism, giving it additional virulence and thus reinforcing the
conflictual tendencies of the international system. Such "black greens," as
they are known in Europe, mark the nationalization of the greens.

Earth-centered identity and community claims are not likely to enhance
and intensify existing national identities, but rather to displace or color
them. The crucial reason is the strength of *science* in deep ecology. All pre-
vious nationalisms contain a pre-ecological or anti-ecological understanding
of place and links to place, but the emergent earth nationalism integrates sci-
entific ecological understandings of place and human links to place. Unlike
all existing nationalisms, environmental awareness contains a major strain
of ecological and earth systems natural science, and these scientific con-
structs are fundamentally incompatible with the parochial orientations of all
existing national identities. Localist bioregional ideologies and political
practices exist within the radical environmental community, but the unmis-
takable message of ecological science is that the earth is the only integral
bioregion, and that the "homeland" of all humans is the whole planet rather
than some piece of it.

At least a partial test case of these alternatives may be unfolding in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Jancar-Webster, 1993). Here,
for the first time, a major liberation and awakening of traditional national
groupings is occurring at the same time with significant political mobiliza-
tion around environmental issues. In some widely publicized instances, such
as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine and nuclear testing in
Kazakhstan, environmental concerns have been a major focal point of
national grievance against Soviet rule. In these cases, environmental con-
cerns reinforce the desire of long-suppressed and dormant national groups to
assert their interests in acquiring sovereign states of their own.

The important question, however, is whether these newly emergent
nation-states will be more likely to engage in interstate cooperation once
their aspirations for national liberation have been satisfied. One reason for
believing that the emergence of "green culture" will replace or moderate
state and ethnic nationalism rather than make it more truculent is that envi-
ronmental awareness brings with it an awareness of the interconnected and
interdependent character of the earth's diverse inhabitants. Although envi-
ronmental mobilization almost always begins with some specific local envi-
ronmental grievance, the increased awareness of ecological principles that
accompanies such mobilizations leads toward a globalist rather than a statist

or ethnic sensibility. The anthropologist Luther Gerlach has documented that people first come to environmental issues with a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) mentality, but as they learn more about the actual issues involved, soon develop a NOPE (Not On Planet Earth) mentality (Gerlach, 1993).

NOTES

1. I do not, of course, maintain that all national identity has this nature-centered basis. But it would be a mistake to ignore the role of constructed or historically significated place in ethnonational regime patriotic identical claims. Historical monuments are places that hold great emotive significance, but their importance derives from their place in a historical narrative of group and/or regime struggle. An important difference between identities based on place and ethnonational identities is that place-centered identities do not depend on an "other" against which to define themselves. Topophilia is not threatened by the experience of the loss or displacement from the native place.

8

Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives

J. Ann Tickner

In an infrequently cited work written at the conclusion of World War II, E. H. Carr warned of the dangers of conflicts embedded in exclusionary national identities (Carr, 1945). This potential for nationalist conflicts, which still seemed central to many scholars of international relations at mid-century in their attempt to understand the outbreak of two world wars, was later ignored in realist and neorealist explanations of Cold War rivalries. As post–World War II international theory became firmly situated within the discipline of political science, questions having to do with national identity and its effects on political integration and development more generally, questions that have seemed largely irrelevant to the field of international politics, became subsumed under a separate subdiscipline of comparative politics (Bloom, 1990:1).

Yet, with the recent end of the bipolar struggle between the superpowers and the recognition of the centrality of ethnic rivalries and conflicts associated with state-building and state disintegration, issues related to national identity are no longer being ignored, even by mainstream scholars. With the end of the Cold War, the effects of nationalism on security and insecurity are now being reexamined by realists themselves. According to Barry Buzan, the revival of European nationalism and xenophobia suggests that there will be a heavy emphasis on society rather than the state as the main focus of European security concerns during the 1990s. New insecurities are not about defending disputed boundaries, power rivalries, or security dilemmas between states—traditional realist concerns. Instead, issues of identity and migration are driving underlying perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities (Buzan in Waever et al., 1993:1–5). Similarly, Henry Nau (1993) asserts that identity is a more powerful variable than anarchy or power for understanding international relations: Nau is particularly interested in developing an identity-based theory to better explain conflict and insecurity as well as to explore the possibilities for building a more secure world. Recent literatures, which claim that democracies do not fight each other, are also drawing,

albeit implicitly, on state identities to explain the decrease in international conflict at the core of the international system (Doyle, 1986).

While mainstream theories have been slow to recognize the issue of identity in international relations, identity has been a central concern in contemporary feminist theory. Since women have generally been outsiders, excluded from historical processes that have framed contemporary political and economic life, as well as from the development of knowledge that has interpreted these processes, most contemporary feminist approaches take identity as a starting point for their theoretical constructions. Conscious of the exclusion of women, feminists have been particularly concerned with the question of who are the collective "we" about whom the historical understanding of our world has been constructed.

In this chapter, I will suggest ways in which feminist theories can contribute to constructing an identity-based approach to international relations. I shall begin by examining some contemporary feminist analysis of the western Enlightenment subject around whom the body of knowledge about our political, economic, and social relations has been built: I shall argue that, under the guise of objectivity and universality, this subject is actually gendered masculine. Feminists claim that the historical definition of the masculine subject depends on its relationship to a devalued female "other." I will apply this analysis to international relations through an examination of similarly gendered identities of states and their relationships to exterior others. I will argue that the identity of the modern state, legitimated through ambiguously gendered ideologies of nationalism, has been constructed by drawing exclusionary boundaries to contain security threats from devalued and dangerous "others" on both the inside and the outside. While the state has been historically inscribed with the characteristics of "sovereign man," others on the outside are frequently described in less favorable terms, similar to those used to describe women. Such relationships of inequality have been used to justify expansionism, military preparedness, and war. I believe that such an analysis can contribute some new insights into our understanding of conflict and insecurity. Finally, I shall draw on some feminist theories to suggest how we might begin to think about reconstructing less exclusionary state identities, built on less gendered constructions of the self that are more compatible with world security.

FEMINIST THEORY AND IDENTITY

Stuart Hall describes the modern subject, whose birth he places in the seventeenth century, as a new and decisive form of individualism that set the human subject free from his moorings in the traditions and structures of medieval life (Hall et al., 1992:281–282). This representation of the modern universal subject, who has been both the creator and the object of knowl-

edge, is a gendered representation based on human qualities that most political theorists have attributed to men but not to women (Heckman, 1990). For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau claimed that abstract principles and speculative truths are the preserve only of men, since women are not capable of reason (Pateman, 1988:101).

The extreme form of individualism that Hall describes has been central to the construction of the autonomous subject so important in Western liberal political theory, particularly social contract theory with its assumption that individuals are prior to community. This radical individualism has also provided the basis for the construction of "rational economic man," an individual whose self-interested profit-maximizing behavior in the market has been central to the development of modern capitalism. Historically, "modern man" has derived his identity from his engagement in the public domain of politics and the market, spaces from which Western women were increasingly excluded during the early modern period.

If, as Hall argues, modernity has been built around the notion of radical individualism, how was it possible that women could have been excluded from the public sphere and defined by Western political theorists as incomplete individuals incapable of reason? Feminists claim that the denial of the subjectivity of women was achieved by containing them in the private sphere of the household. As Susan Okin argues, the sphere of public life was premised on the existence of the private sphere of the family, whose demands defined women's functions and lifestyle and excluded them from equal participation in the world of economic and political life—in the Western philosophical tradition the public and private spheres have depended on one another for their existence (Okin, 1979:281). In the seventeenth century, European women began to be deprived of an economic basis for independence by the separation of the workplace from the household and the consolidation of what consequently became the patriarchal structure of capitalism (Pateman, 1988:90). This public/private split not only deprived women of a voice in the public spheres of politics and the market, in the eighteenth century, it also engendered a division between reason and feeling as the household, the "natural" site of women's existence, became associated with moral sentiments as opposed to self-interest, characteristic of the public world (Tronto, 1993:52–56). Excluded from public life, women's identities were constructed around a lack of autonomy and independence—in other words a lack of the (favorable) characteristics attributable to men (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987:85).

Simone de Beauvoir's famous definition of women's identity as "other" can be attributed to this historical legacy of Western political and economic thought. According to Beauvoir, the fact that women have had no history of their own has been an important contributor to their incapacity to overcome their position subordinate to men. Moreover, this lack of subjectivity causes women's subordination to appear natural, as primordial as consciousness

itself (Beauvoir, 1952:xxi–xxii). Importantly for feminist theories of identity, woman as "other" is a relational concept that depends on and is derived from the identity of the male as universal subject. "No group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the 'other' over against itself" (Beauvoir, 1952:xix).

Yet, as Beauvoir articulated more than forty years ago, "one is not born, but rather becomes a woman" (Beauvoir, 1952:301). That these masculine and feminine identities are a social construction has been central to almost all contemporary feminist theory. Dichotomies, such as strong/weak, rational/emotional, independent/dependent, public/private, and cultured/natural, grow out of the legacy of Western political and economic thought, which has denied that women are fully human; the second of each of these pairs, associated with femininity, has been constructed as a devalued characteristic in opposition to the ideal (male) subject.

For Beauvoir and many of her contemporary first-wave feminists, the subordinate identity of woman could only be erased if women were to become like men. Second-wave feminists have dealt with this issue somewhat differently, however, their solution has been to try to move women from the margin to the center by making them the subjects of knowledge through the development of theories that reflect what has been termed "a woman's way of knowing." One of the most cited works in this tradition is Carol Gilligan's *In A Different Voice*. In her critique of psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's research on the stages of moral reasoning, Gilligan detected a masculine bias; she claims to have discovered that women articulate their moral reasoning "in a different voice." Since boys' early socialization emphasizes autonomy while girls are socialized for interdependence, when men reason about morality they stress rights and rules while women focus on responsibility and relationships (Gilligan, 1982).

Similarly, feminist standpoint theory has argued for the construction of knowledge based on the material conditions of women's experiences. Nancy Hartsock has claimed that looking at the world through women's experiences gives us a more complete picture of the world; since those who are oppressed have a better understanding of the sources of their oppression than their oppressors, this allows them to see more clearly the deeper reality of life (Hartsock, 1985).

More recently, however, feminist theory has moved from an emphasis on discovering the identity of "woman" to a concern with difference. Postmodern and postcolonial feminists and feminists of color have criticized psychoanalytic and standpoint theorists, of which Gilligan and Hartsock are representatives respectively, for what they claim is their tendency to replicate the male subject. According to Elizabeth Spelman, the generic woman of standpoint theory functions the way generic man has functioned in the creation of Western knowledge (Spelman, 1988). Spelman claims that by taking white middle-class women as representative of women's identities

more generally, contemporary feminism is paralleling the legacy of Western philosophy. Just as Western philosophy was sexist, it was also elitist, as it generalized from the lives of elite men. Therefore, Spelman argues, an analysis of gendered identities cannot be isolated from those of race and class (see also Hooks, 1984).

All feminist theories concerned with both identity and difference question the possibility of developing one universalist objective body of knowledge. Feminists argue that all knowledge is socially constructed and depends on the social, temporal, and spatial location of the knower. I shall now suggest how these ideas can contribute to the construction of an identity-based approach to international relations.

WHAT CAN FEMINIST THEORIES OF IDENTITY TELL US ABOUT IR?

Feminist claims that women have been absent from the construction of knowledge has been particularly true in the realm of international politics. Gendered perspectives are very recent additions to the field and are rarely incorporated into mainstream or critical international theories. Feminists have questioned realism's claim to universality and objectivity; they suggest that its epistemology is gendered masculine and is constructed out of experiences more typical of men than women (Grant and Newland, 1991; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992; Sylvester, 1994). Favorable attributes of states, such as independence, strength, autonomy, and self-help, resemble the characteristics of sovereign man. Where identities, inscribed as feminine, have impinged on the traditional discipline, they have done so through the association of feminine characteristics with idealism that has often been branded as naive, unrealistic, and even irrational by its realist critics. Just as sovereign man depended on the female other for his identity, so the state secures its identity through its relationship to identities of devalued and dangerous others, both inside and outside its boundaries.

STATE IDENTITIES

In conventional international theory, states, like Hobbes's individuals in the state of nature, appear to have sprung like mushrooms into maturity: States look alike, differentiated only by their power and capacity to act on the international system. Yet the characteristics that neorealists attribute to states are quite similar to those attributed to the radical individualism of sovereign man discussed earlier. Rational choice theorists' explanations of the instrumentally competitive behavior of states in the international system parallel the self-interested market behavior of rational economic man. Given

this type of behavior under conditions of anarchy, conflict can break out at any time; therefore, states must act to maximize their own power and self-interest. Moral behavior has no place in international politics. Just as moral sentiments have been contained in women's space, the private sphere of the household, so too the possibility of moral behavior has been banished from the international sphere. Realists counsel that statesmen who act morally are behaving "irrationally," given the "realities" of an anarchic and dangerous world.

As Rob Walker has claimed, state sovereignty is "a crucial reification of human identity as a particular rendition of rational man" (Walker in Peterson, 1992:191). An examination of the historical development of state sovereignty as it has evolved over time in the West does indeed suggest a deeply gendered construction that has not included women on the same terms as men. Early states in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe were identified with the person of the sovereign king. Hobbes's depiction of the Leviathan, a man in armor wearing a crown and carrying a sword, serves as a visual representation of this early modern form of sovereign authority. International relations were relations between kings and princes who constructed alliances and guaranteed treaties through royal marriages and whose foreign policy making was conducted in isolation from their populations.

With the advent of republican forms of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the state became associated with the will of the people rather than the crown. Yet the identity of the "people" remained limited; nowhere were women given the right to vote in the nineteenth century, nor could they own property on an equal footing with men. Although women's right to vote is now guaranteed in all Western democracies, it is still questionable whether they have achieved a voice in the construction of foreign policy. In the United States in 1987, women made up less than 5 percent of the senior foreign service ranks and held less than 4 percent of executive positions in the Department of Defense (Tickner, 1992:1). We must conclude, therefore, that the collective *we*, embedded in the historical construction of the state-as-unitary actor model of international theory, represents men's rather than women's voices.

Yet in reality, states do not possess stable fixed identities; they construct and reconstruct them for the political purposes of the moment. While much of the conventional literature on state-building has claimed that a sense of nationalism among people preceded and provided the motivation for the creation of states, recent historical sociology has suggested that nationalism is a construct of the state rather than the people; in other words, the nation is an "imagined political community" (Campbell, 1992).[1] From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity; since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and

success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities (Linklater, 1990:149).

NATIONAL IDENTITIES

If the state has used the ideology of nationalism for its own political purposes, individuals also rely on nationalism as an important component of their personal identity. In spite of the emphasis on the desirability of individualism in Western liberal thought, the psychological need of individuals to identify with a group is well established (Bloom, 1990). The nation-state, demarcated by boundaries and a unique sense of shared historical memories, is well suited to provide both the physical and psychological security and the sense of personal transcendence necessary for secure personal identities. The category of stateless person is a powerful reminder of the importance of a national identity.

I have argued that there is a close coincidence between the characteristics of states and sovereign man; nationalist identities are more ambiguously gendered, however. Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relationships, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. For example, in 1603 King James I of England pronounced, "I am the husband, and all the whole isle is my lawful wife; I am the head, and it is my body" (Helgerson, 1992:298). Even after the displacement of the absolute sovereign, the ideology of nationalism has remained closely tied to the metaphor of the family. Paradoxically, whereas relations inside families were assumed out of Western political and economic thought, nation-as-family has been and continues to be an important metaphor on which the state relies for reinforcing its legitimacy; it also provides a powerful symbol for individuals' need for community. Images of motherlands, fatherlands, and homelands evoke a shared sense of purpose and community for states and their citizens alike.

Nevertheless, the sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways whose implications reinforce inequalities between women and men. The theme of the nation as female implies the gendering of the citizen as male and sets limits on the forms of national belonging available to women (C. Hall, 1993:100). While women have been construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, they have been denied any direct relation to national agency. Just as families have been patriarchal institutions of hierarchy, so these nationalist family metaphors denote hierarchies in which men's roles are privileged over women's. "Despite nationalisms' ideological investment in the idea of popular *unity,* nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender *difference*" (McClintock, 1993:61).

The historical myths around which national identities have been con-

structed are also deeply gendered. Defining moments in collective historical memories are often wars of national liberation, great victories in battles against external enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion; heroes are frequently military figures, defenders of the nation, or individuals who have left the homeland to explore "virgin" lands or to lead expeditions of imperial conquest. Flags and national anthems are often associated with war. Rarely do these stories, heroes, or symbols include women or women's experiences. When women have fought alongside men in wars of national liberation, their concerns as women have frequently been put aside and their contributions erased from historical memory once the war has been won. Craig Calhoun has suggested that nationalist movements resist women's demands because allowing women to identify their distinctive interests opens up the claim that gender has autonomous status as a basis for personal identity, a claim that threatens the commonalities of male-dominated nationhood (Calhoun, 1993:231).

Mobilization against external threats has been crucial for augmenting and consolidating states' legitimacy as well as for achieving a common sense of purpose among citizens. Scholars of nationalism have emphasized the importance of warfare for the creation of a sense of national community; not only does war mobilize the national consciousness, it also provides the myths and memories that create a sense of national identity and cohesion (Smith, 1991:27). As Jean Elshtain asserts, "Societies are, in some sense, the 'sum total' of their war stories" (Elshtain, 1987:166). Throughout the history of the state, military service has been an important mechanism for eroding subnational identities by instilling in younger generations a common sense of national identity, purpose, and experience (Buzan in Waever, 1993:47). We are taught to believe that it is through military service that citizens can best express their patriotism and it is during times of war, when national identity is under threat, that states are able to command the deepest loyalty from their citizens. Many individuals, both men and women, remember war as the best years of their lives even though it may have been a time when life was most difficult and when individual freedoms were most likely to have been eroded.

During war, and in times of crisis more generally, states exhort masculine heroes, or "protectors," to fight for the defense of the "mother" country. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, "It is curious how one cannot resist the tendency to give an anthropomorphic form to a country. . . . India becomes *Bharat Mata,* Mother India, a beautiful lady, very old, cruelly treated by aliens and outsiders, and calling upon her children to protect her (Kohn, 1955:183). The role of the protector is central to the mobilization of national identity. But a protector is a relational concept, often gendered, that depends on the presence of those in need of protection; it requires the existence of those who are believed to be incapable of protecting themselves, a category to which all women, children, and even some men have been

assigned. The myth that women are in need of protection is sustained by contradictory messages that simultaneously suggest that women are too valuable to fight and that they would be ineffective and unreliable if called on to do so (Stiehm, 1982). As "mothers of the nation," women's patriotic duty has often been associated with their reproductive roles; in times of crisis, states exhort women to produce sons who can fight to defend the homeland. A "Gold Star Mother" is but one symbol of the ultimate sacrifice of losing one's son for a noble cause.

The relational, but unequal, categories of protectors and protected are reproduced in images of "just warriors" and "beautiful souls." Jean Elshtain suggests that the Hegelian construct of the beautiful soul plays a supporting role in the creation of national ideologies, particularly with respect to war—as mourner, as occasion for war, and as the embodiment of nonwarlike values. But while beautiful souls may support men's wars and act as the keepers of the nation's moral values, they are firmly lodged in the private sphere (Elshtain, 1987:140–149). This identity has legitimated the exclusion of women from the corridors of power, particularly in matters of foreign policy.

As Elshtain also points out, war is an experience to which women are exterior; men have inhabited the world of war in a way that women have not (Elshtain, 1987:194). Although women have played important supporting roles on battlefronts, these experiences are frequently hidden, lest they tarnish the image of the nobility of war. Because women on the front lines are usually nurses and caregivers, their experiences with war are often associated with tending men's injured bodies, a role that sits in uneasy tension with the patriotic glorification of war, central to the construction of national identity. Consequently, women's stories about their experiences of war have frequently been erased from popular memory (Higonnet in Cooke and Woollacott, 1993:221).[2]

In opposition to war is peace; yet peace is a concept around which it is difficult to inspire citizen loyalty and identity. At best, images of peace appear uninteresting; at worst they evoke identities that are problematic and unpatriotic,[3] identities that are often associated with women and feminine characteristics. From Jane Addams and her colleagues at The Hague speaking out against what they saw as the futility of World War I to women protesting the placement of nuclear missiles at Greenham Common in England in the early 1980s, women in peace movements have been portrayed as naive, unpatriotic, and incapable of understanding the complex realities of national security. While peace movements more generally disturb the image of a unified national purpose embodied in states' national security policies, the association of feminine characteristics with peace has contributed to the disempowerment and delegitimation of peace projects undertaken by both women and men (Tickner in Klare, 1994).

I have indicated how women and men are differentially and unequally

incorporated into nationalist identities through the contrasting roles they have played in national myths and legends, particularly those constructed around issues of war and peace. I have argued that the unequal roles of protector and protected, assigned to men and women respectively, render women second-class citizens and reinforce national identities that prioritize war and conflict. These masculinized, militarized identities, which depend on their relationship to devalued characteristics associated with femininity, have been important for states in legitimating their foreign policies. Just as the family in the modern West has institutionalized women's inferiority, family metaphors—often central to the construction of the identities of state and nation—evoke a sense of male agency; in addition, they reinforce women's association with the private sphere and, therefore, their exclusion from the seats of power.

Family metaphors have also assigned others to the ranks of second-class citizens since images of race and nation are never far apart (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991:37). In the West, the ideal family has historically been seen as white and middle class; "mothers of the nation" are generally portrayed as affluent enough to stay at home with their children. Although the United States has been cast as a nation of immigrants, blacks and Native Americans have not played a positive role in defining America's identity. In Europe and the United States, immigrants, particularly those who are non-white, have often been portrayed as a particular threat to the state. While nationalism preaches cultural diversity, in fact it often imposes cultural homogeneity; Ernest Gellner claims that, while nationalism is presented as coextensive with its total population, it is really about the identification of a nation with a literate high culture (Gellner, 1983:95).

Just as national identities have been created through this mythical claim to homogeneity, these identities have been reinforced by the attribution of difference to those outside state boundaries. Common identities have always been formed and strengthened through their relationship to difference.

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

In conventional international theory, boundaries between inside and outside have been defined in terms of an order/anarchy distinction, where "domestic" safe spaces are contrasted with a dangerous international environment devoid of any sovereign authority to curb the predatory actions of expansive states. This notion of community surrounded by danger and external threat was an important rationale for early state-building and has continued to legitimize national security policies. Since its birth in early modern Europe, the Western state system has constructed its encounters with "uncivilized" and dangerous others in ways that have justified expansion, conquest, and a state of military preparedness. Anarchy, or the "state of

nature," is not only a metaphor for the way in which people or states can be expected to behave in the absence of government; it also depicts an untamed natural environment in need of civilization, whose wild and chaotic spaces are often described as female.[4]

The engendering of the external other, an important legitimator of Western imperialism, was already manifest in early European voyages of exploration. Describing Columbus's first encounter with the Indians of the "New World," Tzvetan Todorov depicts his inability to see them as subjects; in his diaries, Columbus speaks about the Indians in ways that suggest he saw them, not in terms of their humanity, but as part of the landscape. Columbus describes the Indians as natural specimens, "naked as the day they were born," gentle and fearful but devoid of culture and religion (Todorov, 1992:35–38). The association of the Indians with nature, which denied them the possibility of having a will of their own, is similar to the association of women with nature, which has supported historical claims that women are incapable of rational thought. Evoking similarly gendered sentiments, Todorov remarks that, on encountering the Indians for the first time, Columbus experienced a sense of superiority that engendered in him a protectionist form of behavior.

Protection, or the attribution of characteristics to outside others that render them incapable of caring for themselves, has provided an important legitimator of Western imperialism. The "civilizing" mission, epitomized in the concept of the "White Man's Burden," demonstrates the tensions that occur at the intersection of race and gender. In his analysis of various justifications used for United States interventions in Latin America during the nineteenth century, Michael Hunt describes the racial and gender stereotyping in popular portrayals of Latin Americans. One image is the Latino as a black male, corrupt, dishonest and obstinate; a more favorable one is provided by the portrayal of a white senorita in need of saving from her dangerous black suitor. The third image is that of a black child, which combined the characteristics of the previous two, the racially degenerate male and the dependent female. Together they provided legitimation for the portrayal of the United States as savior and tutor to people incapable of governing themselves (Hunt, 1987:58–61). Similarly, Cynthia Enloe describes pictures of native women on postcards sent home to Europe from African and Asian colonies in the early nineteenth century, suggesting images that were appealing but that made clear that these alien societies needed the civilizing government that only whites could bestow (Enloe, 1990:42).

Such gendered images, although somewhat muted, remain today and are particularly prevalent in Western states' portrayal of the South. In the postindependence era, former colonial states and their leaders have frequently been seen as emotional and unpredictable, characteristics also associated with women. The language of modernization theory portrayed newly independent states as an aberration of the developed West. Dichotomies, such as

modern/traditional, rational/irrational, dynamic/static, and progressive/ backward, evoke the dyadic characteristics of sovereign man and the female "other," whose identity is constructed in relation to but inferior to the masculine norm. Applied to North-South relations, this language portrays "underdevelopment" as an aberration, a negation of the norm—the developed "First World" (Johnston, in Murphy and Tooze, 1991:154).

During the Cold War, the South was generally subsumed under the primary imperative of the East-West struggle. More recently, however, a North-South polarity is beginning to replace an East-West one in the discourse of international relations. With persistent ethnic conflict and war associated with failures of state building in the South, "zones of peace" in the North, reinforced by claims that democracies do not fight each other, are being contrasted with "zones of turmoil" in the South (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993). In such thinking, the identity of postcolonial states is portrayed in an ominous light; conditions of instability and conflict appear inevitable until these states attain the level of political and economic development of the North. While anarchy—both domestic and international—abounds in the South, relations between democracies of the North have reached a stage of "mature anarchy," a condition that makes war unlikely (Buzan, 1991).

I have shown that national identities, constructed in terms of differentiation from devalued others both inside and outside state boundaries, reinforce social and cultural hierarchies and provide the legitimation for expansionary projects, military preparedness, and even war. Conventional international theory has reinforced these exclusionary identities through the anarchy/order distinction and the power politics prescriptions that flow from it. Feminist perspectives claim that these constructions of identity and difference are gendered; they suggest that the insecurities and conflict that arise out of these exclusionary identities will not be diminished until gender and other social hierarchies are diminished (Tickner, 1992: Chap. 5). I will now outline some feminist thinking that could contribute to reconceptualizing identity in ways that would allow us to begin to think about transcending these hierarchical relationships.

RETHINKING PERSONAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES

As a more peaceful alternative to the conflict-prone world of exclusionary nation-states, international relations has had a long tradition of positing universalist schemes that could transcend the particularities of statist identities. However, the creation of global identities necessary for building conflict-reducing universal structures must be approached with caution. As Stuart Hall points out, the most powerful creators of global identities today are elites who control global economic processes (Hall et al., 1992:317–318).

While feminists are aware that planetary survival requires identities that are compatible with global solidarity (Peterson, 1993:1), a feminist analysis must be aware of the power implications of the global identities to which Stuart Hall refers. As Immanuel Wallerstein has suggested, universalism is particularly appropriate for the functioning of the capitalist world economy, but it has also been accompanied by an increase in the destructive ideologies of racism and sexism. Wallerstein sees these two trends as interrelated since the globalization of capital has been built on a supply of cheap or nonremunerated labor provided by nonwhite workers, women and men, both inside and outside the official workforce (Wallerstein in Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991:31–33). Mona Harrington argues that feminists should be alarmed by structures of international economic power that rarely include women or the interests of underprivileged groups and that operate without the kind of government oversight possible only inside the state (Harrington in Peterson, 1992:66).

Identities implied in terms such as "global village" and "global citizen" suggest a reconceptualization that attempts to reconcile global identities with local ones in ways that are less hierarchical. Yet these too are gendered concepts into which assumptions of inequality between women and men and elites and less privileged are built. When we examine the composition of institutions involved in efforts to build peace or deal with environmental problems, we find that men are more likely to be found at the global level and women at the local. While women throughout the world are frequently leaders of local peace and environmental movements, international governmental organizations include fewer women than do national governments. When women create transnational alliances, non-Western women complain that they are required to accept models based on Western understandings of feminism and Western ways of doing things. The global/local nexus can, therefore, have racist as well as gendered implications.

How, then, can we begin to conceptualize identities compatible with a genuine community of humankind, in which there is a balance between the universal and the particular that does not lead to doctrines of superiority and inferiority? My answer to this question is not to give up on the state entirely—democratic states, because of their political accountability have, in many instances, been protectors of people's interests.[5] We should, therefore, be thinking about reconceptualizing state identities in ways that are not associated with an exclusionary, militaristic, gendered form of patriotism. This would depend on rethinking the identities of citizens also. Recent feminist writings have provided some alternative models for both states and their citizens that can contribute to these reconceptualizations.

Mona Harrington has developed a model she calls the "inward-turning feminist liberal state." This would not be a liberal state in the classic sense, with an emphasis on individual autonomy and individual rights, but a social democracy committed to protecting the needs of its most vulnerable citi-

zens. Such a state would be contentious rather than harmonious since it would recognize disparate and conflicting interests based on sex, race, and class. In light of these conflicting interests, state identities built around the illusion of a homogeneous concept of the national interest would have no legitimacy; therefore, the pretense that the joint fortunes of a nation's people could be advanced by war would be politically impossible (Harrington in Peterson, 1992:77). While Harrington's model is inward looking, it in no way supports exclusionary boundaries or the concept of national interest defined through self-aggrandizement and hostility toward others; although it puts the vulnerable within one's own state first, it does not do so at the expense of those on the outside.

In a similar reconceptualization of state identity, Jean Elshtain argues that we must try to move toward what she calls a "postsovereign politics" that shifts the focus of political identity from sacrifice to responsibility. This would involve the forging of civic identities that do not privilege the sacrifice of the self, such as those associated with a military definition of citizenship (Elshtain in Peterson, 1992:150). A focus on responsibility shifts identity closer to an ethic of care compatible with Harrington's social democratic model.

These alternate state identities would depend on the construction of national identities associated with a reformulated model of citizenship. A more secure future depends on a less rigid boundary between the instrumental rationality of the public realm and the values we espouse in the home. These barriers between public and private identities will not be broken down, however, until men and women participate equally in both realms.

Judith Stiehm's concept of the citizen defender, a notion predicated on the participation of women in the military on an equal footing with men, provides an alternate model for the military dimension of citizenship (Stiehm, 1982). In a nation of defenders the roles of protector and protected would cease to exist. The concept of citizen defender diffuses the aggressive connotations of warrior patriot. With less emphasis on the manliness of war, new questions about its morality could be raised.

Rethinking identity from the perspective of breaking down gender and other hierarchical social relationships requires the construction of epistemologies that do not rely on the universal male subject as their starting point. Virginia Held suggests that as an alternative to defining the individual in terms of contractual relationships related to the historically specific concept of economic man, we should ask what society would look like if we substituted the paradigm of the mother/child relationship (Held in Mansbridge, 1990). Held argues that for mother and child, the progression is from society to greater individuality rather than from individuality to the contractual ties of social contract theory; thus this relationship offers us an

alternative conception of the self that is an equally plausible paradigm for social relations.[6]

For many feminists, the substitution of maternal values for values typically associated with the public domain is problematic. As long as the public and private are perceived as men's and women's spheres respectively, certain feminists have argued that characteristics designated as "feminine" will continue to be devalued. In her construction of a model of care, Joan Tronto posits ways in which we might begin to overcome this public/private divide. Tronto claims that the vocabulary of care is the mechanism that offers the greatest possibility for transforming social and political thinking, especially with respect to the treatment of "others" (Tronto, 1993:124). Tronto argues that liberal models of political thought have allowed us to think only in terms of autonomy and dependence: a care perspective permits us to change the assumptions we make about human nature. Care allows us to see that humans are not fully autonomous, but always in a condition of interdependence, sometimes giving care and at other times receiving it. Thinking about human identity in this way starts from the assumption that human beings are interdependent rather than autonomous, an assumption that would challenge our traditional view of the world (ibid.:162).

Standpoint feminism has made an important contribution to deconstructing the sovereign subject and revealing its identity as gendered. However, feminist reconceptualizations of personal identity must not replace the universal male subject with a female one. Constructing bodies of knowledge that do not start from the position of the universal male subject involves being sensitive to difference while striving to be as objective as possible. While acknowledging the impossibility of representing all the world's multiple realities in terms of one universal truth, feminists must seek theories that offer us what Donna Haraway calls a "reliable account of things, . . . an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different—and power-differentiated—communities" (Haraway, 1988:580). Haraway argues for what she calls "embodied objectivity" or "situated knowledge": Situated knowledge does not mean relativism, but rather shared conversations leading to "better accounts of the world" (ibid.:583).

In international relations, "better accounts of the world" involve getting beyond theories that take the historical construction of sovereign man as their starting point. Given their definition of gender as a hierarchical social construction, feminist theories can make an important contribution to formulating an identity-based approach to international politics that understands the exclusionary nature of national identities built on similar relationships of social inequality. Shared conversations across racial, ethnic, gendered, and international boundary lines are imperative for the construction of nonhierarchical identities that can transcend the exclusionary bound-

aries of statist and nationalist ideologies embedded in the theory and practice of international relations.

NOTES

1. For the most important statement of this view of nationalism see Anderson 1983.

2. A monument to nurses in the Vietnam War was recently erected in Washington, D.C., near the Vietnam War Memorial. This project stimulated considerable controversy and protest.

3. President Clinton's avoidance of military service in Vietnam is an example of this. While a majority of Americans now regard U.S. participation in Vietnam as a mistake, Clinton's support for this position in the 1960s is still widely viewed as unpatriotic.

4. As Hannah Pitkin 1984:127 notes, Machiavelli's depiction of "fortuna" as a woman who must be tamed and bent to men's will is regularly associated with nature, something outside the political world that must be subdued and controlled.

5. Some of the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in Europe came from groups representing the interests of those at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale, who feared that the welfare benefits of the European Community would be less adequate than those of their own states (this was true in Denmark, for example, where women's organizations were important in mobilizing forces against the treaty). Opposition to the creation of a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was based on similar fears that global trade agreements could, in the future, be concluded without any political accountability.

6. Held and other feminist theorists have suggested that these types of relationships existed in the state of nature since women and children were necessary for the existence of adult males.

9

Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility

David Campbell

The identity and role of the United States in the postwar world was enabled by a Cold War moral cartography. Understood as a struggle over identity that exceeded the military threat of the various postwar protagonists understood as foes, the interpretive dispositions associated with the Cold War—zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all responses, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them—mapped the problem of responsibility and brought into being particular identities (Campbell, 1992). The responsibility for evil was located in the other and the responsibility for combatting it was a burden of the self.

One of the effects of this moral cartography was the currency attached to the idea that no international action was possible without U.S. leadership, and without U.S. leadership no future other than anarchy was conceivable for the international system (Brzezinski, 1988:694). |But just as the end of the Cold War has sent political mapmakers rushing back to the drawing board with pen in hand, so too has it erased the certainty concerning United States policies, foreign and domestic, in the emerging international order. This can be witnessed in the ongoing debate over U.S. "national interest." It can also be seen in the many-sided controversy swirling around the idea of "multiculturalism." In their respective ways, each of these domains of argument is part of an overarching crisis of representation that has put into question the ground of the sovereign state, the unified polity, from which a sense of identity has emerged, and upon which the burdens of deploying responsibility have in the past fallen. This is because the modern commitment to a settled and unified self has insinuated within it the idea of autonomous moral agents who can bear the burden of responsibility, either in the mode of exercising obligation or suffering culpability (Connolly, 1991b:78).

At the same time, most particularly with respect to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other regions of the former Yugoslavia, the demand for a

new moral map and the exercise of responsibility have never seemed more urgent. The abundant evidence of inhumanity stemming from that conflict begs for a response, yet the deafening silence of inaction with which it has been met suggests traditional compasses offer little bearing on this new terrain. Which leaves us with a dilemma: Can responsibility survive anarchy? What ethical course, in the face of such destruction, can possibly be chartered by subjects subject to deconstruction?

These questions point to an ethicopolitical dilemma that exceeds any specific intellectual domain. Nonetheless, they also represent a profound predicament for international relations at the end of the Cold War. The moral cartography of the Cold War was sustained by, and in turn nourished, the hegemony of realist perspectives in the discipline (Gaddis, 1992–1993; Kratochwil, 1993; and George, 1994).[1] The unravelling of that orientation to the world—which above all else depends on the notion of the state as a pre-given subject—existing independently of and prior to the dangerous relationships it encounters—creates the possibility of rethinking the problematic of subjectivity in international politics. This is especially important with regard to the oft-cited eruption of ethnic and nationalist passions in the post–Cold War era, a development usually rendered in terms of settled identities, naturalized animosities, and ancient hatreds.[2] Rethinking the problematic of subjectivity is essential to improving our understanding of these situations.

In this chapter, these concerns are dealt with in respect to U.S. foreign policy and the conflict surrounding Bosnia. The argument begins with the proposition that the normal foundations for ethical considerations in international relations—sovereign states in an anarchic realm—can no longer be theoretically considered sufficient for the purpose, even if their illusory permanence remains efficacious within political discourse. With respect to the United States, I maintain that this is also practically the case, given the impact of the debates associated with the "national interest" and "multiculturalism" on self-understandings of the nation's identity and purpose. Both these conditions have affected the constitution of identity and the exercise of responsibility as traditionally conceived, and I conclude by proposing that this dilemma—the deconstructibility of states in general and the United States in particular and the questions of identity and responsibility it poses—which can be located in the way the idea of "Balkanization" has functioned within recent debates—is the dilemma behind the inadequate U.S. response to the crisis in the Balkans.[3]

REFIGURING THE STATE

The deconstruction of the state as subject is not restricted to those states liable to destruction. Although the multifarious discourses surrounding the

state that invoke its name and declare its purpose give the appearance of simply reflecting a reality awaiting apprehension, such discourses in actuality constitute that reality for, when pursued, the sources of authority on which those discourses rest can be considered "mystical" (Derrida, 1992a: 11–12).[4] In consequence, the founding moment that institutes the law, a constitution, or the state involves an interpretive and performative force, a *coup de force:*

> It is probable, as it might be said, that such a coup de force always marks the founding of a nation, state, or nation-state. In the event of such a founding of institution, the properly *performative* act must produce (proclaim) what in the form of a *constative* act it merely claims, declares, assures it is describing. The simulacrum or fiction then consists in bringing to daylight, *in giving birth to,* that which one claims to reflect so as to take note of it, as though it were a matter of recording what *will have been there,* the unity of a nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of producing that event. (ibid.: 18)

This *coup de force,* then, is violence without a ground, for at each self-declared point of origin, at each supposedly secure ground, the discourse of primary and stable identity "comes up against its limit: in itself, in its performative power itself. . . . Here [at the limit] a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act" (ibid.: 14).[5]

"Simulacrum," "fiction," "violence without a ground," "the absence of foundations"—such notions would appear at first sight to confirm the worst fears of deconstruction's detractors, that it is beyond reason and nothing more than (in Derrida's words) "a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-political-juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just and unjust" (ibid.: 19). But first appearances can be deceptive, particularly if they themselves are motivated by a certain desire to go beyond reasoned argument and simply dismiss that which appears alien. For three reasons (and perhaps many more), to speak of the interpretive and performative basis of authority is not to advocate irrationalism, injustice, or any other form of licentious anarchy.

Reason number one: Within the frame of Derrida's argument, the proposition that the interpretive and performative *coup de force* gives birth to grounds that must be considered either "illegal" or "inauthentic" is rethought. As Derrida maintains, to say that the foundation of authority cannot rest on anything but itself, that it is therefore violence without a ground, "is not to say that they [the grounds constituted in the *coup de force*] are in themselves unjust, in the sense of 'illegal.' They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment. They exceed the opposition between founded and unfounded, or between any foundationalism or anti-foundationalism" (ibid.: 14).

Reason number two: Just as the founding of the law, or any similar

foundation of authority, exceeds the normal confines of either-or logic, so too *the authority of reason* supposedly governing the logic of the either-or exceeds these confines. Simply put (though this is very difficult to put simply), this is because reason cannot ground the authority of reason. In other words, the authority of reason itself—by which it is said that the argument above is quasi-nihilistic, irrational, and so forth—depends on a similar interpretive and performative *coup de force.* This feature of reason has been forgotten (or, better, it has become a silence walled up) because of the transformation of Leibnitz's principle that "nothing is without reason," into a principle that "now says that every thing counts as existing when and only when it has been securely established as a calculable object for cognition" (Heidegger, 1991:120–121). To rest there is unsatisfactory—even unreasonable—for Derrida, who argues that to truly enact reason involves recognizing that "'Thought' requires *both* the principle of reason *and* what is beyond the principle of reason, the *arkhe* and an-archy" (Derrida, 1983:18–19).

But what politics, and what understanding of responsibility—even if we accept that they flow from an adherence to thought faithful to reason—might reasonably respond to the *coup de force* that produced the silence walled up in the violence of its founding act(s)? Here—and this is reason number three—Derrida offers hope. In his view, the logical result of the walls of authority containing concealed silences because of the way their foundations were constituted is that the resultant structure (be it the law or the state) is "essentially deconstructible, whether because it is founded, constructed on interpretable and transformable textual strata . . . or because its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded" (Derrida, 1992a:14).[6] In other words, necessarily built into such structures, through a founding act that has no recourse to established, prior grounds, are moments of potential undoing. This potential for dissimulation, however, is not necessarily negative. That the law or the state "is deconstructible is not bad news. We may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress" (Derrida, 1992a:14). I'll return to this point in my conclusion.

REIMAGINING AMERICA

The argument above has made plausible the proposition that the state as subject is, through the process of its founding in a *coup de force,* intrinsically deconstructible. But to buttress that claim, and to provide evidence relevant to the task at hand, I want to argue that this is particularly the case with regard to (the United States of) America.[7] If all states are "imagined communities," devoid of ontological being apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, America is the imagined community *par excellence,* about which it has been said that it consists of "a rhetorically United States of nonetheless mainly unresolved borders . . . and a constant-

ly shifting array of cultural crossings" (Campbell, 1992, Chap. 5; Bercovitch, 1993:27).8

Devoid of ontological being, bereft of any resolution to fix its (social) borders, short of any means of stemming the array of cultural crossings, and all too aware of the silences walled up in its structures of authority and identity, "America" has to resort to a range of strategies to establish its conditions of possibility. Important among them, as I have argued elsewhere, is foreign policy, that privileged discourse of danger for the state that participates in an ongoing and more general "evangelism of fear" along with other discourses and practices (Campbell, 1992).9 Its effect is to bring into being and domesticate the identity in whose name it operates, a process that gives rise to a "geography of evil" whereby threats to the putatively secure inside are said to originate from a distinct, distant, and morally inferior outside. This process can be observed in the ongoing debate about what constitutes America's "national interest" in an era of international transformation.

The demise of the Soviet Union as principal antagonist has been met, except in a few instances, not with a confident assertion of self, but with an ever more fervent casting around for the form that new dangers and recalcitrant threats might take.10 The likely international candidates have been many and varied: countries such as Iran, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, and other so-called "weapons states"; conditions such as environmental degradation, population growth, migration flows, and refugee movements; divergent belief systems such as "fundamentalist Islam"; the culture clash of incommensurable civilizations; and even previously unimaginable possibilities such as "killer asteroids."11 This process is necessary, according to Irving Kristol, because it is very difficult "to articulate a foreign policy in the absence of an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one's enemies that help define one's 'national interest,' in whatever form that definition might take. Without such enemies, one flounders amidst a plenitude of rather trivial, or at least, marginal, options" (1990: 16).

Judging by the attempts of many on the conservative end of the foreign policy spectrum, floundering in pursuit of certitude has been the order of the day. What is most interesting about these many attempts to define the "national interest" is the way in which little can actually be specified. In recent debates, the "national interest" has incorporated the desire that America "be true to its historic principles,"12 and "preserve the union, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity";13 it has been said to be that for which Americans are willing to fight and die;14 or it is simply that which a majority agrees after debate is in its long-term interest in relation to the world (Nye, 1991:56).

Even those who are critical of prevailing interpretations of the "national interest" themselves have little recourse to other than abstractions. Alan Tonelson, for example, in an attempt to substitute interest-based thinking for

internationalism of either the liberal or conservative bent, has spoken of the "tangible U.S. interests" that would "secure a certain level of material and psychological well-being," interests that don't go much beyond the central pivots of core security: "the nation's physical, biological survival, and the preservation of its territorial integrity and political independence" (Tonelson, 1991:36–38).

It is thus not hard to discern in these debates on the "national interest" performative enunciations masked as constative acts. Declarations of historic principles, the virtue of the majority will, or the necessity of collective sacrifice are as good a set of examples of the "mystical foundations of authority" as one could get. When one reads authors writing authoritatively of the "four primary interests that have guided American foreign policy from the founding of the Republic" (Lagon and Lind, 1991), it is not difficult to appreciate—particularly given the many debates surrounding the issue of constitutional intent—that such an act "consists in bringing to daylight, *in giving birth to,* that which one claims to reflect so as to take note of it, as though it were a matter of recording what *will have been there,* the unity of a nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of producing that event" (Derrida, 1987:18).[15] Even the enumeration of alleged external threats or the expression of national desire ("securing access to markets and resources") can be understood as projections that are "a matter of recording what will have been there," rather than statements that matter-of-factly account for what is there.

Recent debates concerning the national interest are therefore marked with an obvious undecidability. This is not to suggest that they consist of a vague mishmash of things that escape the possibility of decision, for that has never been the meaning of this concept. What it does suggest is that there are no natural realities that guarantee a particular tie between words, concepts, and things, and thus allow them to escape the indispensability of interpretation or the probability of deconstruction.[16] Reference to an important article from the traditional literature on the national interest can illustrate this.

Writing in 1952, Hans J. Morgenthau sought to specify as far as possible the constitutive elements of the national interest, arguing that the concept had both a residual element "which is inherent in the concept itself," and a content beyond that residual element which "can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it." The residual element was logically required while the content was "variable and determined by circumstances." What was this residual element? "Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation" (Morgenthau, 1952:972). What is proposed is thus a self-referential concept: When the question "What are the nation's interests?" is posed, the answer provided is that their residual and logically necessary element can

only be understood by reference to the nation. In this paradox, whereby it is said that the national interest founds itself by reference to the interests of the nation, we can see a clear instance of the *coup de force*, the violence without a ground that performatively enacts the "mystical foundations of authority."

While reference to the "nation" as the grounds of the national interest would, in terms of the argument being made here, be logically implausible as a guarantee for any state, given its inherent deconstructibility, for "America" it is even more improbable. As the imagined community *par excellence*, America takes the structural relationship of representation to identity to its most intensified extreme (Campbell, 1992:153). And in the current era, where the very meaning of the "nation" and its cultural identity is the subject of passionate ("domestic") contestation, a contestation understandable in terms of the debates surrounding "multiculturalism," the "nation" of the United States offers a less stable ground on which to found interests and secure responsibility than ever before.[17]

"BALKANIZATION" AT HOME AND ABROAD

None of this is foreign to America. In fact, as Bercovitch has argued, debating the meaning of "America" has long been integral to the identity of America. Far from being a threat to the nation, such debates—even when they have the appearance of being fundamentally antagonistic and oppositional—have served as an important element of socialization into the idea of "America" (Bercovitch, 1993:30). Moreover, these contestations about the nation manifest the strangely iconic quality of America, in which state identity is secured through nonterritorial significations often organized under the rubric of "values."[18] This, of course, does not prevent the interpretation of such debates as alien and destabilizing by those who have a particular—most frequently, monocultural—idea of the nation to defend.

What is of most interest here about these cultural arguments over the identity and purpose of America is that they bear a relationship to the policy contestation over the national interest. Indeed, if a purely "external" focus is unable by itself to secure state identity, then the symbolic struggle over the meaning of "America" can be seen as playing an integral role in the constitution of the state. Specifically, what these arguments attempt to do is link what are perceived as resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" of the nation with threats identified and located on the "outside" of the state through a discourse of danger that contains elements applicable to both. It is because of this that foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external policy orientation of preestablished states with secure identities) can be retheorized as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates.

However, these practices highlight the need to draw a distinction between two understandings of foreign policy. The first is one in which "foreign policy" can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as "foreign" in the process of dealing with them. In this sense, foreign policy is divorced from the nation or the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference, and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between a self and another located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography (with those sites themselves being constituted in the process). Operating at all levels of social organization from the level of personal relationships through to global orders, foreign policy in this sense has established conventional dispositions through which new instances of ambiguity or contingency can be apprehended. In other words, the first understanding ("foreign policy") has provided the discursive economy or conventional matrix of interpretations in which the second understanding (Foreign Policy) operates. This second understanding—Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally understood within the discipline of international relations—is thus not as deeply implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding. Rather, Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by foreign policy and its linkage with "external" threats, and to *contain* challenges to the identity that results. The outcome of this is a problematic for the constitution of political/state identity through foreign policy/Foreign Policy: boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives marginalized (Campbell 1992:75–76). It is a problematic that thus enables moral cartographies to be instituted and responsibility to be apportioned.

The relationship between foreign policy/Foreign Policy and the securing of a particular national identity can be illustrated by reference to the way the trope of "Balkanization" has functioned in recent political debates.[19] During the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the argument was made by Charles Krauthammer (and supported by commentators such as George Will) that the cultural contestation afoot in America—associated with the issues of multiculturalism, proliferating identities, changes in the educational curricular, "political correctness," postmodern discourses, and so forth—was fragmenting the unity of society and "the American idea" to such an extent that the resultant "Balkanization" poses "a threat that no outside agent in this post-Soviet world could match." While Krauthammer's argument declared that "America will survive . . . Saddam Hussein," it left the impression (in a manner reminiscent of Norman Podhoretz's arguments in the late 1970s) that this new catalog of so-called internal subversives might weaken the country's vigilance toward the demons of the future (Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse, 1991). Likewise, William Lind has declared that "culture" must be the basis for a new conservative foreign policy agenda, for Western

culture is under the most "explicit assault" since "the last Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683." Those perpetrating this threat are identified as "'politically correct' radicals" at home and "other cultures" abroad. The identity of the latter group is not much of a secret, because Lind opines that if the necessary vigilance (in the form of a "domestic revival" necessitated by large-scale immigration) is not summoned, "the twenty-first century could find once again Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as armies" (Lind, 1991:40).[20]

In other instances where there has not been so specific a link made between internal and external threats to America, "Balkanization" has nonetheless been employed to try and regulate domestic debates. Understanding the term to mean the way in which differences are raised into "cultural ramparts" and a social field is split "into sects, groups, little nodes of power," Robert Hughes, for example, has observed in his polemic against certain forms of multiculturalism in America that "on the dismembered corpse of Yugoslavia, whose 'cultural differences' (or, to put it more plainly, archaic religious and racial lunacies) have been set free by the death of Communism, we see what that stale figure of speech once meant and now means again" (Hughes, 1993:13).[21]

RESPONDING TO THE "BALKANIZATION" OF THE BALKANS

The basis of the logic that opposes "Balkanization" at home, and paradoxically shares affinities with it abroad, is the belief that there can and should be a necessary alignment between territory and identity, state and nation. Within the United States, this logic plays itself out in the way multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to the unity of America, a tearing asunder of the collective ideal that founds the nation (such that Hughes speaks of "fraying" while Schlesinger worries about "disuniting") (Hughes, 1993:13; Schlesinger, 1991; Lagon and Lind, 1991:39).[22] Within the former Yugoslavia, this ideal of alignment is the basis for the conflict, regardless of whether one wants to describe the conflagration as a civil conflict or a war of aggression. As the deputy commander of Serbian nationalist forces, General Milan Gvero, has proclaimed, "We say everybody has to live on his own territory, Muslims on Muslim territory, Serbs on Serbian. . . . This [Serb areas in Bosnia] is pure Serbian territory, and there is no power on earth that can make us surrender it."[23] To be sure, there are obvious differences in the intensity of feeling associated with the logic of alignment between territory and identity in the United States and the former Yugoslavia. It would be ludicrous to suggest that the outcome in the former will in any way resemble the disaster of the latter (Robert Hughes's allusions notwithstanding). But it is equally difficult to avoid recognizing the analogous assumptions between

the two distinct debates. For example, John Mearsheimer—in an article that demonstrates the dangerous utopianism of so-called political realism in a polyethnic world—has declared that in the former Yugoslavia "ethnically homogenous states must be created . . . a Bosnian state peopled almost exclusively by Muslims, a Croatian state for Croatians and a Serbian state made up mainly of Serbians" (Mearsheimer, 1993:A23). Although Mearsheimer's proposal envisages the necessary population movement of one million people (his estimate) as a peaceful, ordered, practical, and "moral" operation, is it anything other than a case for "ethnic cleansing"?

The clearest manifestation of the way in which the same assumptions (of autonomous and settled identities) undergird both opposition to "Balkanization" at home and its operationalization abroad, is the prevalence of the idea that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is nothing but a playing out of ancient and entrenched animosities, the "archaic religious and racial lunacies" Hughes mentioned. This enframing of the conflict, the notion that this is the way it has always been, that "hatred is the only constant," is a pervasive tendency among observers and politicians alike (*U.S. News and World Report*, February 15, 1993). News reports speak of the way in which "Serbs savor ancient hatreds" (Cohen, 1992:15), how "Balkan hatreds defy centuries of outside meddling" (*New York Times*, April 11, 1993:E5), the way the end of the Cold War has bared old hatreds such that "the contagion" of "Europe's new tribalism could infect us all" (*New York Times*, October 13, 1991: E2; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 7, 1993:8). The Clinton administration has also propagated this view of the conflict. In his inaugural address, the president spoke of a world "threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues" (*New York Times*, January 21, 1993:A15). Secretary of State Warren Christopher has described the hatred among all three groups in Bosnia as "almost unbelievable. It's almost terrifying, and it's centuries old . . . a problem from hell"[24] while Clinton told a press conference that the people of the Balkans "have been fighting each other for centuries."[25] Even those analysts who might want to dispute the historical fatalism of this discourse themselves share the view that we are witnessing the *reassertion* (hence time-honored quality) of local and particularist identities in the form of tribalism, the "retribalization of the world" (Walzer, 1992a:164; Barber, 1993:49).

The trouble with this perspective, particularly in its historical determinism, is that it is ethnographically dubious. It overlooks the important fact that in the federal states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the communist leaderships did not suppress nationalist identifications, but rather constitutionally enshrined and used them for the futherance of their authority. And it overlooks the fact that at the same time as they have spread the line on ancient animosities, news accounts have also contained eyewitness statements of Bosnian residents that speak to the lie of centuries-old hatreds. In one such report, a (Muslim) Bosnian army commander who spoke with a

group of (Serbian) Bosnians declared that "we have all lived together here for centuries, and we want to go on living together." Responding for the gathering, one of the (Serbian) Bosnians proclaimed that "it's impossible to divide us, we are simply too mixed. Politics are [*sic*] one thing. Real life is another" (*New York Times,* March 7, 1993: E3). Likewise, Misha Glenny has observed that not only did Serbs and Croats live "together in relative contentment throughout the regions which have now been so dreadfully ravaged," but that even *during* the ongoing conflict there have been areas (not the least of which has been Sarajevo) where multiethnic communities have survived (Glenny, 1992:19, 108). Because of this interdependent existence, an eighty-two-year-old (Serbian) Bosnian—whose own son, a doctor, was killed by Serb nationalist forces because he refused to join "ethnic cleansing operations"—was mystified at the Vance-Owen plan: "We have lived together for a thousand years. . . . Where did they come up with this crazy plan to divide us up? Why don't they come and talk to us?"[26]

Hedley Bull had an answer for this gentleman: "In the conversation among the Powers there is a convention of silence about the place of their human subjects, any interruption of which is a kind of subversion" (Bull, 1990:68; Klein, 1994:13). To take into account these everyday realities would have undermined the political premises of the nationalist conflict in the former Yugoslavia (which, as Glenny points out, is not an ethnic conflict, because each of the national groups comes from the same ethnos [Glenny, 1992:168]) and it would subvert the grounds upon which outside states, including the United States, have built their rationale for inaction. One of the principal effects of the historical fatalism associated with the thesis of entrenched hatred in the Balkans has been to disenable calls for political or military action, to the despair of those who think we have witnessed a genocidal conflict, and to the relief, if not satisfaction, of those who prefer to sidestep responsibility. Indeed, it seems that the Clinton administration, in airing the views cited above, has deliberately shifted its characterization of the conflict so as to justify its relative inaction.[27] At the very least, the administration's present consensus on the cause of the conflict differs from some of the president's position expressed when action in the name of U.S. leadership was being considered. At that time, Clinton expressed outrage at "ethnic cleansing"—calling it "the kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree"—noting he found it "especially troubling in that area where people of different ethnic groups lived side by side for so long together" (*New York Times,* April 7, 1993:7).

Moreover, the representation of the timeless quality of the conflict is disenabling of our understanding of the cause of fighting, and thus detrimental to future attempts to deal with such instances. If ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history or human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress or ignore such struggles. In this view,

the historical animus has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative consistent with this understanding would be for nature to be miraculously overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason.

However, a different interpretation of such conflicts, one that sees them as the most extreme version of a *coup de force* designed to found that without foundation—for example, the attempt to found an ethnically homogenous state when polyethnicity and national heterogeneity are the reality of the time—offers greater potential for their understanding and resolution. If we understand political violence to be "a mode of transcription" that "circulates codes from one prescribed historiographic surface to another" (Feldman, 1991:7)[28] the recent intensification of ethnic and nationalist conflict takes on a very different character. Far from being a natural outgrowth of historical animosities and earlier conflicts, we can think of these issues of ethnicity and nationalism as *questions of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals.*[29] For example, when a Croatian militiaman stitches an Ustache symbol to his uniform before going into battle with Serbian forces, he is—in a moment that can be considered an act of "foreign policy"—doing more than acting out a preordained history or exercising a pregiven subjectivity: He is reproducing and rearticulating an historical representation and violently deploying it in the present to constitute his (individual and/or collective) subjectivity. Although this constitutive process is driven by the partisan impulses of new regimes—and Croatia seems to have gone to some lengths after independence in 1991 to fashion an identity that put it into conflict, especially with Serbs within its territory (Glenny, 1992: 11–12)[30]—such a stimulus is far removed from the historical calculation of popular understanding. Likewise, and perhaps most infamously, one can consider the way in which historical and nationalist icons have been deployed to secure power by the Serbian intelligentsia as Yugoslav communism unravelled, a process most obvious in the 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.[31] As such, the character of political violence in a place like the former Yugoslavia is as modern as it is premodern, for it constitutes the identities in whose name it is deployed.[32]

The norm of territorial and cultural alignment, inherent (as Mearsheimer's Balkan remedy makes obvious) in an international relations construction of the world as comprising sovereign states in an anarchic realm, remains the norm against which the possibility for international action is considered. Even though its ethnographic inaccuracy exposes it to be no more than a form of nostalgia for the politics of place (Connolly, 1991a:463), it continues to function powerfully because it constitutes a cartography of autonomous moral agents who can bear the burden of responsibility. To establish that this is the case, one need only contrast the equivocal

reactions to the Balkan crisis with the mobilization of the coalition in the Gulf War of 1990–1991. In the latter case, the fact that the conflict could be enframed solely as an act of territorial aggression devoid of history against a state (even though the invasion of Kuwait was an act of aggression insinuated with many histories), enabled the anti-Iraq forces to engage in a discourse of moral certitude that performatively secured sovereignty for participants (in places that it might have otherwise been insecure) such that the allies could exercise an obligation and Iraq alone could be held culpable.[33]

With respect to the Balkan crisis, the fact that the battle is so evidently one of contending national and political sovereignties, rendered as conflict over territory in accordance with history, removes the most easily (albeit performatively) constituted ground upon which to mobilize action. In consequence, although the U.S. public and its leaders have been revolted by the carnage they are witness to, the "political will" (the common metaphor for the basis of mobilization) for action has not been apparent. In the past, this "will" to oppose aggression per se has been effective as a rallying cry because it entails an affirmative aim, the restoration of sovereignty. In pursuit of an equally positive goal, efforts to garner support for measures to oppose "ethnic cleansing" have either tried to rely on its shock value or attempted to indirectly render (someone else's) sovereign territory as the issue by making reference to the potential for "regional instability."

In the case of Bosnia, abhorrence of aggression, even in the extreme versions we have encountered there, has proved insufficient as a basis to bring about the necessary action because restoration of sovereignty cannot be the goal. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 there has been no going back. The absence of such traditional grounds, along with the seeming inability of "humanitarian concerns" to muster the requisite support, means an alternative impetus for action on the part of states has been (and still is) required.

The fatal predicament for Bosnia has been the absence of such alternative grounds in the discourse of the West. At the outset of the political transformation of the Balkans, through a "nonpolicy" that one analyst has described as "criminally negligent," the Bush administration opposed any alteration in the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state (Rizopoulos, 1993:2). Although the Clinton administration has not publicly offered an equivalent view, it has done little to formulate any alternative. Indeed, the official debate about Bosnia has been structured around the options of air strikes against Serbian positions, the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians, or the creation of "safe havens" for (predominantly Muslim) civilians, all of which are means rather than ends, tactics rather than objectives.[34] Secretary of State Warren Christopher did declare that whatever policy was adopted must have a clearly stated goal, but no administration official has ever indicated what that goal might be (*New York Times,* April 28, 1993:A1). Moreover, as a corollary to the Clinton administration's shifting characteri-

zation of the conflict as historical hatred rather than contemporary crime, Christopher redefined the U.S. role as one of responding to "humanitarian concerns" rather than "vital interests," and emphasized efforts to prevent the spread of the war beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia rather than its amelioration or termination within them (*New York Times,* June 9, 1993:A12 and May 19, 1993).

An important reason for this virtual silence on the objective that is either desired or sought in Bosnia is that the affirmative political goal around which opposition to aggression could have been arrayed is for the most part ineligible. This is because the most obvious political goal requires acceptance of the very possibility that is being so actively contested in the cultural terrain of America and other Western nations: multiculturalism.[35] Which is not to suggest that Western inaction is premised on the basis that these communities are multicultural; rather, it is to claim that the West's inability to act in pursuit of a political goal in Bosnia stems from its unwillingness to make multiculturalism that goal. This is so because to mount the case for assistance to the many multinational and multicultural communities throughout the former Yugoslavia would require resolving in favor of plurality one of the most hotly contested cultural controversies in the United States and other Western nations, a controversy that is central to the reproduction of the identity of those states. The reluctance of the West might therefore be said to stem from the "nostalgia for a politics of place" at home and abroad that underpins so much of our political thought, and which the West shares (rather unfortunately) with the Serbian and Croatian (and, no doubt, a few of the Muslim) nationalist leaders (Glenny, 1992:146, 153; Magas, 1993:xviii; Glenny, 1993:14).

CONCLUSION

Can responsibility survive anarchy? In the wake of the theoretical decentering of the subject that bore the burden of responsibility (even though this development cannot be interpreted as the subject's death), can responsibility still be located and exercised?[36] Can the theoretical concern with the performative constitution of identity enable an ethicopolitical response to conflicts like that in the former Yugoslavia?

The unwillingness or inability of "civilized" nations to act in Bosnia— predicated on a yearning for what once might have been, is no more, or will never be (at least in the absence of violence greater than that we have witnessed in the Balkans)—means that the sovereign norm of territorial and cultural alignment, or the appeal of "humanitarianism," does not offer much hope in pursuing an answer to that question. This catastrophe suggests that an effort to return to traditional grounds would be "to search in the vacuum

of the place deserted by the successive representations of an unshakable ground" (Schurmann, 1987:4).

Indeed, we can conclude that the inadequate United States response is enabled (if not caused by) impoverished theoretical resources pertaining to how ethics, identity, responsibility, and sovereignty can and should be thought and exercised in the post–Cold War world. Issues of identity exist at many sites in the domain of United States foreign policy toward Bosnia. In the context of the United States, these include the debates over the meaning of the end of the Cold War, the attempts to define the national interest, and the struggle to cope with the challenges of multiculturalism. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, they are most evident in the conduct of the fighting itself, the various proposals to bring about its end, and the manner in which such conflicts are rendered.

Yet the governing codes of subjectivity in international relations—the assumptions of pregiven subjects with autonomous and settled identities, and of ethnic and nationalist conflict having natural and timeless qualities— sublimate the importance of these issues of identity and occlude the violent performances by which their settlements are achieved in these various sites. In consequence, by preventing an appreciation of the way in which conflict, such as that in the former Yugoslavia, involves the violent deployment of history in the present as a means of determining political struggles, the dominant traditions of international relations are strategically disenabling.

As such—to return to Derrida's proposition—the fact that the state, or any other formation of identity, is necessarily deconstructible is not a recipe for inaction or despair but rather "a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress" (Derrida, 1992a:14). This is so because deconstruction can be regarded as the "at least necessary condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk" (Derrida, 1989:155). To appreciate why this is the case, recall that the containers of politics are indispensably deconstructible because their foundations of authority are "mystical." At the same time, remember that such structures exist and exercise power because the interpretive and performative *coup de force* that brings them into being elides the mystery within that unfounded process. Consider also that the greatest acts of violence in history have been made possible by the apparent naturalness of their practices, by the appearance that those carrying them out are doing no more than following commands necessitated by the order of things, and how that order has often been understood in terms of the survival of a (supposedly pregiven) state, a people, or a culture. Then it is possible to appreciate that only if we examine, through strategies of deconstruction (among others), the *coup de force* that encloses this logic in a timeless quality can we resist such violence (ibid.:155).[37]

With regard to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, although it sounds outrageous, deconstruction is the "at least necessary condition" for thinking

about a solution that does not come from the victory of one side over the other. Only if we can think of politics organized in terms of ethnicity and nationalism as being enabled by the unfounded questions of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals and resist its presentation as a natural outgrowth of ancient animosities can we exercise our responsibility toward the other, and do other than wait for the carnage to subside. Indeed, even more outrageously, we can say that without deconstruction there might be no questions of ethics, identity, politics, or responsibility. Were there in fact secure foundations, privileged epistemological grounds, and unquestionable ontological bases "somehow removed from the strife, investments, and contamination regularly associated with them" (Keenan, 1990:1681) then social action would be no more than the automatic operation of a knowledge, and ethics and politics would be no more than technology (Derrida, 1992b:44–45).

NOTES

1. One of the most powerful critiques of realism remains Vasquez 1983.

2. For a succinct discussion of some of the problems with these essentialist understandings in the Bosnian context, see Sorabji 1993.

3. The focus on the United States here should not be read as absolving Europe—or any other relevant actor—of responsibility in this situation.

4. This argument builds on the propositions concerning the performative constitution of state identity in Campbell 1992, especially the introduction. For other examples dealing with this theme, see Dillon and Everard 1992 and Weber 1994.

5. "Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground" Derrida 1992a:14.

6. International law serves as an excellent illustration of the way in which structures are founded on foundations that are ultimately unfounded, particularly if one considers the way it performatively constitutes the basis for its existence, namely the idea of a community of states governed by ethical codes and the rule of law. See the discussions in Jones 1991 and Nardin 1992.

7. For a discussion of this interpretive and performative process relevant to America, a discussion based on Derrida's reading of the American Declaration of Independence, see Honig 1993:104–109.

8. Even Michael Walzer, much of whose work has granted presumptive powers to the borders that mark off states, acknowledges that "Constructed communities ['imagined, invented, put together'] are the only communities there are: they can't be less real or less authentic than some other sort" (1992a:165).

9. Another such discourse would be the law. For an extended analysis of how jurisprudence in the United States helps constitute the state, see [Anon.], "Constructing the State Extraterritorially."

10. The most confident assertion of the self is to be found in Fukuyama 1991.

11. See, for example, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era," *New York Times,* February 17, 1992, p. A1; Miller 1993; Huntington 1993; and "Asteroid Defense: 'Risk Is Real,' Planners Say," *New York Times,* April 7, 1992, p. C1.

12. Robert L. Bartley in "America's Purpose Now," p. 27.

13. Malcolm Wallop, in ibid., p. 47.

14. This is the view of both Buchanan 1990 and Layne 1991.

15. On the manner in which jurisdictional discourse has "given birth to" the national interest it supposedly only reflects, see Anon., 1990:1280–1284.

16. See Derrida 1992a:24. Because of its importance, this discussion is developed below.

17. For a variety of perspectives on this series of ongoing debates, which range from language policy to academic politics to immigration issues to the arts, see Schlesinger 1991; Carby 1992; Scott 1992; Bolton 1992; Gutman 1992; and Gless and Smith 1992.

18. For the way this process functioned at the heart of the Cold War, see Campbell 1992: Chapter 6.

19. For a discussion of the changing meaning and uses of "Balkanization" in international relations discourse, see Der Derian 1992: 146–150.

20. Lind's discourse of danger bears a resemblance to the arguments of the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. Prior to the Bosnian Serb plebiscite on the Vance-Owen plan, Karadzic declared that "We realize that we are completely alone and that only God is with us, although we are defending Christianity against militant Muslim fundamentalism." Quoted in "Belgrade Meeting Backs Peace Plan," *New York Times,* May 15, 1993, p. 3.

21. To be sure, when multiculturalism within the United States relies on the logic of individualism (that established individual differences are the basis for respect) or the inward focus of authenticity (that monologically derived characteristics are the basis for identity), it warrants extended critical analysis. For a description and critique of the first proposition, see Scott 1992:70–74; for the second, see Taylor in Gutman 1992. Such a critical stance, however, is not derived from a fear of domestic "Balkanization," but from an appreciation for the way in which the assumptions that structure such positions rely on notions of the autonomous generation of settled identities, thereby occluding the social, necessarily dialogical, and contingent process through which identities are constituted in relationship to difference.

22. Thus Hughes (1993:13) declares: "The fact remains that America is a collective work of the imagination whose making never ends, and once that sense of collectivity and mutual respect is broken the possibilities of Americanness begin to unravel." In a similar vein, the specter of cultural separatism driven by Hispanic immigration to the United States is cited by Lagon and Lind, in their article on the foreign policy interests of America, as "the major threat to national integrity today." See Lagon and Lind 1991:39.

23. Quoted in "Exuding Confidence, Serbian Nationalists Act as If War for Bosnia Is Won," *New York Times,* May 23, 1993, p. 12.

24. Quoted in "Bosnia Recast," *New York Times,* April 8, 1993, p. A6. When Christopher testified to Congress along these lines, and claimed that there was no responsibility on the part of the United States to aid the Muslims because all sides in the conflict shared the guilt equally, his position was rebutted by officials from within his own department who had found the bulk of the atrocities to be the work of the Serb forces. See "U.S. Memo Reveals Dispute on Bosnia," *New York Times,* June 25, 1993, p. A3.

25. "Excerpts from Clinton's News Conference in the Rose Garden," *New York Times,* May 15, 1993, p. 8.

26. Maggie O'Kane 1993:10. Further such accounts, which highlight the degree of interethnic marriage and communal living, can be found in "The Tearing

Apart of Yugoslavia: Place by Place, Family by Family," *New York Times.* May 9, 1993, p. E4.

27. See "Bosnia Recast," *New York Times,* April 8, 1993, p. A6.

28. These issues are discussed in greater detail in Campbell/Dillon 1993.

29. For one account of how this operates, drawn from observing a conversation among Serbian–Croat teenagers about what had happened to their families during World War II, see Slapsak 1993. The conversation convinced Slapsak "that an evocation of dead ancestors might be a transparent strategy for gaining some 'human justification' in acting against living people. . . . In every instance an enemy-type was created to accommodate a certain project to gain local—or national—power." Ibid., p. 740.

30. In her account of being subject to these strategies in Croatia, Slavenka Drakulic writes of the way they worked to produce her own identity as "Croatian," a concept that prior to 1991 had no particular meaning. "Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood—not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army but by national homogenization within Croatia itself." Drakulic 1993:51.

31. See "Memorandum de l'Académie Serbe des Sciences et des Arts, Belgrade, September 1986." This document was never publicly released in Yugoslavia. I am grateful to Jasna Dragovic for providing me with a copy. For similar deployments in other sites, see Magas 1993, especially Chap. 3.

32. For a similar reading in terms of religious violence in India see Nandy 1990:137.

33. This argument is detailed in Campbell 1993.

34. This argument is made in Kaldor 1993:364. For examples that illustrate this tendency, see "What to Do in Bosnia? 3 Hard Choices for Clinton," *New York Times,* April 29, 1993, p. A6. Even postmortems critical of inaction tend to have this procedural rather than substantive cast. See "Caught in the Grip of Euro-sclerosis," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* June 27, 1993, p. 12.

35. As a London newspaper editorialized, the nexus of multiculturalism at home and abroad is of particular relevance to British Muslims:

> Bosnia, and Sarajevo in particular, had until recently represented the flowering of multicultural ideas so valued in Britain. . . . Communities whose differences dated back to Ottoman victory in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo lived in peace together. So, at a time when Islam is increasingly being characterized as hardline and incompatible with multiculturalism, the best example challenging that stereotype is being destroyed half-way across the Continent.

"Fear for Muslims as Bosnia Burns," *The Independent.* June 19, 1993, p. 16.

36. I propose an extended answer to this question in "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility."

37. As Derrida observes, "without deconstructive procedures, a vigilant political practice could not even get very far in the analysis of all these political discourses, philosophemes, ideologemes, events, or structures . . . what I have practiced under that name [deconstruction] has always seemed to me favorable, indeed destined (it is no doubt my principal motivation) to the analysis of the conditions of totalitarianism in all its forms" (1989:155).

10

Citizenship:
On the Border of Order

Friedrich Kratochwil

Discussions of citizenship have gained new salience due to the disintegration of states and the concomitant minority and refugee problems caused by international migrations in general, and integration in particular. On the one hand, boat people—from the original Vietnamese to the more recent Haitians and Chinese—the victims of "ethnic conflict" from former Yugoslavia, and other immigrants have unquestionably strained the resources of Western welfare states. On the other hand, it also has become clear that beyond this distributional problem there lies the more serious long-term issue of how to deal with the perception of threat to the identities of those societies that suddenly find themselves in the throes of xenophobia and racism. Finally, even in the benign case of the European integration the increasing number of "outsiders" as permanent residents has resulted in a "democratic deficit" and presumably in a legitimization problem for both the democratic states within the EC and the supranational institutions themselves (Koslowski, 1994).

These practical problems raise two interconnected issues leading us to the two focal points of the concept of "citizenship": "belonging" and "status" (understood as a bundle of distinctive rights). I claim that these notions constitute the "core" of our understanding of citizenship. From these initial distinctions further questions follow. First, given that important "economic" entitlements that are traditionally part of the status of citizenship have increasingly been bestowed on citizens and noncitizens alike, is the passive enjoyment of these rights claimed against the state compatible with the notion of citizenship, or must this passive acceptance of citizenship rights not be balanced with more active virtues such as personal responsibility, self-reliance, participation, and civility? Second, given the increasing diversity among the "members" of a society, can citizenship still provide a meaningful experience of identity and allegiance? If not, what are the implications for political order?

Both issues have been debated extensively, by those criticizing the wel-

fare state and its "give aways" (Mead, 1989) and by those advocating a "minimalist" or "thin" conception of citizenship including, even, the notion of "partial" membership in such amalgamated communities (Peled, 1992). Similarly, at least some versions of "multiculturalism" (Schlesinger, 1991) seem also to imply that a "thin" notion of citizenship has become necessary to deal with increasing diversity, thereby not only eroding the traditional sharp distinctions between citizens and aliens, but also the identification of the citizens with a particular cultural tradition that defines their identity (Brubaker, 1989; Raskin, 1993; Levinson, 1989; Hamar, 1990).

While "belonging" is, as Kenneth Karst reminds us, "a soupy gerund," Karst also suggests that the sense of belonging is no trivial matter. "We all need it if we are to know ourselves and locate ourselves in the world. . . . Who belongs to America? Successive generations of Americans have answered the question differently, with grave consequences for the people excluded" (Karst, 1989:ix). What are the implications of these initial considerations? It seems best to see the concept not as a "thing" whose proper "definition" is governed by the criteria of "truth" (*adequatio intellectus ac rei*). "Citizenship" might not even be a "description" of a social fact such as the bundling of rights. It is perhaps best to conceive of "citizenship" as a *space* within a discourse on politics that institutionalizes identities and differences by drawing boundaries, in terms of both membership and the actual political practices associated with this membership. An explication of the concept is not, therefore, governed by the atemporal criteria of adequacy or correspondence. It necessarily becomes "historical" by requiring an examination of the genealogy of the concept and its various temporary reconciliations.

In this chapter I will use the notion of citizenship as a prism for investigating this history of inclusion and exclusion. I do so in the hope that such a theoretical discussion will be helpful in sorting out some of the often unsubstantiated claims for policy that are made in this context. Understanding the role of the citizen is as fundamental in this respect as it is for understanding the problem of political order in general. It not only creates the internal and external domains of "politics," it informs us of "who" we are. It is clear that "citizenship" serves as a gatekeeper between "humanity" in general and what Walzer called the "communities of character" (Walzer, 1989), between one's "idiosyncratic" interests and those of one's "persona" presented to others. As a result, changes in the conceptions of the public and the private, the nature of the "community of character," and the shifting boundaries between our particular commitments and what we believe characterize us universally as humans will be mediated through the inclusionary and exclusionary practices of citizenship. Maintaining boundaries is not then important only for strategic reasons. Rather, maintaining boundaries and defending those particular traits and practices whereby we

as beings of "limited generosity" (Hume 1978:494) differentiate ourselves might be necessary and constitutive for us as individuals.

In making good on these claims my argument will take the following steps. In the next section I begin with the elucidation of the special sense of "belonging" that is entailed in the membership component of citizenship and that is inadequately captured by contract theories that phrase the problem of belonging in simple terms of a voluntary exchange. In the following section I address the conception of citizenship as "status" and some of the difficulties that result from the "thin" notion of citizenship. The next section is devoted to an antifoundationalist account of citizenship that attempts to understand it not only as a bundle of rights but as particular *duties* we owe to our fellow members. A brief conclusion draws some lessons from the conceptual explorations in this paper.

BELONGING

Being a member of a political community is not like being a member of a club or association (Sandel, 1989:Chap. 2; Kratochwil, 1995), despite the fact that classical liberalism tried to understand the obligations originating from real or imagined bonds of solidarity in such a "community of fate" in terms of a contract. There are several difficulties with such a contractual solution. First, since political obligations cannot simply be revoked by "opting out" their special character strains the contract metaphor (Herzog, 1985). Second, contracts usually have to be "implied"—traveling in the countryside and holding property are some of Locke's suggestions. But in order for such acts to be construed as implying consent it is logically necessary to have a rule covering implied consent, which, in turn, cannot be explained in consensual or contractual terms. Thus, territoriality and jurisdiction do virtually all of the explaining instead of the (implied) contract (Brilmayer, 1989).

Consequently, being a member of a community of fate is not well captured by the voluntaristic paradigm even if, in some cases, members do opt out of certain communities and transfer their loyalties through naturalization to another. The invocation of "nature" in characterizing the rite of passage, transforming the alien into a citizen, suggests that something more than opting into a new game is required. Newcomers must commit themselves to a new identity. Not only are others now fellow citizens, compatriots who have a claim to our solidarity—as we have against them—the stakes of membership are also higher in a community of fate (Goodin, 1988; Miller, 1988). While we might not agree with Horace that *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,* it is nevertheless for most of us true, as Benedict Anderson points out, that dying for one's country assumes a moral grandeur that dying for the EC,

the COMECON, the Liberal Party, or perhaps even Amnesty International cannot rival (Anderson, 1983:10, 53).

It is perhaps no accident that the themes of birth and death and of the "land" are the most powerful that are invoked in this context. In the Phoenician tale—inserted at a crucial juncture in the *Republic*—Plato calls the "citizens" the "children of the Earth," symbolizing their commonality. They are to be told that their formation took place beneath the earth, but "when they were completed, the Earth, their mother sent them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse they are bound to advise for her good and to defend her against attacks and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers" (1973:414b–415d). Similarly, it is at the occasion of death suffered in defense of the polis that the nature of this transgenerational community of fate becomes clearest in various *epitaphioi* of which Pericles's "Funeral Oration" (*Peloponnesian War*, Bk. II:35–46) is perhaps the best-known example (Loraux, 1986).

When we stress the aspect of "belonging" we mean considerably more and at the same time less than participation in political affairs. After all, women whose participation was limited to the creation of "legitimate" offspring in Athens (both parents had to be Athenians), and children who suffered the consequences of war but had no participatory status, all "belonged" to the city. Similarly, although women had even in common law and civil law countries no right to vote (Kerber, 1991; Vogel, 1991), they were nevertheless "citizens" and carried a passport. Even today "belonging" extends to the person who has lost his civil rights of participation, as in the case of a person convicted of a crime. Sometimes he can improve his status by "serving" his country in the armed forces, or in a particularly dangerous mission. Thus, in stressing "virtue" and *amor patriae* as defining dispositions for political life, citizens could "contribute" to the community even if their actual rights were minimal.

Much of this tradition, better characterized as patriotism than as citizenship, is, as Mary Dietz (1989) correctly suggested Roman rather than Greek. Its revival after the interruption of the Dark Ages, often preceding the revival of classical "republicanism" in the Renaissance, is particularly instructive. By the thirteenth century *amor patriae*—that is, love for the *actual patria* instead of for the medieval *patria* understood as the "heavenly Jerusalem"—endowed the emerging state with quasi-sacral dignity. This development has been carefully traced by Ernst Kantorowicz in *The King's Two Bodies* (1957), in which the country becomes identified with the second "body of the king," a body that is the exact parallel to the conception of the *corpus Christi mysticum,* used originally for the demarcation of the church. Joan of Arc's pronouncement that someone making war on "the holy realm of France is engaged in a "war against Jesus the king," captures this shift well (ibid.:263).

Similarities and differences between this type of "belonging" and active

political participation as elements of citizenship can now be addressed. It was indeed the French Revolution that forged a new and powerful link between these two notions. In particular, it was Jacobine ideology that conceptualized membership as "a universal office, everyone was to serve the community" (Walzer, 1989:211). The *levée en masse* of 1793 actually did conscript virtually everybody, including women and children. As an appeal by the revolutionary government put it: "Young men will go to the front; married men will forge arms and transport foodstuffs; women will make clothes, will serve in the hospitals; children will tear rags into lint; old men will get themselves carried to public places, there to stir up the courage of the warriors, hatred of kings and the unity of the republic" (ibid.).

From these brief remarks it is clear, however, that "participation" on the basis of this strong sense of "patriotic belonging" had distinctive features. It was characterized by the expanding scope of the *political sphere* itself, rather than by the usual involvement in issues of governance such as voting or even paying taxes and debating policy. This distinction is crucial for understanding the excitement and rapture of this experience.

It is the engagement in a "constitutional moment" rather than participation in accordance with the rules defining a political system that is also characteristic of "charismatic" authority and of the mutual reconstitution of the members of a community as well as their leaders. As Ann Norton observes:

> Traditional and rational legal types of authority clearly differentiate subject and object. The object of likeness remains the community, but here it is attended by an object of difference, the government. Government in such regimes is construed as a separate entity, whether it is understood as the law, the monarch, or some other body. . . . The charismatic leader, in his comprehension and ambivalence, his creative and transformative capacities, represents the archetype Jung called "the Great Mother." The leader contains the community of the people within himself, for those traits that define his wholly personal title to rule delimit the boundaries of subjective nationality. Here the metaphorical derivation of the archetype from gestation is especially apt, for the people in the independent character of an objectively constituted nation, has not emerged. (Norton 1988:118f)

It is this lack of differentiation, the primordial quality of total identification, that has as its flip side the potential for hate and violence (Kristeva, 1993). And it is this destructive potential that has often been used as an argument against "belonging" in favor of a "rational"—instrumental—basis for membership.

Whatever the merits of the argument might be—as neither "nations" nor "race" are primordial even if their constructions use (primordial) symbols—the fact remains that the notion of citizenship as a "status" arose as a partial defense against the dangers of highly politicized revolutionary situations in which everything is literally up for grabs. The next section elaborates this point.

CITIZENSHIP AS STATUS

It is often forgotten that the assertion of prepolitical rights either as "natural" rights or as those flowing from the "Ancient Constitution" (Pocock, 1987) was part and parcel of a controversy concerning not only usurpation of power by the king but also, as its basis, the revolutionary egalitarian moves to enfranchise new segments of the population. The civil war, the Putney debates, the controversy with the "levellers," the restoration of the Stuarts, as well as James II's assertiveness vis-à-vis the parliament, form the context in which Locke's argument justifying the Glorious Revolution emerges. The story of these events has been told many times and concerns us here only insofar as it throws light on a new concept of "citizenship." This new concept stresses specific rights more than either belonging or participation in the sense of the intense commitment to direct political action.

Citizenship as "status" is basically the "right to have rights" (Murphy et al. 1986:145). This conception of citizenship as a bundle of rights protected by law to be enjoyed by its bearer is in a way quite different from the idea of citizenship as an originator of law or from the concept of citizenship as a universal office, even though some of the "rights" in this status pertain to political participation. The governing notion seems here to be that to possess these rights means to be free from certain (arbitrary) interferences. To share in this enjoyment of rights means largely to share some "negative freedom," as Isaiah Berlin (1969) has called it, and to be "master" of one's own choices, including the right of refusing to participate in the political world. "Having" these rights usually means that their possession is not tied to the affirmative exercise of certain duties. Significantly, in *Trop v. Dulles* (356 U.S. 76 [1958]) the U.S. Supreme Court considered the revocation of citizenship after desertion in war unconstitutional. In other words, to be a citizen could not be made contingent upon the affirmative performance of some duty. "To be a citizen and share in the common liberty," writes Michael Walzer,

> is to be protected against various sorts of dangers posed sometimes by other people, sometimes by the authorities themselves. . . . But this search for protection assumes the primacy of what is protected, namely the private or familial world. It is there that men and women find the greater part of their happiness; they enjoy protection but rejoice in something else. They are not political people; they have other interests, in salvation, or business or art and literature. For them the political community is only a necessary framework, a set of external arrangements, not a common life. (Walzer, 1989:215f)

This definition of the "member," whose real life is that of the *bourgeois* rather than that of a *citoyen* gives rise to the praise of civil society and the voluntary nature of its associational structure in lieu of some Rousseauistic

or Jacobinian conception of politics. On the flip side of this paean however, exists Marx's critique of the deeply alienated nature of modern man. It leads to complaints about the lethargy of the electorate and the apparently ever-increasing divergence between the ideals of democratic theory and the reality of political life in democratic but bureaucratized states (Barber, 1984).

This passive conception is vigorously defended by such liberal theorists as Rawls (1971), Ackerman (1980), and Gutmann (1985), who insist that citizens cannot and should not bring their passions and concerns about what constitutes the "good life" into the public sphere. In their reading of it, there exists a necessary primacy of "right(s)" over even some widely shared conceptions of the "(common) good." This position has some ironic repercussions as it creates several practical and conceptual puzzles.

Practically the "status" view of citizenship, conceptualizing it as a bundle of rights (in the sense of passive entitlements) is viable only if, at least, a good portion of the citizens care about their community by postponing some of their "private" interests. This has led also to calls for some type of "civic" education, which, however, is to teach children "liberal virtue" rather than civic pride—that is, skepticism toward public authority and distance from that aspect of their own cultural tradition that excludes others (Gutmann, 1987).

The conception of the school or civil society as a seedbed of civic virtue relies, in fact, on a problematic empirical generalization, shirking the issue of how the furtherance of private interest can generate the common good, and on an equally problematic theory of "transference." Since it is not clear how, for example, the informal practices familiar from associational life are to further civic consciousness, some advocates have therefore argued for the *reconstitution* of these associations along participatory lines, so as to conform to the imperatives of democratic structures (Walzer, 1992). But the latter requirements rob these institutions of much of their "voluntary" character and their distinctive status as independent entities rather than as appendices of the state.

Theoretically, the reconstitution of a participatory citizenship on the basis of a strong associational life seems also to stand, if not in direct contradiction to, then at least in tension with, the "thin" version of citizenship often advocated for "multicultural" societies. True, multiculturalism may contain nothing more than the plea for the extension of recognition to groups that traditionally have not been included. But such an "integrationist" version is opposed by proponents who contest the idea that substantive notions of the good or of a common "culture" can be used in defining who we are in a political sense. In a way, the "liberal" strategem of eliminating all substantive content from the public sphere and situating it in "civil society" (Rawls, 1971; Ackerman, 1980) has come to haunt this very construct, as the very identity of "civil society" is now being subjected to a similar process of elimination.

Whether such a strategem is conceptually and practically viable is, of course, another question. After all, it seems that the "liberal" solution was possible only *because* "society" was the residual category into which all apparently unresolvable problems could be dumped and that—on the practical side—guaranteed some substantively informed consensus of how one dealt with public issues as "English gentlemen" as "French citizens" or even as "Americans."

Consider in this context Rawls's argument in greater detail.

> From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when that can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus, if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. (Rawls 1971:115)

But there is certainly something amiss in this argument, since the obligation resulting from a just arrangement "does not provide a good explanation of legitimacy, because it does not tie political obligation sufficiently tightly to the particular community to which those who have the obligation belong" (Dworkin, 1986:193). In other words, in order to show that, for example, a New Zealander has special duties to *his* country—and not, for example, to France—both of which satisfy the criteria of justice, Rawls must assume the (ethical) relevance of (territorial) boundaries, or his theory requires further specification of what acts would be necessary to establish that a set of just institutions "applies to" the citizens in question.

While Rawls seems to have "assumed" a "society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies" (Rawls, 1971:8), critics like Simons (1979) and Waldron (1993) have pointed out that something more is required for the construal of a "natural duty" than the mere "territorial application" of a set of institutions. What remains a puzzle in the contractarian paradigm is the basis on which the individuals recognize each other as members of a society. It is here that the idea that "culture" not only can provide this important link but that it also solves the normative issue of justifying the entitlements that were part and parcel of a citizen's identity.

The theorists who provide the necessary rationale in this context are T. H. Marshall (1964) and Ernst Gellner (1983). For both, the emergence of a general national (rather than status-oriented) "culture" is the element that integrates the members being released from intermediary bodies and local ties by the breakup of the old order under the impact of capitalism. In other words, where formerly personal identities were formed by status and local

folk cultures, now a new "national identity" is forged by universal education and a national curriculum.

> It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together, above all, by a shared culture of this kind in place of a previously complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk-cultures, reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. (Gellner, 1983:57)

In a similar vein Thomas H. Marshall considers the extension of citizenship and the various waves of particular rights that define the "status" of citizenship, from the seventeenth-century bestowal of "civil rights" to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century welfare rights. For him, modern citizenship emerges as a response to the emancipation from feudal protection ("the pre-modern prototypes of social citizenship like the Poor Laws" [Somers, 1993:591]) of the general population because of the needs of the capitalist mode of production. Marshall suggests that the subsequent expansion of political, social, and welfare rights were already entrenched in the conception of citizens as free agents in a society characterized by contract and market exchange.

In a way Marshall raised again the question, adumbrated by Marx, of whether the equal status bestowed by citizenship is compatible with the de facto inequality of a class society. Obviously Marshall is particularly concerned with the integration of the British working class, whose lack of resources and education prevented them from meaningfully participating in the "common culture" that should have been *"their common possession and heritage"* (Marshall, 1964:101f, emphasis added). This emphasis on the sharing of a common culture as a means of establishing both an autonomous personality and a meaningful role as a participatory citizen, however, points far beyond traditional Marxist analysis.

DRAWING BOUNDARIES: AN ANTIFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF CITIZENSHIP

The foregoing discussions of the core components of citizenship—belonging and "status"—has also suggested a link between these two focal points. Under modern conditions this link was provided by "culture" that is constitutive both of the "individual" released from his specific stations in a society and of the "nation," which became the "imagined community," bestowing rights and demanding the performance of particular duties. Thus, in regard to both welfare and political obligation, citizenship exemplifies the overriding importance of *particular* duties and entitlements.

It is this particularity that has come under attack from moral philosophy

which seems to suggest that duties and privileges have to be justified by universal criteria. To that extent, "citizenship" is either (national) egotism written large—and therefore problematic—or it has to agree with general principles of "justice" (Barry, 1982) or "cosmopolitan" conceptions of duties that provide the foundations for national institutions (Beitz, 1979; Shue, 1980, 1988).

But as the brief discussion above of the Rawlsian version of justice demonstrated, universal criteria of "justice" do not satisfactorily explain why we have obligations to "our" particular fellow citizens and "our" country (Goodin, 1988; Miller, 1988). Similar difficulties arise when we attempt to solve these puzzles by invoking the Kantian "categorical imperative." The attempt to arrive at concrete material conclusions on the basis of purely formal criteria is tempting but cannot be done in a straightforward, logical, impersonal fashion. Again and again we have to assume the existence of well-institutionalized practices and functioning societies that offer themselves as objects of evaluation, but *that cannot be constructed out of the specified formal criteria* (Kratochwil, 1989, Chap. 5; O'Neil, 1988). Both attempts at privileging the general over the particular, at explaining and justifying social arrangements not from a specific "situatedness" of the individuals involved but from the abstract universal observer's point of view, lead therefore to a variety of impasses and make one wonder whether such "universalist" projects are not only misconceived in terms of their practicality but in terms of their very own logic itself. Consequently, contrary to the claims of the enlightenment project to provide secure foundations for our social arrangements and moral practices, moral philosophy and "reason" in general might be of considerably less help than is usually assumed.

Nevertheless, some insights can be gained from a critical analysis. If foundationalist claims become incoherent by making it necessary to import back some of the very features that the universality of abstraction rules out, then one of the starting points for our reconsideration is the relationship between the universal and the particular. After all, in one of the strongest statements for the universality of "natural law," Sophocles' Antigone does not argue for universality in terms of abstractions, but for the recognition of the *particular duties* imposed on her by her "situatedness" as the sister of Polyneikes. In stressing the natural fact of "sharing the same womb" (*adelphos, adelphe,* in Greek originally have this connotation), Antigone claims respect for the particular duties that nobody but her, a family member, can fulfill (Segal, 1986). The universality of law, its "justness," does not consist in its abstractness, but in its respect of the rights and duties we as fully situated persons have. Just before going to her death, Antigone reflects on her deed and justifies it:

> If I had been the mother of children or if my Husband's body were wasting
> away, I would not have chosen this labor, going against the citizens. For the

sake of which law [*nomos*] do I speak thus? If my husband had died, I might have found another, or a child from a new husband, had I lost the first. But with my mother and father both hidden away in the land of Hades, no brother could ever be engendered. (905–912)

While Creon as the representative of the city is its "source" of law, which tries to overcome the particularistic loyalties resulting from the original aristocratic order of lineage, the meaning of the drama is not exhausted by seeing in it a "conflict of loyalties" that occurs as we move from the tribal order to the *polis* or "state." After all, it is Haimon (his name alludes to *haima* or blood), Creon's son, who pleads with his father for Antigone's life by pointing out that the "whole city mourns secretly for this girl" whose deed is the most "worthy of kleos" (692–695). Thus in a strange way, Antigone establishes a new balance between the old order of lineage and the new law that rules the polis. She thereby becomes "heroic in stature" by not only remaining true to her origins but by performing a rite for the dead and winning *kleos* for it, in a rite from which women had been excluded by the new law of the city (Hamilton, 1991). The question of "universality" as the ultimate ground of justification raises a variety of issues. One, there is the *logical* universal, that is, the characteristic that a variety of phenomena have in common after their particularities have been abstracted. The second meaning of "universality" is related to the claim of validity, but might be based on very particular reasons, as the Antigone example shows. For example, the duty of parents to their children is universally acknowledged, despite the particular grounding of such duties. Finally, there is a "universality" claimed that is based on neither the actual distribution of common traits nor the generally acknowledged validity claims, be they general or particular. Rather, this type of universality is based on *idealized assumptions* that are supposed to be constitutive of human agency. This version of universality gives rise, then, not only to the construct of rational economic man, but also to the ideal moral spectator, or the utilitarian legislator employing the felicific calculus.

By employing this last version of universality two moves are made that have important consequences for a "foundationalist account" of "morality." Instead of the agreement among real persons (even if they are somewhat "abstracted" from some of their properties), the perspective developed by the device of an ideal spectator usually involves the idealized actor per se. Kant's transcendental deduction establishes what constitutes "good will"; Rawls's "veil of ignorance" provides us with a *hypothetical agreement among hypothetical (ideal) actors* that would marshal (unanimous) assent. It is obvious that under such circumstances the metaphor of (voluntary) agreement has entirely lost its meaning as the problem has shifted from providing for some grounding for voluntary commitment to the ascertainment of what represents a proper "cognition" or proof. After all, nobody would employ

the metaphor of "agreement" in describing the assent mathematicians give to a theorem in their discipline.

The second move consists in eliminating entirely the issue of our "moral sense," or what Hume calls the "sentiment of approbation," and avoiding the determinations of who counts as the "we" representing the set of relevant others whose assent has to be sought. This is all the more surprising, as we have known since Hume that "oughts" are not simply derivable from what "is." If the "feeling of (dis)-approbation" (Hume, 1975a) indeed plays a crucial role in our moral judgment then it is hardly excusable that the question of what role sentiments play in the constitution of the social and moral world has been so neglected. It is here that Hume's theory of sentiment (Baier, 1991) and the role of "imagination" (Ferreira, 1994) in extending our sympathies to *particular* "others" becomes relevant, as does his conception of "history."

At the risk of oversimplifying Hume's thoughts, which show great subtlety (Whelan, 1985), I will provide an outline of his argument, which involves three steps. One consists in the demonstration that the love of "humanity" does not provide sufficient pull for motivating action. As Hume suggests in the *Treatise:*

> In general, it may be affirmed that there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such independent of personal qualities of service, or of relation to ourself. There are no phenomena that point out such a kind of affection to men, independent of their merit, and every other circumstance. (Hume, 1978:481–482)

The rejection of the motivating force of an abstract ideal does not mean for Hume that "there is no human, and indeed no sensible creature, whose happiness or misery, does not in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours" (ibid.).

As Hume is quick to point out, however, such a concern transcending our simple self-interest proceeds not via abstraction—that is, the arriving at the "universal" by stripping the "other" of all that situates him or her. Rather, our concern springs from "sympathy" after our "imagination" has engaged us in the concrete, genuine "other" that we thereby encounter (Ferreira, 1994:48–51).

This is Hume's second step. "Imagination," often also our "heart" in Hume's parlance, engages our feelings and dispositions, which, in turn, motivate action, but this activity does not proceed reductively. "It is more affected by what is particular, than by what is general" even if it involves a turn away from our own immediate concerns (Hume, 1978:579–580). To that extent sympathy is as far removed from abstract universality as it is from simple empathy, from the imaginary reconstruction of how we would feel if we were in the other's shoes. In both cases we would never encounter the real "other" but would remain captive to our representations of the other,

which consists in seeing "ourselves" in specific circumstances, or of conceiving of him in terms of a "stripped-down" version of ourselves. For Hume, there remains a distance and our engagement with others results from our extensions of sympathy to others in *their particularity.*

This argument is then further fleshed out in Hume's conception of "interest." While again submersion of private and public interests is rejected, Hume is equally clear that the public interest stands for something that is "not our own only" (Hume 1975a:218f). Thus at the basis of the public interest we find again "public affection," the extension of our sympathy to others, which makes the public interest coincide neither with simple private desires nor with the "identity" of interest among the others. Rather, interest is what remains "between us" in the sense of the term "inter-esse" rather than what makes us identical.

> Hume's appreciation of the role of imagination in interestedness is appropriate for two reasons. First, what is inter-esse is a relationship which is posited rather than discovered as fully actualized; what is between us is not a simple given which we need to recognize—it is rather a creative appropriation. Interestedness is thus imaginative. In a real sense it is not there till we make it there or allow it to be there. . . . We must allow ourselves to be captivated by what is potentially, but not yet there—only imagination gives us access to possibility. Second, Hume's understanding of the moral mode as one of captivation implies a recognition that what occurs is neither simply willed nor simply something that happens to us against our will. His notions of "decisions of sentiment" rejects traditional dichotomies, and supports his appeal to imagination, for imagination it has been argued, is precisely what we need to appeal to and appreciate if we are to transcend dualisms between active and passive, reason and will, or reason and feeling. (Ferreira, 1994:49)

These considerations lead us to Hume's third point: the appreciation for "history" as an account of these mediations that engage our will as well as our sentiments, and that make up the artifices that sustain the order of societies through time. Such an account may exhibit patterns and sequences in which the present arrangements can be understood in terms of their developments from some antecedent conditions. But such an account provides for neither a conception of history as an ultimate judge, which is both common to the "Whig interpretation of history" (Butterfield, 1965) and to Schiller's conception of *Weltgeschichte als Weltgericht,* nor does it bear out the foundational claims advanced by the project of the enlightenment, as exemplified in Kant, Hegel, or Marx, about some hidden *telos.*

In his *History of England* Hume proceeds both critically and constructively in telling the story that leads to the rule of law and the guarantee of individual liberty. He is critical of the traditional wisdom, which sees in the historical struggle a morality play between the forces of good and evil, between progress and reaction. By showing that the Stuarts did not act any differently than "good old Bess" and that their situation had been rendered

more precarious by the Tudors' mismanagement of the public domain, Hume opposes the ideology of the "Ancient Constitution," "the natural liberty of Englishmen," and the self-serving arguments of partisans of the 1688 settlement. The constructive element lies in Hume's advocacy of moderation and his claim that he is a member of no party. Only by transcending the traditional divisions between court and country and between authority and liberty, only by focusing on the rule of law, can Hume detach himself from parties of his days as well as from the conceptual fetters that limited the arguments on the important constitutional issues. Only through moderation, Hume argues, is one able "to increase our zeal for the public" and bring about adherence to a constitution whose justification cannot be based on external reasons, save those that finally contributed to a settlement in which liberty under the rule of law was historically established. As Don Herzog points out:

> Adherence to this constitution, although it has no imposing pedigree, is justified. The rationale for obedience lies not in the constitution's longevity, but in its usefulness. The constitution provides for the rule of law, which saves England from the perils of civil war and yet preserves liberty. It is thus a very good solution to a genuine historical problem: worlds without it are worse than the world with it. With this fittingly simple conclusion to Hume's analysis of English history, we see how justification works in a concrete social context. We need not escape the world and fly to language or God, or mirages labeled the greatest happiness. Justification can proceed as an exploration and evaluation of possibilities in the world. (Herzog, 1985:201)

Such contextual justification seems at first weaker than appeals to immutable or universal premises, but it does so only if we have already accepted both the project of the enlightenment and its premise, that is, that outside of appeals to nature, reason itself, or the "contract behind the veil of ignorance" there is no viable basis for agreement. History tells us otherwise, as actual societies have functioned even though they were not built on universal precepts or uncontrovertible deductions. Given the importance of sentiments to the emergence of the "artifice" of a community and thereby the partiality with which we extend our sympathy to others, it would indeed be strange if such extensions would follow the logic of the foundational accounts. Besides, the appearance of rigor in foundational accounts quickly dissipates not only when we interrogate the actual historical record but also when we examine critically the (ideo-) logical foundations of such enterprises.

CONCLUSION

These considerations provide at least four lessons in regard to our investigation of citizenship. First, as a gatekeeping concept determining the

"inside" and therefore creating the "outside" (Walker, 1993) for our analytic frameworks, citizenship has always been a place of struggle. It provided a site within certain discourses where this struggle could be waged by determining not only issues of membership and participation, but also delineation of "private" and "public" spheres. As Etienne Balibar reminds us,

> history still shows that this concept has no definition that is fixed for all time. It has always been at stake in struggles and [has been] the object of transformations; not only because, as Aristotle has already shown, each political regime builds the distribution of powers into a specific definition of citizenship, but also because, in juridically . . . delimiting a certain type of "human being" and a certain model of rights and duties, this definition crystallizes the constitutive social relations of a society at the level of the individual. (Balibar, 1988:723)

The second lesson of the history of citizenship is not that it follows a path of evolution as depicted by Marshall and others. Such a perspective is largely the result of exempting the "story" from various disturbing anomalies. The issue of women is a striking counterfactual to the argument of an unfolding universality. It is not so much that women were "simply omitted or forgotten" but rather that the main constraints on women's citizenship resulted from the institution of marriage, in which rigid subordination was institutionalized (Vogel, 1991:78). Redressing this imbalance, therefore, not only necessitates the conferral of certain preexisting "social rights" directly on women—instead of tying them to their status as wives—but the actual modification of the "private sphere" and the relations that have developed on the basis of this separation. Again Hume is in this respect an innovator long before his time by explicitly rejecting patriarchal authority in the family in favor of *parental* authority (Hume, 1978; Baier, 1991).

The upshot of this argument is that rather than seeing citizenship as a status or attribute of persons, it might be better to conceive of it as an "instituted process." As Margaret Somers concluded from her study of citizenship in eighteenth-century England,

> citizenship is a set of institutionally embedded social practices. . . . [A]lthough modern citizenship is normalized by national and universal laws rather than corporate and particularistic laws, it is not in practice exclusively a national and universal institution. Rather citizenship emerges from the articulation of national organizations and universal rules and varying political cultures of local environments. . . . Thus citizenship is reconceptualized as the outcome of political, legal, and symbolic practices, enacted through relational matrices, universal membership rules, and legal institutions that are activated in combination with the particularistic political cultures of different types of civil societies. (Somers, 1993:589)

But what was true of England in the eighteenth century is even more true of our time, when the conceptual boundaries between state and nation, between state and civil society, between state and the economy, and between

states themselves (in the case of newly emerging "communities" such as Europe) are being called into question. A study of citizenship can map some of these changes, but having abandoned the illusions of foundationalism it cannot point us to a predestined *telos* whence all these changes can be understood or the conflicting duties can be reconciled once and for all.

The third lesson consists in the realization of the following dynamics. Since the processes of inclusion and exclusion, of mobilizing differences vis-à-vis "outsiders" and homogenizing differences within the group, is constitutive of the notion of both identity and citizenship—as status is assigned on the basis of these criteria—it is inevitable that tensions will result from drawing such boundaries. Attempts to mediate these tensions in the fashion of Montesquieu by positing simple concentric circles of "belonging" are unlikely to succeed. (Montesquieu, 1985, Vol. 1:28; Cohen, 1985). As Chris Shore has pointed out:

> European Union requires not simply the erosion of national barriers to trade, or the free movement of capital and labor, but the elimination of all those barriers that actually constitute the nation-state. . . . Thus, the precondition for the emergence of a true "People's Europe" becomes the dismantling of the nation-state and its associated ideologies of nationalism. The assumption here is that while *benign,* and "purely cultural" expressions of national identity are to be welcomed (as part of what the Maastrich treaty calls "the flowering of cultures"), the construction of a new Europe ultimately requires the dismantling of the sovereign nation-state. This idea clearly contradicts the functionalist model . . . of European integration as a non-conflictual, segmentary-type of cohesion between complementary tiers of authority. (Shore, 1993:787)

The fourth lesson is: If it is true that modern polities are different from face-to-face communities in that they are "imagined communities," then two further problems need elucidation. One is the role of "imagination" in this process and its captivation by particular traits rather than by abstraction, as Hume pointed out. The second problem has to do with the process by which these imaginary extensions become imbued with sentiments of approval and value. Thus, while constructivists and postmodernists have shown the "mythical" nature of modern nations relying on the construction of a common ancestry, they seem largely to believe that by exposing the "irrational" elements of such constructions, their job has been done. Implicit in this approach is then an argument that since something is the work of imagination, *anything is possible,* because anything seems to be imaginable. But while the first part is certainly true, effectively dispelling the notion that there is an essence or ultimate reality to which our imagination and symbols "correspond," the second part or conclusion does not follow. The reason for this is that such an argument fails to account in a systematic fashion for the constitutive nature of our *sentiments* in these constructions. Again, Hume provides here a much-needed corrective to the bias that a social theory can

be based solely on cognitive foundations. But leaving unanalyzed the feelings behind the thoughts, the issues of sympathy and approbation, of solidarity, and, unfortunately, also of hate, is not simply an omission. It is to fail in the very effort of providing a coherent account of social reality. However, this last issue will have to be taken up on another occasion.

NOTE

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PART 4

CONCLUSION

11

Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?

Friedrich Kratochwil

The author of a conclusion in a book of compiled research can follow various strategies in showing the coherence and relevance of the individual contributions. On the simplest level he can summarize them in the hope of showing that cumulatively they represent "new knowledge" that is related to the focus of the collection instead of having just the covers of an anthology or the personal acquaintance of the various authors in common. He can go farther and analyze some themes and show how their variations in the individual contributions follow a certain logic. Or, most radically, he can demonstrate how the various contributions represent actual "building blocks" of a new theory.

While the latter strategy is obviously the most ambitious and, at first sight, also the most promising for establishing a new research program, there is always the danger that individual contributions thereby get "normalized." Thus, rather than stimulate our thought and reflection they prematurely become parts of a "whole" that soon turns out to be a chimera. This danger is all the more salient if the new research program is based on "imports" from other fields since it is possible that neither the concepts nor the methods of the new imported research focus might be clear or applicable.

To avoid the most obvious of these pitfalls it seems advisable here to orient the concluding remarks to answering the following three interrelated questions: (1) To what extent is the "return" of culture a significant element with the potential for theoretical development rather than a mere fad? (2) (related to the first question): What is the intellectual purchase of the conceptual link between "identity" and "culture" for social theory? and (3) What are the implications of these two questions for a research program in world politics?

In a way these three questions are related to the elements in the title of this book: _return, culture and identity,_ and _international relations theory._ Furthermore, by organizing our concluding thoughts along these lines, the

significance of the "themes" appearing in the various contributions can be appraised as they are placed in the larger context of continuing debates not only in international politics but in social theory in general.

THE QUESTION OF FAD

In a field that is not exactly known for its theoretical sophistication, in which intellectual fashions seem to change nearly as fast as the styles of couturiers in Paris, London, or Milan, one would indeed be inclined to belittle the "return" of culture as just another indicator of changing tastes. As such, the phenomenon is either not susceptible to critical appraisal (*de gustibus non est disputandum*), or, more cynically, it can be explained by either the understandable desire of another "fringe group" to carve out a position vis-à-vis the dominant paradigm, or by the equally problematic tendency of the established center of the discipline to pour old wine in new bottles. In the latter case, what was the "regime" a few years ago and has been resold to the public more recently as an "institution" is suddenly brought back, presumably "new and improved," as an "idea" whose power has to be ascertained, and from there it is then only a small step to "culture."

While such a depiction of the developments in the field are a caricature in that they highlight by distorting some salient characteristics, there is more to the story than either the playing out of changing fashions or the pathologies of the sociology of knowledge. First, given that culture's influence is pervasive, we would expect that an interest in culture is particularly noticeable after large-scale dislocations occur that call into question the traditional ways of understanding social reality. To that extent, wars are prime candidates for reflection and reconstitution of the political and social realms, but so are other, more subtle and more "natural" occurrences.

Among the more subtle influences "inventions," such as the ascendancy of new forms of communication, have occasioned various important investigations into the impact of, for example, printing on the success of the Reformation; national consolidation; and of the institutionalization of dissent (*samizdat*) against totalitarian attempts of control. Similarly, the advent of electronic media might not have brought about the "global village," but it certainly has influenced how and what we perceive as "news" and how various forms of functional organizational networks relate to each other in the international arena. For example, the integration of financial markets on a world scale and the new interdependencies created by the globalization of production have led to discontinuities and new forms of organization that pit not only "states" against "markets," but in the inversion of the logic of our predominant mode of understanding politics, makes states increasingly price takers rather than price makers (Stopford et al., 1991). Similarly, the encounter of others by either "discoveries" or migrations necessitates often

painful adjustments in our self-conceptions and in the way we think the world works or should work.

If "who" we are is crucially related to how we see and experience others, then the influence of "culture" is less ascertainable on the level of discrete events than on the more abstract level of cognition and appraisal. This does not mean that events are not important and that they should be downgraded, as in the historiography of the *Annales* school, in favor of the investigation of the elements of the *longue durée*. After all, sudden natural events such as earthquakes or the outbreak of diseases have a demonstrable impact on the course of history and the way we understand it.

In perhaps one of the finest studies of the interaction of natural events and political outcomes mediated by abrupt cultural changes, Thucydides traced the impact of the plague on Athenian politics and the fortunes of war. On the most obvious level the plague robbed Athens of its most talented statesmen and thus provided the opportunity of mindless and ambitious imperialist ideologues, as exemplified by Cleon and Alcibiades, to attain positions of leadership. But beyond these historical events, perhaps the most devastating impact of the plague was the "change in the meaning of the terms of political discourse" that Thucydides so admirably analyzes (Thucydides, 1972:155f) and that, in turn, explains the subsequent revolutionary pathologies and the accession of immoderate leaders to power.

Far from representing a mere personal preference or question of "taste," questions of culture and identity have been always part and parcel of our analysis of the social world. Like the bourgeois gentilhomme we might, after all, have spoken the prose of culture all along. What needs explanation, then, is not so much the "return" of culture but the intermittent episodes of "amnesia." This leads me to a second point that is relevant in our assessment of faddism.

If this hypothesis is correct, then reflecting on earlier "returns" provides us with valuable clues as to the similarities and differences in the periodic returns and episodes of amnesia. Since there are obvious length limitations for such a survey let us begin with the formative years of the "discipline" of international relations itself and branch out from there, if necessary.

In one of the first modern statements of the realist agenda, E. H. Carr not only contrasts "utopia" and "reality" but argues that they represent two different styles of thinking, which explain a variety of other significant facts of politics, as, for example, the "left–right" division, the distinction between "theory" and "practice," and the difference between "intellectuals" and "bureaucrats" and their decisionmaking style is seen as the outcome of these different orientations (Carr, 1945:Chap. 1). Thus realism in its modern version contains right from the beginning not only a claim that "power" (never properly conceptualized but used as a cipher) is the "reality" of politics. It also contains an additional argument concerning the importance of a "code" that determines ontological and methodological problems and normative

questions alike. Apparently neither Carr nor his followers realized that such an argument is then at odds with the proposition that reality is simply "out there" and can be grasped by pointing to it and used for the assessment of a theory by comparing the conceptual constructs with the "underlying" reality.

Similarly, when Hans Morgenthau claims universal validity of his power politics he has to address his early critics, who argued for American exceptionalism and the less-than-universal applicability of the precepts derived from the practice of the European nation-state. Morgenthau dealt with these objections by employing two devices involving "culture": (1) the construction of a "tradition" that ranges from Kautilya to Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes to the present; and (2) the argument that the Philadelphia Convention simply "replaced one constitution, one sovereignty with another one, both resting upon some pre-existing community" (Morgenthau, 1967:499).

Both gambits involve some highly contestable moves. As R.B.J. Walker has shown, much of the realist "tradition" dissolves when we engage the actual texts of Machiavelli and Hobbes, for example (Walker, 1993). Such an enterprise—rather than showing us the existence of some canonical wisdom—proves mostly that theorists differ fundamentally on key conceptual issues. Thucydides was certainly no simple realist of either the first- or third-image variety despite some references to human nature and the "growth of power" (Garst, 1989; Johnson-Bagby, 1994). It would also be extremely hard to press his observation of the stasis of political systems and their repercussions for international politics in the procrustean bed of a second-image theory. Similarly, Kautilya's positional logic of enmity and amity among political rulers has very little to do with the internal and external balancing behavior within the European state system.

Morgenthau's second gambit not only denies the originality of the "Philadelphia System," constructed in conscious opposition to Hobbesian notions of sovereignty (Deudney, 1995) and the Westphalian ordering principles, it also flies in the face of the historical record, which establishes the role of the constitutional order in the making of the "first nation" (Lipset, 1963). Like liberal theorists before and after him—as strange as it sounds—Morgenthau settles the issue of the complex interaction between a community (nation) and the state by the simple assumption that one (state) is simply the "form" of the other (community/nation). While such a move provides Morgenthau with ample ammunition against proponents of "utopian" world-state, world-government proposals, it creates its own puzzles.

In view of the later realist move of inverting this precedence by becoming thoroughly "statist," it is legitimate to ask whether "realism" represents a coherent "tradition" of its own. Furthermore, the "neglect of nationalism" problem, identified in Chapter 6, cuts off realism from some of the most important dynamics of the international system. Rather than encouraging

research and empirical investigation its dismissal by (neorealist) scholars creates an eerie silence. Finally, if the state is the "form" of the community or nation, it is not clear why the "national interest" should not be crucially related to the very conceptions of identity and interests of these communities rather than to some positional considerations or to the abstract convention called "power," in terms of which allegedly all interests can be measured.

The double reduction of "goals" to "security" and of "security" to "power" conceived as a distribution of resources has been rightly attacked both by power theorists (Baldwin, 1983) and international relations specialists (Buzan and Jones, 1981). In this context Wolfers's early criticisms and his insistence that "milieu goals"—rather than simple power considerations—form an irreducible part of international politics (1962:Chaps. 5 and 10) have lost nothing of their critical bite in spite of the subsequent ascendence to theoretical hegemony by the neorealist orientation.

Indeed, it is in this context of national and personal identity that the "cultural" made its most explicit appearance both in the political discourse and within the organization of knowledge (academe). The need to justify both the pro-English bent of U.S. policy and the rather deliberate violation of neutrality laws to a reluctant public led in this period to a campaign against the "hyphen Americans"—that is, groups that advocated traditional neutrality. Not only was such a campaign directed at casting doubt on the loyalty of such groups, it also further cemented the cultural preponderance of the "Anglo-Saxons" who thereby became, virtually by definition, "true" Americans. This cultural card was then again played with virtuosity by Churchill during World War II and in the beginning of the Cold War.

Similarly, the dislocations of World War II and the Soviet threat were originally conceptualized by Kennan's famous X telegram not as a primarily military threat, but as a threat to American society and its conception of a free community (Kennan, 1947). It resulted in the creation of unprecedented multilateral institutions in the North Atlantic area after the hopes for universalist solutions had faded (Ruggie, 1993c) and it led to the establishment of "American studies" in the academy, but it also engendered in its paranoic deformations the loyalty oaths and the McCarthy witch-hunts concerning "un-American" activities.

Given these responses—ranging from international institutions to the pathologies of McCarthyism—one wonders perhaps what is left out. Obviously something that explains everything explains nothing. Have we not embarked on an endless journey that leaves us ultimately at sea? These are certainly troubling questions that dash euphoric visions that "culture" can be the panacea for our theoretical woes. Such hopes are not only misplaced in this particular case, where an inventory has yielded some 128 different definitions of culture for the period 1871 to 1987 (Vijver and Hutschemaeker, 1990), they are misplaced in general, for obvious reasons.

First, general, intelligible fields of study are not theorized themselves and thus do not determine the appropriateness of various approaches within them. Rather, they present some widely recognized problems that more specific "theories" try to solve. Second, amorphous phenomenal domains need not necessarily be useless as a "field," as the phenomenon of "power" suggests. Power presumably pervades social reality from the level of discourse to that of coercion, from false consciousness to agenda-setting, but this pervasiveness has not impelled us to discard "power" as an important problem. On the contrary, it has encouraged a variety of theoretical efforts and is thus one of the strongest justifications for theoretical pluralism (Lapid, 1989).

In this context, the difference between "naming" and providing a proper theoretical place (mentioned in Chapter 6) becomes relevant. No theory of culture---even if it was available—can substitute for one of politics, nor can any theoretical effort of bringing culture into international relations analysis be conceived as a simple application of some ready-made construct to a set of phenomena. In the next sections I will elaborate on these problems in two consecutive steps. The first concerns the claim that a focus on culture and identity creates a more specific and useful focus for directing substantive research in international politics. The second will draw out the methodological implications of the return of culture and identity.

THE QUESTION OF CULTURE
AND IDENTITY AS A RESEARCH FOCUS

In probing the theoretical purchase of identity and culture the peculiarity of the present "return" comes into sharper focus. A preliminary observation is helpful in this context. At first blush it seems rather ironic that the term "identity," which used to denote "sameness," has become the focus of attention and political action, as it is the new insistence on "differences" that determine new groups and their patterns of conflict and cooperation. It is precisely the emphasis on the constitutive nature of this identity search and the displacement of these seemingly only "psychological" issues onto the political arena that makes the present preoccupation with cultural factors different. To that extent, the identity problematic in its political implications seems intrinsically linked to the problems associated with the end of modernity. A brief discussion is helpful in this context.

Individuals have always faced the problem of identity—how a "self" can be sustained throughout all the changes of a lifetime. This problem, however, was supposed to be addressed by the "biography," where its narrative establishes continuity and the frame of reference of the person. Although such constructions are largely personal, biographies are not necessarily highly individualistic, nor are they simply "private" matters. The example of individuals in primitive societies (or even of most of the "com-

mon people" in status societies), whose biographies are largely circum-
scribed by their respective statuses and roles and the various passages from
one to the other, shows that a "biography" might have little to do with our
understanding of individuality, or even of personal glory (kudos), character-
istic of the Homeric world and the epic form in which such biographies are
found.

The examples of kings and the *populo grasso* in status societies (men-
tioned Chapter 2) demonstrates that neither various "passages" nor individ-
ual interests or achievements need to be only a "private" matter. Thus the
passage of a young aristocrat through marriage could cement an alliance and
continue the dynasty or establish a new house, which could compete for
public power by means of its legitimate claims to succession.

These examples drive home several lessons. Perhaps the most important
is that, contrary to our predominant understanding of the individual and
society in which "society" results from aggregation of individuals, there
seems to exist a much more intimate conceptual link between the two as they
are mutually constitutive of each other. Alexander Wendt's constructivist
argument in Chapter 3 and the present agent–structure debate further elabo-
rate this point.

In addition, our understanding of this co-constitution seems to be linked
to particular cultural forms, ranging from the rituals (rites of passage) to
roles (status hierarchies) to forms of narratives (epic, biography). Ann
Tickner examines in great detail in Chapter 8 the role gender plays in the
constitution of the political space that we traditionally associate with the
interstices of well-established communities. The point is not only that tradi-
tionally particular "virtues," such as martial prowess, have been associated
with international politics but that our conceptions of gender roles influence
both our practices of inclusion and exclusion in decisionmaking and our
ways of understanding social reality.

Finally, and connected with these two observations, understanding the
complex relationship between the individual and society requires not only
an understanding of the complex structure of co-constitution but an appreci-
ation of the historical changes that occur in the importance and weight of
these elements. Thus the different natures of "politics" and of the modal per-
sonality that emerges after the dissolution of a status society have been part
of an intense debate in political theory concerning the role of possessive
individualism and the establishment of liberal political institutions
(Macpherson, 1962). Indeed, the conceptual apparatus for understanding
"modernity" is tied to the distinctions between state, civil society, individu-
als as rights holders, and role conceptions that distinguish the "citizen" and
the "bourgeois." Chapter 10 considers some of the relevant historical
changes through the notion of citizenship as a constitutive prism.

However, given that the project of modernity was largely inspired by
the Enlightenment, which conceived of the restructuring of individual and

society largely in terms of "negative freedom" (Berlin, 1969), it is not sur-
prising that increasingly only the linkage of the now-unencumbered indi-
vidual and the constitution of groups on the basis of "identification" became
the focus (Bloom, 1990). Although the "psychologization" of the problem-
atic contributed a useful corrective to the standard liberal accounts of the
formation of "society" through contract and aggregation, it nevertheless
constituted a considerable narrowing of the focus away from symbolic sys-
tems and their organization to the dynamics of the individual psyche. Insofar
as "history" entered at all it became the tale of stages of development and of
the highly speculative assumption that individual and social formations fol-
low the same path—that is, that ontogenesis and phylogenesis mirror each
other. While the individual had thereby gained considerably more depth than
in the liberal version, it had lost much of its cultural component, which tied
it to particular systems of meaning.

Undoubtedly such a focus was suggested by the crises of modernity. On
the level of the individual, otherwise unexplainable compulsions of suppos-
edly "free" individuals arouse interest. On the level of society, the emer-
gence of a mass public and of crowd behavior also suggested new patholo-
gies deeply rooted in individual disorientation. After all, the "distinguishing
feature of mass society is not the size or density of a population but the qual-
ity of participation . . . where the texture of human relations is thinned as
more and more people become rootless, detached, mobile" (Selznik,
1992:188).

Both issues served as the focal points of the Freudian program and
strengthened the bias that social phenomena have to be explainable in terms
of individual characteristics, attitudes, or orientations. As a matter of fact,
the term "identity" (as opposed to "personality" or "individuality"), made its
appearance only four decades ago in the writings of Erikson (1950, 1980).
He attempted to capture the "social–psychological" dimension of the per-
son, but argued for its rootedness in the dynamics of the individual psyche.
Originally its central question followed the old Freudian tradition of
explaining what traits enabled a particular person to become a "leader" of
individuals, who by identifying themselves with the leader become a group,
or—less euphemistically for Freud—a "horde." This approach has on the
one hand spawned Erikson's own psychobiographical studies of Luther
(1958) and Gandhi (1969), and on the other hand gave rise to the studies of
the "authoritarian personality," the explosion of social psychology, and the
"moral development" of children pioneered by Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg
(1981).

In this context it is interesting to note some recent trends related to our
discussion. First, there has been a trend away from more individually con-
ceived studies to those that increasingly emphasize the complexities of pat-
terns and their internal logic for understanding the individual and social
world. Quite different from the earlier concept of "socialization," in which

ready-made "cultural patterns" were somehow ingrained in individuals during childhood or "training," the moral development literature emphasizes the ability of actors to use the cultural templates in complex patterns of reasoning and justification for solving dilemmas. Rather than the individual's motives or learned behavior, it is the productive capacity of individuals to use moral codes in an intersubjectively justifiable fashion that has become one of the main research foci. In quite a similar fashion there has been in anthropology and sociology a shift from viewing culture as "patterns of behavior" and from the idea that it is a summary conception of the distribution of individual "attitudes" in a population, to the notion of "culture" as a "symbolic and historically transmitted system of shared meanings" (Geertz, 1973:89; Schweder and LeVine, 1984).

Second, there is a certain unevenness in the social sciences in their attempts at addressing issues of culture and identity. While in anthropology questions of culture are obviously central, in both sociology and political science cultural issues are sequestered to subfields and specialists and thereby often fail to make a lasting impact on the "mainstream." Thus even books that include sophisticated contributions on race, class ideology, and so forth by well-known authors fail to reorient mainstream international relations analysis (Walker, 1990b). Nowhere is the "disciplining" force of the dominant paradigm, as mentioned in Chapter 6, more apparent than here.

Third, and related, reception has been largely a function of the saliency of political issues rather than of sound theoretical criteria. Thus books written from the perspective of the "revolt against the West" (Bozeman, 1960) had a certain readership, as had Said's *Orientalism* (which could be conceived as part of this trend) and Huntington's recent dire warnings about the coming clashes of civilizations (1993). Although such works provided helpful criticism of the "ethnocentrism" of the "enlightenment project" and a useful reminder that allegedly universal values and institutions were far from enjoying the undivided approval of the rest of the world, such a treatment of culture and identity did little to advance a more general social theory.

If the self is dependent on the other in its constitution, and if stereotyping occurs in this process, then the more important aspect of this dynamic is less connected with the individual level of cognition and more with the role the other plays in discourse and the practices of a given society. As Inyatullay and Blainey remind us in Chapter 4, a variety of strategies is possible on this level, ranging from rejection to tutelage to acceptance. No leap from individual cognition to outcomes, no inference from the structure of the dialectic of "self and other" to particular outcomes seems illicit without further specification. The unsatisfactory nature of reducing the dynamics of culture to individual attributes is perhaps best brought out by popularity and the failure of the *Civic Culture* (Almond, 1963). Aside from the inductivist ad hocery in specifying which types of attitudes were supposedly related to

the political performance of a system, the "causal" paths of how cultural factors were to influence "levels" of satisfaction with the performance of the system were somewhat naive. To argue that people revolt if they are dissatisfied suggests some commonsensical interpretations of events—it is hardly a social theory.

The positivistic and individualistic bent of much of this type of attitude research neglects crucial elements of conceptual interconnectedness and historicity within the symbolic universe that provide some suggestions of why "private" issues attain "public" support. It thus fails to inform us why and when dissatisfaction leads to protest rather than withdrawal; it is also oblivious to structural elements that weigh heavily in the equation. Governments not only possess the means of coercion that, aside from their potential effectiveness in breaking determined dissent, create a collective action problem for opponents, but they have also at their disposal various means of representing the difficulties leading to dissatisfaction as the result of "outside" interference and as threats to the very identity of a society. Wendt's and Campbell's arguments (in Chapters 3 and 9) that as antecedent to interests, questions of identity are crucial and have to be addressed by a theory of politics, add emphasis to this point. Campbell's suggestion that the historical situation of the end of the Cold War and its attendant confusions result not only from the absence of an enemy but reach deeper into the controversies surrounding the definition of national identity along "multicultural" lines deserves further conceptual as well as empirical investigation.

In any case, these shifts in emphasis away from the individual psyche to the social roots of both culture and identity have significant repercussions for both the substantive and the methodological dimensions of a research program in international politics, as will be shown in the next section.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
THEORY-BUILDING IN WORLD POLITICS

Our discussion, which so far has been ostensibly directed at answering the charges of being faddish, has yielded, at least indirectly, several other corollaries that are important in outlining the positive heuristics of a new identity and research program for world politics. These corollaries can be conveniently discussed under the three rubrics of "system," "historicity," and "meaning."

While such a grouping might be justifiable for giving greater clarity to the discussion, I want to make some additional points in this context. One, I claim that these concepts provide not only a lexical ordering for various phenomena of theoretical import, they are theoretically linked. Bringing out these linkages in the discussion to follow is in itself a first step in developing a better understanding of world politics. In other words, it is precisely

for these linkages that viewing culture as a historically transmitted system of meanings provides a powerful theoretical focus.

Two—perhaps to the surprise of many—I shall argue that given the centrality of these three concepts and their attendant linkages, theoretical progress is more likely when we pay attention to their ontology through clarification and elaboration than when we pursue the methodological route. The subordination of methodology to ontology not only saves us from some egregious epistemological errors, it also provides the justification for advocating "responsible" methodological pluralism, a point forcefully made in the "Third Debate" (Lapid, 1989).

Systems

That systems and meanings are conceptually and historically linked should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the development of structuralism out of Saussurian language theory. It was precisely the recognition that the meaning of a sentence is not given by the sum of the words and their respective referents, but rather by their structure and their syntactic chaining, that added to the persuasiveness of the structuralist paradigm. In a way it seemed to have solved some of the puzzles of "sense" (meaning) and "reference" that plagued the strict correspondence theory of truth since Frege. In a generalization of some of the solutions to problems in set theory Frege had shown that "meaning" can exist without a referent, as in an algebraic function, which, although it has no entity for which it stands, nevertheless has "meaning." This led to his general attack on the notion that to be meaningful concepts must name objects. (To that extent Waltz's justification of the crucial role of "unobservables" echoes some of these arguments.)

It is one of the ironies that needs further exploration that "structuralism" entered international relations analysis not in the form pioneered by language theory—which would have entailed a more thorough rethinking of positivist methodologies—but, rather oddly, via the microeconomic analogy. To that extent the problem of "meaning" had virtually disappeared, at least from the manifest research agenda. Furthermore, buttressed by a rather odd interpretation of reductionism, all elements concerning the actors' intentions, purposes, or ideas were ruled out as inappropriate explanations. It was "anarchy" and "power" that were now privileged in the predictive accounts of the systemic theory. What remained was the ahistorical conception of a complete system analogous to the Saussurian conception of *la langue* as opposed to the actually spoken word (*la parole*). Finally, true to positivism, it was postulated that the persistence and operation of the system could be understood in terms of observable shifts in capabilities.

Such a theoretical posture was problematic for several reasons. Let us just consider here only those directly relevant to issues of meaning. Contrary

to its own understanding, "meaning" plays a crucial role in Waltz's systemic theory. On the level of deep structure it is the institutional rule of sovereign equality that establishes anarchy. Even on the surface level, that of capabilities, it is the analogy to money that gives "power" its purported explanatory force. But, as we all know, money is not a thing but a shared convention that not only provides a medium of exchange for goods and services but also establishes the systemic character of their independent transactions via the price level

Oddly enough, the criticism of structural realism began with attention being called to the importance of the second level of structure neglected by realists because of the alleged functional equivalence of the units in the system. As Ruggie suggested, however, cultural formations do matter, as it is the principles on the basis of which the various units are differentiated rather than anarchy that explains much of the dynamic of the system. To that extent, Chapter 6 investigating the historically contingent relationship between state and nation that fundamentally redefines the sovereignty game, expands on and generalizes Ruggie's critique. Similarly, Deudney's reflections in Chapter 7 on the role of "place" in constituting viable political actors and on the potential of ecological movements in this respect suggest a different conceptualization of system, its dynamics and thresholds for transformation. All these contributions insist that the limitation to either changes in polarity or to the transformation of "anarchy" into hierarchy leads to a rather anemic theory of international politics and to a restricted set of the underlying puzzles.

Alex Wendt's chapter elaborates on his previous criticism of the explanatory power of anarchy. His thought experiment, relying on symbolic interactionism rather than the Hobbesian premises of conceiving international politics as a n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, shows that it is not anarchy but rather the historical sequence of moves that explains patterns of enmity or amity among a multiplicity of actors. "History" provides not only a richer account of the interactions—a "richness" that can be sacrificed on the altar of a theory's parsimony and power—but also crucial information about the presences of the actors and their choices. To that extent, the "strategy" derived from the logic of anarchy or from criteria of rationality in the theory of games badly models the problem that decisionmakers face in choosing a strategy. The fact that we speak in both cases of "strategy" should not blind us to the fact that it is used equivocally (Weber, 1992). "Strategy" in the game theoretical sense means a choice given certain preferences while "strategy" in the second sense means choosing a course of action that aims at altering the adversary's preferences and concept of self-interest. It is therefore an issue of high theoretical significance that cannot be sacrificed on the altar of the misunderstood ideal of parsimony (Dessler, 1989).

Chapters 4 and 5 take this criticism further and, in a way, turn it against

Wendt himself and his thought–experiment. If individual preference forma-
tion has to be endogenized then not only the historical sequence but also the
repertoire from which the interacting parties choose has to become part of
the critical reflection. But such a critical reflection always exceeds the
abstractions of the "original" interaction and of the psychology of the indi-
vidual actors. It pushes the analysis necessarily toward the structures of
meaning that we call culture. In this sense Chakrabarti Pasic's criticism
advances analytically as well as historically. By tracing the "anarchy" dis-
cussion of the British school of international relations to its roots in the civ-
ilizational debates of the Royal Institute she constructs a systems theory that
is not only indebted to the "systems of states" literature but is systemic in a
much more fundamental sense than Waltz's microeconomic analogy.

History

It is perhaps no accident that the question of "culture" and identity most
clearly comes to the fore when we focus on problems of change. After all,
one of the persistent criticisms of "systems" theory—especially in its func-
tionalist version—has been its static character and the concomitant privile-
gization of synchrony over diachrony (Giddens, 1979). Some of these prob-
lems result from the misuse of the notion of equilibrium in social theory
since the times of Spencer and Pareto. Imported from physics, where it
means entropy (system-death), equilibrium in the social sciences was used
to explain "order" or "system-integration." Clearly, we face here a major
confusion.

Some of these problems can be corrected if an open systems perspective
is chosen (Bailey, 1994), a move that dispenses with classical equilibrium
analysis. Nevertheless, at least in international relations analysis, the prob-
lem of what systems are and how they reproduce themselves remains woe-
fully underspecified. International relations analysis relies for such purpos-
es largely on loose organic metaphors of growth and decay (Gilpin, 1981;
Kennedy, 1987) and problematic analogies, such as evolutionary selection.
The result of such stratagems is not only that this type of analysis consider-
ably narrows our understanding of "history," but that our analysis is increas-
ingly mistaken.

Let us examine in this context the use of natural selection prevalent in
international relations analysis. The upshot of the argument is that the eco-
logical pressures of the environment promote "sameness" and that, there-
fore, the second level of "structure" needs no further examination. A
moment's reflection shows that there are at least two problems with such an
interpretation.

Even on its most narrow reading, "selection" in biology is not entirely
determined by "ecological" factors. As Monod suggests, to argue otherwise
is a "completely mistaken conception," since the selective pressures exerted

by outside conditions "are in no case unconnected with the telenomic, i.e., internal regulatory performance characteristic of the species. Different organisms inhabiting the same ecological niche interact in very different and specific ways with outside conditions (among which one must include other organisms)" (Monod, 1972:125f).

While this argument draws attention to such factors as, for example, symbiosis, even more damaging to the argument of selection among social formations is the fact that successful forms are the result of learning and emulation. Both processes operate on the level of the exemplar, not on that of the species, and both involve cognition rather than adaptation in terms of the changing composition of a gene pool. Thus, not only do states not exist in any of the large numbers that would be necessary to make the argument of natural selection even vaguely plausible, any argument about the reproduction and change of the system will have to take cognitive (reductionist!) factors very seriously. Thus "history," even in its narrowest meaning of the record of change, is not simply the playing-out of some logic of combinations (as Saussure suggested) or the unfolding of some teleology destined to head toward the "end of history." The lack of reference of the precise way in which change takes place encourages the notion of an "unfolding"—so familiar from the everyday experience with living beings—and of a smooth and virtually automatic sequence of stages.

Finally, and certainly most puzzling to anyone only vaguely familiar with the theory of evolution, is the argument that ecological pressure leads to "sameness" rather than specialization. While homogenization within a species that has found an ecological niche might be one of the side results, the *logic* of the evolutionary argument obviously points in the other direction—that is, toward greater differentiation and specialization in the forms of life. Thus, if "sameness" is indeed the fact of life in international politics, it has to be explained, as it is "surprising" and contrary to the drift of the evolutionary argument.

Given these objections, whose force is so compelling because it addresses such elementary issues, it is indeed surprising that Waltz's "structural theory" was so successful in becoming the hegemonic discourse on international relations and that the "back to the future" argument enjoys a certain popularity. Here, perhaps psychology and cultural analysis, rather than systems and history, provide some preliminary answers.

As Freud suggested, arrested personal development is characterized by a "repetition compulsion," in which the repressed traumatic experience is constantly subconsciously reenacted. Rather than leaving the individual free to experience life, to take his or her licks and joys, and to go on with his or her life within an open horizon that makes room for new experiences, the compulsion condemns him or her to the eternal return of the same. Although the "back to the future" (Mearsheimer, 1990) experience is appropriately buttressed by evidence, it is largely produced by the enactment of a self-ful-

filling prophecy. There is indeed something very disturbing in the ease with which Waltz and his acolytes often jump from the possibility of war based on "anarchy" to policy recommendations that have to be based on something considerably more compelling—a largely illicit claim about probabilities. Equally disturbing is the rigidity with which "history" is then bent to fit the theory rather than to test or modify it (Fischer, 1992; Hall and Kratochwil, 1993).

A theory sensitive to culture tells us that the sameness of "traditional" societies has little to do with evolutionary pressures, but rather with the conscious favoring of the past over the present and future. The past, for example, reproduces itself through the action of the actors looking at a history understood and recorded in paradigmatic terms. The same approach also tells us that this process of reproduction will be altered by "modernity," in which new sources of change appear that make the past increasingly unlike the present and thus less apt as an example to be imitated. But again, the resulting process is hardly one of unfolding stages, evolution, or simple diffusion, in which the "new" is victorious over the old way of life (even if both the political and economic development literature of yesteryear sometimes suggested such imagery).

Consider in this context Wehler's argument of "defensive modernization" (1987). As a historian of German social and political development Wehler uses this concept to describe the reforms Prussia and other German states adopted in response to the French revolution and the Napoleonic challenge. Far from leading to liberalization it nevertheless provided the impetus for the modernization of Germany, not only as an unintended consequence. Similarly, the most spectacular change in recent history, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, is perhaps best understood in terms of such a (misfired) counterreformation strategy rather than as the result of nonexistent changes in the distribution of capabilities (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994). Other (more successful) examples of the same genre are the Meji Restoration and the coup of the Young Turks (Burke, 1992:Chap. 5). These considerations suggest that there exist two major problems with models of social evolution or growth. One is that they make little reference to the actual way in which change occurs, that is, how actions change social structures. The other is the unwarranted assumption that changes in the systemic structure will always have the same historical consequences or meaning. This gives rise to the arguments about the end of history, the coming of "modernity," the end of ideology, and so forth. In short, the hopes of the Enlightenment that through the abolition of constraints on human actions man will move from the realm of necessity to that of freedom are then paralleled by the pessimistic visions of the resurgence of the primordial in the revolt against "the West" and the coming clashes of "civilizations."

The first mistake is easier to correct than the second. Students of political development have over the last two decades rather successfully attacked

the first mistake through more detailed historical research and comparison. Besides, there has always been at least a minority position in developmental studies that focused on the problem of identity in the nation-building process (Pye, 1962). For many, if not most, international relations scholars, however, history is still, in the memorable words of Henry Ford, "mostly bunk." This does not mean that IR treatises are not peppered with historical "data," but the use of "history" shows mostly a confirmationist bent rather than critical distance and theoretical sophistication.

It is therefore useful to examine various international systems in their historical context, as Ferguson and Mansbach do in Chapter 2. At a minimum, such an effort shows the great variation of "polities" and their interaction patterns and it warns us of the dangers that allegedly "neutral" terms—such as "unit"—pose for conceptualizing and understanding international politics. Rather than seeing always the same as suggested by "neutral" terms we had better pay attention to the bundling and unbundling of authority relations that are part and parcel of domestic and international political life. In particular, such a historical narrative counteracts the amnesia induced by the conceptual grid of a state-centered systems theory. The fact that "ethnic/cultural fatalities"—even by conservative estimates—reached the 10 million mark for the period 1945–1974 alone—with no indication of improvement afterwards—(Isaacs, 1979:3f) should give us pause for viewing classical war as the main problem for our theory, or even as the most important manifestation of conflict resulting from group fragmentation (anarchy). Similarly, it should caution us in calling the bipolar configuration of the system "stable" without much ado, only because the patterns of violence did not coincide with the canonized conceptualization of fragmentation: states.

Consequently, beyond setting the record straight, a conceptualization sensitive to the historical nature of world politics will have to address the problem of change by examining directly the constructs underlying various historical narratives. This entails the escape from the teleology of the Enlightenment accounts, as well as from the reification of historically specific notions, such as the sovereign state, treating them as a manifestation of some eternal structure. What is required, rather, is the interrogation of the *discourses* themselves, within which the notions of identity and change, sovereignty, community, and internal and external order function. Chapter 10 attempts such an interrogation by examining the conceptual changes of the gatekeeping concept of citizenship. R.B.J. Walker reminds us in the context of sovereignty that

> To come to terms with state sovereignty, to understand the limits of the way we speak about it and to ask what kind of sovereignty is possible or desirable now, is necessarily to come to terms with deeply entrenched philosophical principles, of which state sovereignty is only one expression. The

more encompassing philosophical principles rest on a claim to be able to fix a point of identity—a universality in space and time—against which all the differences . . . can be measured, judged, and put in their place. The principle of state sovereignty organizes this historically specific resolution into a spatially differentiated . . . dialectic. Within states, the relation between universality and particularity may be resolvable. It may be understood as a dialectical interaction between state and civil society, a dialectic amenable to both totalizing closure or a democratic opening. Between states, irresolvable contradiction is guaranteed. Consequently, challenges to the principle of state sovereignty cannot be understood only as challenges to a historically specific account of what it means to engage in political community. They must also involve a questioning of the grounds on which that account . . . has become reified. . . . More crucially still, they must lead to a questioning of the processes through which the spatio-temporal claims of state sovereignty both reify and are guaranteed by a historically specific resolution of the relationship between universality and diversity. (Walker, 1990a:175)

This leads us directly to our third point, the question of "meaning" for both the reproduction of social systems and for explaining their functioning, a problem that will now be addressed.

Meaning

At the simplest level the problem of meaning arises in the context of understanding human action. To know what somebody is up to we have to reconstruct the choice situation from the actor's point of view and map the goals and alternatives open to him. This is Weber's argument about the need to conceive of action "subjectively" and "rationally." "Meaning" here is little more than finding a way of representing an action in terms of the assumption of rationality defined as goal maximization. Sure, explanations might misfire, as the actor either chooses the wrong means, given the goals he pursues—putting butter on a fishing line instead of a hook and flies or worms is unlikely to result in catching fish—or the completed action gives us, the observers, pause as to whether the actor's presumed or professed goal was actually governing the observed action. Thus selling at cost is not necessarily irrational if we have reason to believe that the actor acted altruistically (and thus had a different utility function) rather than pursuing his narrow self-interest.

This simple account provides several lessons for resolving some of the seemingly endless controversies. First, rather than modeling the actor's actual motives, the intentional account is not one of empathy and gaining access to the private world "inside" an actor's head. Rather, an intentional account is always an "interpretation." After all, not even the actor might be able to correctly assess his motives, or he might have a strategic interest in disguising them. To that extent empathy as well as the actor's own utter-

ances might be helpful in understanding, but they do not have automatic precedence or claims to validity in the construction of the intentional account.

Second, given these problems, the "rationality" principle simply provides the categorical frame for understanding an action. But since we adjust our search for alternative goals to find more fitting explanations, we hold this principle constant. Therefore, being "irrefutable" it cannot be part of any substantive theory that is supposed to explain the action in question. To that extent the persuasiveness of the "rational choice" perspective derives from its categorical force in understanding action, not from its power as a substantive "theory" of action, which only would derive from an empirically founded utility theory.

Third—as a corollary to one and two— since the intentional reconstruction of action is always an interpretation rather than an attempt to gain access to the private motives, unintended consequences are only understandable against the background of intentional action—thereby casting doubt on the status of systemic explanations that are solely based on unintended consequences. Furthermore, much of the force of the argument for radical methodological individualism (that is, that all explanations have to be reducible to individualistic action accounts or properties) is thereby undermined. While the first corollary is intuitively clearer, the second will require further investigation. In other words, this discussion leads us back to the question of culture conceived as a detailed symbolic system of meaning, versus the notion of culture as an aggregate of individual beliefs and attitudes.

Let us begin with the argument that since "systems," "states," and so forth do not exist in the social realm, only people exist, assertions about systems states have to be reducible to statements of individual characteristics. In a way, this stance is the corollary of the reference and correspondence arguments of language and theory respectively. As particular concepts have to refer to given objects in the "outer" world, so theories have to "mirror" nature or reality. There are at least three difficulties with this position.

First, as already discussed by Frege, there is the problem of meaning and reference, which shows that meaning cannot be reduced to reference. Second, this stance suffers from the shortcoming of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The "individuals" we encounter in theories—whether economic or sociological matters little—are not concrete persons bounded by their skin, but rather *constructs* whose ontology is largely derived from their function in theory rather than in everyday life. The *homo economicus* is the most salient example. Finally, the construction of ontological objects is not only a function of theory-building but a part of our everyday language. Thus it would be pedantic to point out that no "train" actually exists, since there really exist only coaches and engines, or that the "broom" in the corner is really only a brush with a handle (actually not even a brush, since the brush

itself is composed of bristles, wire, and the plate). How far we aggregate or disaggregate to create "objects" for reference depends on a variety of (pragmatic) considerations ingrained in our everyday language, and the hope of finally getting down to some incontrovertible "atoms" that are objective because they refer to "brute facts" in the outer world is futile indeed. The meaning of a term and therefore its "objectivity" is guaranteed by its use and the intersubjectivity of language that rules out idiosyncratic uses or a merely private world of reference.

This does not mean that the intersubjectivity of meanings provided by everyday language is the same as what we consider in politics to be a consensus. After all, through its presumed intersubjectivity language provides precisely the location where meanings can be contested and conflicts can arise. People might then not only disagree in their judgments whether or not *x* should be counted as a *y* (for example, that a given sculpture is truly "art"), they might also contest the criteria according to which we use the term "art" and thus constitute the meaning of art itself in our discourses.

The difference between the conception that treats culture as an aggregate of beliefs and investigates its codes can be seen in Wuthnow's analysis of legitimacy. While, for example, in Almond's *Civic Culture* questions of legitimacy revolved around the conditions under which a set of practices is deemed "right" by some significant aggregate, legitimacy in the cultural code approach entails not primarily "a matter of subjective belief but . . . an exchange relation . . . that has symbolic aspects containing an identifiable structure comprised of symbolic boundaries" (Wuthnow, 1987:81). To that extent legitimacy is present when these boundaries are maintained and allow for the expenditures of resources in return for moral reward.

It is precisely this shift of meaning from the subject (beliefs and consistency) to the system, whether to language, discourse, or culture (coherence according to an identifiable code), that brings to the fore the power of conceptual connections. This, in turn, spawned interest in the notions of hegemony and the disciplining power of discourses, and finally in the redefinition of the identity problem after the discourses of law, sexuality, normalcy, and so forth had been unmasked as structures of domination.

Although the power of ideological formations (Gramsci) and discursive practices (Foucault) are real enough, I think we need a more fine-grained approach for understanding the co-constitution of self (identity) and society. The universal suspicion of power or the search for a victim—not "the victim of something but the pure victim as the figure of irreversible difference," the "cry" as Wlad Godzich suggests (1974:28f)—will not do for an organizing concept of our research program. Despite all of its postmodern rhetoric, such a cry for liberation remains solidly within the old emancipatory logic of the Enlightenment, but it fails in answering the question how this new "self" and its project of an identity are supposed to proceed. Crying is not much of a program! As Habermas correctly points out, Foucault shows little

appreciation for the positive role of law—even criminal law—in protecting individuals or in distinguishing between a repressive socialization and one that produces authentic and competent persons (Habermas, 1987:290).

Our investigation of the problem of meaning has up to now proceeded by showing that meaning, although part of intentionality, is reducible to neither the (psychological) motive of an actor nor to a simple problem of reference. The first issue introduced the problem of interpretation, the second the embeddedness of "sense" within a larger framework (such as language) so that no referential point in the outer world needs to be specified for a term to make sense. Particularly in the spoken language this problem becomes obvious. When I say "Hi," the term has meaning not because it refers but because I am greeting someone and understanding what the term means then—being familiar with the practice and following its rules.

Similarly when I demand, or appoint, or even threaten, the meaning of the terms is clear not in virtue of their capacity to describe something in the outer world but by communicating an "action." We are *doing* things rather than merely describing them (Austin, 1962). Speech act theory calls such words "performatives." The meaning of the action is contained in following certain rules that are constitutive of the practice (such as signing a paper and thereby committing oneself to the performance of a contractual duty). This part of "meaning," then, is still compatible with, and similar to, the concept of meaning contained in codes (although it *does* raise some interesting new issues beyond the structural arguments of codes). But what if the meaning of an utterance can often only be assessed by the effect an utterance has on the audience? Only if my "No" frightened you were you deterred; only if you change your actions have I persuaded. Here neither the "locutionary force"—the sense of what is said—nor the illocutionary element—the doing things with words—but rather the *perlocutionary* aspect of meaning—its effect on the hearer—is in focus. Thus if we are interested in the meaning of an utterance we must investigate the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary forces of speech acts.

To ask what something means, therefore, is "to invite by way of reply an elucidation of the 'total speech act' . . . in which what is s̈aid is inextricable from *how* it was said. . . . Force and meaning are mutually embedded" (Inglis, 1993:97). To that extent Skinner's and Pocock's reconstructions of the history of political ideas follows in methodology and intention the speech act theory outlined earlier. It studies influential texts not only in terms of what the author attempted to say, but also in assessing both what was thereby being done and how what was said affected the audience. Far from being a study of the history of "ideas," conceived either as disembodied entities or as subjective representations, such an approach connects individual and society via meanings in action. Nicholas Onuf (1989) has shown how this type of analysis can be brought to bear very fruitfully on the analysis of international politics.

Within this grid the question of the politics of "(self)-identity," characteristic of the postmodern predicament, can now be outlined. The first problem to note is that the self and its reflexive monitoring have become the main locus for establishing identities. Different from traditional societies, in which what you are is determined by your social status, modernity has stripped away the "thickness" of the traditional social self. As my argument in Chapter 10 indicated, the loss of status was either compensated by a new fervent identification with the nation or the distanced segmented participation in "national affairs" characteristic of liberal thought was predicated on the conception that well-socialized people would be sustained in a "thicker" identity by their nuclear families, kinship, and friendships. Such rootedness would counteract the possibility of manipulation, rootlessness, and alienation that are the consequence of "thin" social bonds.

But not only has modernity weakened such primary associations, global influences have thoroughly penetrated the local and familiar, and new modes of control have created possibilities that were far from imaginable in former times. The implications of widespread interdependencies are an example of the first; the possibilities of subjecting, for example, the body to an entirely new regime, remaking it instead of conceiving of it as a naturally given, even radically restructured notions of gender, as Ann Tickner shows, are indicators of the second.

These possibilities create a new reflexivity that makes it necessary for the self, more than ever before, to become its own "author"—that is, the individual must be capable of generating a coherent narrative of self-identity in the face of these massive changes. It is not surprising that this multiplicity of "options" is experienced by most as overwhelming. Shortcuts out of the dilemmas of choice are more popular than ever. There is certainly no lack of claimants to authority, ranging from self-help books to gurus to celebrities, whose commodified life-style provides some "image" to be emulated. Personal problems are increasingly part of the changed public sphere, which tends to marginalize matters of collective common concern in favor of those that concern some or all of us singly.

But despite the multiplicity of "help" and advice, these sources lack precisely what "authority" means: an assurance that comes with amplification (*auctoritas* is based on *augere,* to increase, amplify), that is based on accepted ways of dealing with life's choices. Providing a larger menu is not tantamount to suggesting a sensible diet. To what extent the realization of ecological decay can provide a crystallization for a new consciousness, for new conceptions of community and new "selves" Deudney hints at, remains to be seen. Similarly, Campbell interprets the difficulty in making clear choices about national security as the result of the ongoing struggles to redefine the American identity. Again, whether this redefinition will lead to a more inclusive definition, or whether it will strengthen a more narrow, but more specific identity is an open question.

Whatever the outcomes of these controversies might be, it is clear—at least when seen from the heights of the "American empire," whose cultural forms have been diffused throughout the globe—that a change in the nature of politics has taken place. The agenda of emancipation and life chances, characteristic of modernity, seems to be contested by the postmodern concern with life-styles. Giddens dubs this the emergence of life politics and suggests that "life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes, a self-actualization in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realization influence global strategies" (1991:214).

Thus, in terms of the metaphor of the ship of culture "coming in," or, given the fundamental changes, the possibility that we are simply "at sea" with no safe harbor, no unequivocal destination for anchoring, we had better think that what is important are not the fixed points on the shore but our sense of who we are, what we want to become in going where we want to go, as well as the capacity of the ship of carrying us through the waves of uncertainty. This, then, is the best service the "ship of culture" could provide for all of us.

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About the Book

Unanticipated epochal events associated with the demise of the Cold War have prompted the recognition that the post–Cold War order is transforming itself culturally even faster than it is changing geopolitically or economically. Within this context, this volume explores the scope and promise of the "return" of culture and identity to the IR theoretical agenda.

The authors address a series of questions: What explains the sustained lack of interest in culture and identity in IR theory? What is the case for rethinking the contemporary theoretical reach of these concepts? What are the most productive ways of defining them—elusive as they are—and integrating them into research endeavors? And, finally, what are the risks, if any, associated with implementing the intellectual swing of pendulum documented and advocated in this book?

Though clearly not endorsing any form of cultural determinism, the contributors concur that the incorporation of a carefully sensitized culture/identity optic can serve as an important corrective to IR scholarship in an era of turbulent global transformation. Significant disagreements notwithstanding they share the conviction that it is difficult to exaggerate the political and intellectual stakes involved in questions of culture and identity.

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